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Resumo  
O presente trabalho examina a ancoragem afectiva da língua-nativa (L1) e da 
segunda-língua (L2), e como estas influenciam de forma diferente processos intra-
individuais, inter-individuais e intergrupais. No primeiro capítulo enquadramos o trabalho na 
abordagem da Cognição Social Situada propondo a aplicação das suas premissas à 
comunicação linguística. No segundo capítulo revemos estudos que mostram diferenças no 
processamento de L1-L2 concluíndo que, provavelmente, estas línguas não são 
corporalizadas da mesma maneira.  
No primeiro capítulo empírico examinamos esta premissa em dois experimentos de 
primação afectiva. Observámos efeitos de congruência apenas em L1 para pares de palavras 
primo-alvo, e em L1-L2 para pares de palavras/fotos (expressões faciais). Estes resultados 
sugerem diferenças na ancoragem afectiva de L1-L2 e que a presença de expressões faciais, 
facilitadoras de processos de simulação afectiva, anula os constrangimentos impostos por L2. 
O segundo conjunto de três experimentos revelou que L2 induz distância social e um 
processamento mais abstracto. Para além disso, a distância social induzida por L2 foi 
mediada por um construal-level mais abstracto, o que é consistente com a natureza 
descorporalizada de L2. No último conjunto de dois experimentos observou-se que a 
avaliação de frases de conteúdo afectivo, apresentadas em L1-L2, depende da sua valência e 
da pertença grupal dos alvos descritos. A simulação afectiva (medida com EMG) foi mais 
intensa em L1, e para o in-group, e as diferenças na simulação de frases do in-group/out-
group foram realçadas em L2. O último capítulo apresenta os resultados principais, seus 
contributos e limitações, e sugestões para investigação futura. 
 
Palavras-Chave: Cognição Social Situada; Corporalização; Bilinguismo; Segunda Língua.  
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Abstract  
The present work examines the affective grounding of first-native (L1) and second-
learned (L2) languages, and how they differently impact intra-individual, inter-individual and 
intergroup processes. In the first chapter we framed our work in the Socially Situated 
Cognition approach, and proposed the application of its assumptions to linguistic 
communication. In the second chapter we reviewed literature showing the differences in 
processing L1-L2, and concluded that these languages are not likely to be grounded in the 
same way.  
In the first empirical chapter we examined this assumption in two affective priming 
experiments. Congruency effects were observed only in L1 for prime/target word pairs, and 
in L1-L2 for pairs of word/photos (facial expressions). These results suggest different 
groundings of L1-L2, and that the presence of facial expressions, that facilitate affective 
simulation processes, may overrule L2 constraints. The second set of three experiments 
revealed that L2 induces social distance and a more abstract type of processing. Moreover, 
the social distance induced by L2 was mediated by a more abstract construal-level that is 
consistent with the disembodied nature of L2. The last set of two experiments indicates that 
the evaluation of sentences with affective content, presented in L1-L2, depends on their 
valence and on the group membership of the described targets. Affective simulation 
(measured with EMG) was more intense in L1, and for the in-group, and differences in 
simulation of in-group/out-group sentences were enhanced in L2. The last chapter presents a 
summary of the main findings, their contributions and limitations, and suggests future 
research directions. 
Key-words: Socially Situated Cognition; Embodiment; Bilingualism; Second-Language;  
American Psychological Association (PsycINFO Classification Categories and Codes) 
2300 Human Experimental Psychology 
2340 Cognitive Processes  
2560 Psychophysiology  
2720 Linguistics & Language & Speech 
3000 Social Psychology
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General Overview  
In an increasingly globalized world people talk, read and listen to information, make 
decisions, try to persuade others, acquire, produce and distribute knowledge. This happens in 
a multilingual, multicultural world where distances and differences are shortened trough the 
utilization of a common language.  
While the current reality of multicultural societies requires the participation in two (if 
not more) linguistic communities research has been emphasizing the relevance of 
understanding how one processes, comprehends and experiences first-native (L1) and 
second-learned (L2) languages. If these languages have different affective groundings, as we 
shall argue, they should have a different impact on intra-individual, inter-individual and 
intergroup processes. The main goal of the current work is to experimentally explore this 
argument. 
Theoretically, the current work rests on two main assumptions. First, we shall argue 
that linguistic communication should be analyzed and interpreted in line with a Socially 
Situated Cognition approach (SSC; Semin & Garrido, 2015; Semin, Garrido, & Palma, 2012, 
2013; Semin & Smith, 2002; 2013; Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). This approach emphasizes 
a macro level of analysis of social-cognitive phenomena and considers the joint impact of 
body, mind, physical and social context on cognition (e.g., Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & 
Ruppert, 2003; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Smith & 
Semin, 2004).  
In Chapter 1 we review the traditional and symbolic perspectives in social cognition 
from a critical point of view, describe the SSC approach and apply its assumptions to 
linguistic communication. Namely, we argue that 1) linguistic communication is an emergent 
phenomenon; 2) language is a tool for adaptive action; 3) language is a tool to distribute and 
extend cognition, allowing for the offloading of cognition into the environment, individuals 
and groups; 4) language is a tool for social coupling, and communication is biologically 
grounded; and 5) language comprehension is embodied, being grounded on sensorimotor 
experiences. We explore this last assumption in greater detail, by reviewing embodied 
theoretical accounts of language (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; 2008), and by presenting evidence 
from behavioral, psychophysiological and neuropsychological studies demonstrating that 
understanding both concrete and abstract concepts entails at least partial simulations of 
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perception (e.g., Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), action (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) and 
affective states (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009).  
Second, we shall argue that first-native and second-learned languages are not 
embodied in the same way. This assumption will be detailed in Chapter 2. Our argument 
relies on the fact that L1 and L2 usually have different socialization histories. L1 is typically 
learned early in life in rich emotional contexts (e.g., family life, with peers), which generally 
integrate information from all sensory modalities. L2 is frequently acquired in more 
emotionally neutral settings (e.g., school, work) that do not offer many opportunities for 
affective socialization, and it is learned and used without significant involvement of the 
majority of sensory modalities (e.g., Harris, Gleason & Ayçiçeği, 2006; Pavlenko, 2008; 
Perani & Abutalebi, 2005).  
We explore this idea by reviewing the main studies in the bilingualism and 
embodiment domains that suggest the higher emotional intensity and the stronger affective 
grounding of L1 over L2. More specifically, we review evidence showing that L2: may serve 
a distancing function (e.g., Movahedi, 1996; Santiago-Rivera, Altarriba, Poll, Gonzalez-
Miller, & Cragun, 2009); is usually associated with reduced self-reported emotional intensity 
(e.g., Dewaele, 2004, 2008); induces lower skin conductance responses (SCRs; Harris, 2004; 
Harris, Ayçiçeği, & Gleason, 2003) at least for taboo words and childhood reprimands; is 
associated with an impaired recall (e.g., Anooshian & Hertel, 1994); triggers less automatic 
processing of affective content (e.g., Degner, Doycheva, & Wentura, 2012; Segalowitz, 
Trofimovich, Gatbonton, & Sokolovskaya, 2008); and leads to less biases in decision-making 
and to more rational choices (e.g., Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa et al., 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, 
& An, 2012).  
We then present evidence from recent studies suggesting that the affective grounding 
of L1 and L2 may be different, since affective simulation does not occur to the same extent in 
both languages (e.g., Foroni, 2015). Finally, in the end of this chapter we present a critical 
view of the main findings, we propose specific methodological improvements, and we 
advance some suggestions regarding future studies. 
Based on the theoretical accounts and empirical evidence (reviewed in Chapters 1 and 
2), we argue that L1 and L2 are not likely to be affectively grounded and simulated to the 
same extent. Consequently, we suggest that intra-individual (i.e., how one processes affective 
information), inter-individual (i.e., how one perceives and evaluates others in terms of social 
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distance), and intergroup (i.e., how emotional information about social groups is simulated 
and evaluated) processes are shaped by the different groundings of L1-L2. These ideas were 
tested in several experiments presented in three empirical chapters - Chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
In Chapter 3, we examine the empirical question of whether the affective processing 
of L1 and L2 is grounded to the same extent. Previous evidence suggests that affective 
priming effects rest on the affective grounding of language Specifically, the activation of 
facial muscles in response to valenced visual prime stimulus facilitated response to congruent 
targets when muscular resonance was not blocked (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2012). Consistently, 
the same muscle activity was observed in response to verbal stimuli, which shaped 
subsequent affective judgments when there was potential for motor resonance (Foroni & 
Semin, 2009). 
In Chapter 3 we present two affective priming experiments. In Experiment 1 we 
investigated the affective processing of native and second languages by using valenced words 
as primes and targets, and by asking participants to complete two blocks of trials - one in L1 
and one in L2 - with order of presentation counterbalanced between participants. Participants 
were then instructed to evaluate as quickly and accurately as possible the second word 
presented. In Experiment 2 we also examined the potential role of emotional facial 
expressions on the simulation of L1 and L2 words. Participants were presented both with 
L1/L2 words-photos (facial expressions) and photos-L1/L2 words pairs and were asked to 
evaluate the second stimulus presented. 
In Chapter 4 we examined the impact of the linguistic context (L1, L2) on judgments 
of perceived social distance from fictitious and real social targets (i.e., the experimenter). We 
suggest that construal-level should be the mechanism explaining the relation between 
linguistic context (L1, L2) and perceived social distance, relying on two main arguments. 
First, in L2 (vs. L1) the availability of sensorimotor information is reduced (see for a review 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation), and this type of information constitutes a low-level 
characteristic of a situation (Maglio & Trope, 2012). Thus, we reasoned that L2 should 
activate a higher level mindset than L1. Second, higher (vs. lower) construal-level induces 
higher perceived social distance between the self and a target (Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 
2011).  
We test these assumptions in three experiments, in which linguistic context was 
manipulated by asking participants to write a short neutral story either in L1 or L2. Social 
4 
 
distance was measured both as familiarity and similarity to the self (Experiment 1) and 
resources allocation (Experiment 3). Construal-level was measured both as conceptual level 
of processing using the Behavior Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) in 
Experiment 2, and as perceptual level of processing with the Shape Task (Kimchi & Palmer, 
1982) in Experiment 3. In these experiments we have also considered the role of L2 age of 
acquisition as an important moderator of linguistic context effects. 
In our final empirical chapter (Chapter 5) we investigated the impact of group 
membership and language on the affective simulation and judgments of emotional sentences. 
Previous evidence suggests that group membership impacts both emotional mimicry (e.g., 
Bourgeois & Hess, 2008) and judgments (e.g., Beaupré & Hess, 2003) when emotional facial 
displays of social targets are presented. Based on this evidence we had three main goals in 
this chapter. First, to examine whether the effects of group membership on emotional 
mimicry and judgments are also observed when presenting linguistic affective stimuli (i.e., 
emotional sentences), since language comprehension also entails affective simulation (e.g., 
Foroni & Semin, 2009). Second, to investigate whether language impacts affective simulation 
and judgments, since L1 and L2 are suggested to have different affective groundings (e.g., 
Foroni, 2015). Finally, to examine whether the effects of group membership on affective 
simulation and judgments are modulated by the language in use.  
In two Experiments, we asked participants to make judgments of intensity, probability 
and valence of happiness and anger-related sentences. Sentence described both in-group and 
out-group targets and were presented both in L1 and L2. In Experiment 2 the activity of the 
corrugator supercilii (i.e., associated with frown) and zygomatic major (i.e., associated with 
smile) muscles was also recorded through the use of facial electromyography (EMG). 
Finally, in Chapter 6, we present a summary of the main findings, highlight the 
contributions of the present research, and discuss the impact of this research for the 
bilingualism and embodiment fields. Additionally, we present the limitations of this work and 
suggest future research directions to investigate the embodiment of L1 and L2 and its 
implications for intra-individual, inter-individual and intergroup processes.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON LANGUAGE AND COGNITION 
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It is virtually impossible to imagine human life without communication. People use 
communication to express what they feel and what they think, to make decisions, to talk with 
old friends and to make new ones, to persuade others, to tell the truth, and to lie. We 
communicate through words, facial expressions, gestures, touch and signs, and we do so face-
to-face, by phone, writing, texting, by email, video or through social media. Communication 
requires a sender, a message, a receiver, and a channel, and it is situated in a specific social 
context, has a social target, is time limited, and must be linguistically structured through the 
use of social rules and conventions (Semin 2000). Thus, it is not possible to understand 
complex communicative processes without acknowledging that communication has a deep 
social essence: it involves our relationships with others, it is built upon a share understanding 
of meaning, and it is how people influence each other (Vaughan & Hogg, 2014). 
Whereas communication appears to be an “effortless, efficient and reasonably 
accurate process” (Semin, 2000, pp. 599), it is also a complex one. For example, in any 
communicative situation the sender is also the receiver (and vice-versa); and there may be 
multiple, and sometimes ambiguous or contradictory messages, passed through several 
communication channels (Vaughan & Hogg, 2014). Moreover, in multilingual settings there 
may be cognitive costs due to language switching (e.g., Green, 1998; Meuter & Allport, 
1999), as well as misunderstandings due to the violation of social rules, cultural and 
conversational conventions that constrain successful cross-cultural communication (e.g., 
Farnia & Wu, 2012; Al-Zubeiry, 2013). Thus, if one considers all these complexities, human 
communication constitutes a major social accomplishment (Higgins, 1981, 1992). 
Although traditional approaches in social psychology recognize that communication 
mediates much of social behavior, the social, environmental, and bodily constraints inherent 
to the communication process are still largely ignored. Social psychology’s emphasis on 
social cognition and, more recently, on brain processes has led many to consider that the field 
is generally more focused on studying individual information processing, and brain processes 
and structures rather than human interaction (Vaughan & Hogg, 2014). Considering that 
communication takes place in a continuously changing physical and social environment (e.g., 
Semin & Smith, 2002) and that it plays a central role in shaping cognition (e.g., Forgas, 1981; 
Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Semin, 2001), the study of communication, predominantly through 
language, is still under-investigated in social cognition and social psychology (e.g., 
Holtgraves & Kashima, 2008; Vaughan & Hogg, 2014), particularly from a situated and 
embodied point of view. 
8 
 
Recently, the idea that cognition is grounded on the same systems as those used for 
perception, action and emotion has received much empirical support (see for review, 
Barsalou, 1999a; 2008; Glenberg, 2010; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, 
& Ric, 2005; Winkielman, Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008). More specifically, evidence with 
a multidisciplinary flavor revealed that even high-level cognition, such as language 
comprehension, involves (at least partial) simulations of sensorimotor experiences with the 
world (see for review Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Gallese, 
2012; Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012; for special issue see Borghi & 
Pecher, 2011). 
In the following sections we will briefly describe how cognition and language have 
been framed in the traditional Social Cognition perspective largely characterized by amodal, 
symbolic and decontextualized processes (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1984; see also Hamilton, Devine, & Ostrom, 1994), 
and then introduce the Socially Situated Cognition approach, where the physical and social 
context assume a particularly relevant role (SSC; see Semin & Garrido, 2015; Semin, 
Garrido, & Palma, 2012, 2013; Semin & Smith, 2002; 2013; Smith & Semin, 2004).  
1.1. Traditional Perspectives  
1.1.1. Cognition isolated in the mind 
In the late 1960’s, and largely influenced by the ‘cognitive revolution’, social 
psychology attempted to overcome the behaviorist conception of mind as a “black box” 
(Skinner, 1963; Thorndike, 1940; Watson, 1930) that should not and could not be objectively 
investigated. The cognitive approach to social psychological phenomena resulted in a new 
conceptual and empirical approach – social cognition. Reaffirming the importance of 
cognition, social cognition proposed that a full understanding of the social behavior demands 
the identification of the structure and content of mental representations, and of the respective 
underlying cognitive processes (e.g., Hamilton, et al., 1994). Adopting an elementarist 
philosophical perspective and the information processing model, social cognition assumes a 
microscopic, individual, and symbolic approach to cognition (see Garrido, Azevedo, & 
Palma, 2011; Semin, et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 2015) and to communication (see 
H. Clark, 1996; Lindblom & Ziemke, 2007; Semin, 2000). 
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The elementarist perspective (Hume, 1739/1978; Locke, 1690/1979) adopted by the 
early social cognitive approach is characterized by the segmentation and analysis of the 
scientific problems into their several components that, only when subsequently combined, 
permit a global understanding of psychological phenomena. As a result of the cognitive 
revolution, developments on the information processing field allowed the separation of 
mental operations into sequential stages, specifying the cognitive processes that were 
presumed to mediate the presentation of a stimuli and the observed response (Fiske & Taylor, 
1991). The information processing theory adopts the computer metaphor, describing these 
mediation processes in terms of inputs and outputs, encoding, processing, and retrieval of 
information. Most importantly, the computer was adopted, not only as a theoretical metaphor, 
but also as a methodological tool to explain and predict cognitive processes (e.g., Anderson, 
1976; Newell & Simon, 1972; Schank & Abelson, 1977), such as impression formation and 
social memory (e.g., Hastie, 1988; Linville, Ficher, & Salovey, 1989; Smith, 1988).  
The traditional perspective on social cognition methodologically sustains a 
microscopic level of analysis, which is essentially representation- and individual- centered. 
Namely, it argues that cognition is for representation, processing and computation, and 
perceivers are assumed to passively construct, automatically activate, and abstractly apply 
symbolic representations (see Garrido et al., 2011; Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & 
Garrido, 2015). Indeed, according to this perspective, mental representations (i.e., attitudes 
and stereotypes) are activated and applied by relatively automatic processes that are 
independent from the context and the perceiver’s goals (e.g., Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; 
Snyder, 1981). According to Gardner (1987) the major assumption of this “new science of 
mind” is the belief that when talking about cognitive processes one should speak about 
mental representations and to posit a level of analysis separated from the biological and 
neurological, on the one hand, and from the cultural and sociological, on the other.  
This approach was also incorporated in the study of communication, of language and 
in the study of language-social cognition relationship. Many authors have adopted an 
individualist approach for studying language processes, assuming that production and 
comprehension are the result of individuals in isolation producing and comprehending 
language in a vacuum (see H. Clark, 1996). For instance, in a social interaction context, one 
agent might encode his/her mental state into some form suitable for communication, such as 
language, and another agent would receive and decode the transmitted message and thus 
come to an understanding of the first agent mental states (see Lindblom & Ziemke, 2007). 
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Language is thus regarded as “timeless” and “subjectless”, and not as production of any one 
particular speaker (e.g., Ricoeur, 1955). Regarding language in this way made it possible to 
examine the relationship between specific linguistic properties (e.g., lexical semantics, 
grammatical categories) and cognitive process that were also conceptualized as timeless and 
subjectless (see for review Semin, 2001).  
Therefore, despite the important emphasis in the scientific examination of mental 
structures and processes, the traditional social cognition perspective confined the study of 
psychological processes to the cranial vault (see Semin, et al., 2012, 2013). Namely, 
cognitive and communicative processes were detached from the social and physical contexts 
where they take place and individuals were considered passive spectators of the world. 
Notably, the traditional perspective sustains a symbolic approach to cognition and language. 
According to this approach, the mind is a mechanism for syntactically manipulating symbols 
and cognitive processes are disconnected from the body, as described in the next section.  
1.1.2. Amodal Theories  
The computer metaphor adopted by the traditional social cognition perspective 
implies that: a) the mind’s software is autonomous from the body and brain hardware (Block, 
1995; Dennett, 1969) and that b) high-level cognition, such as inference, categorization, 
memory, and language processing is performed using abstract amodal symbols (e.g., Collins 
& Loftus, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972). According to this view, knowledge exists in a 
semantic memory system separated from the brain’s modal systems for perception (e.g., 
vision, audition), action (e.g., movement, proprioception), and introspection (e.g., conscious 
experience of emotion, motivation, and cognition) (see Barsalou, 1999a, 2008). High-level 
cognition is performed using abstract amodal symbols that do not establish any analogical 
relation with the experienced world – they are merely transductions - and do not have any 
modality specific feature. Instead, these symbols make redescriptions of the original 
experiences, establishing an arbitrary relation with the states that produce them (Collins & 
Loftus, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1984).  
For example, when experiencing a member of a category (e.g., a chair) all the relevant 
information arises in the modal systems – perceptual, motor, and somatosensory systems. 
These modal systems correspond to all the relevant sensorimotor information about the 
category: how the chair looks like, how it feels like, the sound it makes when dragging it, the 
actions one can perform with it, among others. When all the sensorimotor information is 
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activated in the respective modal systems, there is a transduction process in the brain, in 
which modal states of different and separated modal systems are transduced into abstract 
amodal symbols. These symbols constitute conceptual contents, which represent knowledge 
about the category of a chair. When performing higher-order cognitive tasks, such as 
language comprehension, these amodal symbols are activated. In sum, amodal approaches 
sustain that when hearing or reading the word chair the transductions of the modal states (i.e., 
the amodal symbols) are activated, and not the original modal states per se (see Barsalou, 
2008). 
Therefore, concepts are represented in our mind in a propositional way, using for 
example properties, statements, frames, and semantic networks (e.g., Fodor, 1998; Pylyshin, 
1973). Two known examples of these amodal theories applied to language are the 
Hyperspace Analogue to Language (HAL, Burgess & Lund, 1997) and the Latent Semantic 
Analysis (LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997). These accounts sustain that the meaning of 
words is learned from their statistical distribution across language, which means from their 
intra-linguistic or word-to-word relationships. In HAL, the statistical distribution of each 
word in a large corpus is defined by its frequency of co-occurrence with other words. For the 
LSA, the statistical distribution of words is defined by its relationship with other words, 
considering whether they appear together and the frequency with which they co-appear in a 
large collection of text documents (see for review Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & 
Vigliocco, 2012). 
Hence, in these accounts, perception, action and emotion are regarded as “low-level” 
peripheral processes, and low and high-level processes are considered as mutually 
independent. Consequently, perceptual, motor, and somatosensory systems are object of 
investigation per se, as peripheral input and output devices, but are not regarded as relevant 
for the understanding of central cognitive processes, such as language processing and 
comprehension. Moreover, perception and action are postulated as separate domains (e.g., 
Pylyshyn, 1999), excluding a possible mutual and bidirectional influence of these two 
spheres, since perceptual processes take place independently from the motor response 
involved. Thus, according to these amodal approaches high-level processes such as language 
use and comprehension are relatively independent of low-level sensorimotor processes, and 
the linguistic context is not relevant for understanding the cognitive processes that take place 
during linguistic communication. 
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1.1.3. Criticisms of the Traditional Perspectives  
The traditional approach of social cognition sustaining that subjects only passively 
perceive – and do not act upon or construct -, the world, and disregarding the importance of 
the “other”, of the physical and social context on cognition, has been largely criticized. The 
focus on cognitive processes detached from the context resulted in an “individualization of 
the social” and a “desocialization of the individual” (Graumann, 1986), leading many 
researchers to question “what is social about social cognition”. Moreover, the traditional 
approach of social cognition has been increasingly criticized for not considering the relation 
between cognition and action, and most importantly, for neglecting the ultimate adaptive 
function of cognition (e.g., Smith & Semin, 2004). Furthermore, the assumption of frozen 
mental representations started to be challenged by evidence showing the relevance of the 
physical and social context on cognition (e.g., IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Norenzayan & 
Schwarz, 1999; Semin, de Montes, & Valencia, 2003; Williams & Bargh, 2008).  
Additionally, although the symbolic approaches are still commonly acknowledged as 
accounts of human intelligence, and also as the engine for artificial intelligence, they have 
been criticized for not being sufficiently statistical, which have led to the development of 
neural net approaches to fill this gap (e.g., O'Reilly & Munakata, 2000; Rumelhart & 
McClelland, 1986). Most importantly, traditional symbolic approaches have been criticized 
for not considering the grounding of cognition on perception, action, and introspection, but 
on amodal symbols. First, although amodal symbols provide a simple way to explain 
complex processes, there is still no direct empirical evidence for the redescription process 
that produces amodal symbols in the brain (Niedenthal et al., 2005). Secondly, current 
empirical evidence has shown the undeniable role of the body and more specifically, of the 
brain's modal systems, on cognition (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & 
Ruppert, 2003; Damásio, 1994; Glenberg, 1997; Gallese, 2003), and language (Barsalou, 
2008; Barsalou, Santos, Kyle, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; 
Zwaan & Pecher, 2012).  
Currently, evidence from research on situated, embodied, and grounded cognition, 
support that most processes are best understood by jointly considering neural, psychological, 
and situational constraints to cognition (e.g., Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 
2015; Smith & Semin, 2004), as it will be described in the next section. 
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1.2. Socially Situated Cognition 
Considering the assumptions supported by traditional theories on social cognition and 
their critiques, it becomes evident that the unobservable “black box” mind feared by the 
behaviorists has evolved to an investigable non-social and disembodied one. This classical 
perspective of the study of mind narrowed to the individual cranial vault (Semin et al., 2012, 
2013) and to abstract amodal approaches prevails even today, and characterizes an important 
and representative share of what is investigated in social psychology.  
However, developments on several different fields had a preponderant role in opening 
the door to the growth of a new perspective - socially situated cognition (SSC; e.g., Garrido et 
al., 2011; Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 2015; Semin & Smith, 2002, 2013; 
Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007). Social psychologists started to broaden their focus of 
investigation emphasizing the relevance of studying other psychological processes - such as 
motivation, affect, personal relations, group membership and cultural differences – and the 
power of the situation, for a more global understanding of the human mind.  
Simultaneously, in robotics, the embodied aspects of cognition were considered, as 
well as the role of social interaction on the construction of an upper-torso humanoid robot 
(Brooks, Breazeal, Marjanović, Scassellati, & Williamson, 1999). In cognitive anthropology, 
Hutchins (1995) declined the peripheral role attributed to culture, proposing an integrated 
approach where culture is a cognitive process, and cognition is per se a cultural process. 
Additionally, Thelen and Smith (1994) showed how multimodal experiences form the 
foundations for self-organizing perception-action categories, and emphasized the notions of 
dynamic representations and processes of change on psychological human development. And 
even cognitive psychology was stage of new developments such as Perceptual Symbol 
Systems Theory (PSS; Barsalou, 1999a) integrating a symbolic approach to cognition with a 
grounded modal one.  
The contributions of all of these fields endowed the Situated Cognition movement 
with a multidisciplinary strength that aimed to refute the ontological Cartesian division 
between subject and object, ego and other, mind and body, which is pervaded by excessively 
individualistic conceptions of knowledge (e.g., Farr, 1996; Graumann, 1986). With the 
rejection of the individualistic paradigm of the traditional theories, SSC attempts to provide a 
systemic approach that links all the elements (goals, emotions, body, and environment) that 
influence and are influenced by cognition.  
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Framed in this perspective, social cognition should be analyzed not as cognitive 
processes isolated from the world, but as resulting from the joint impact of the social context, 
physical environment, brain structures, and bodily constraints. Based on this assumption, 
SSC is grounded on five pillars: 1) cognition is an emergent phenomenon; 2) cognition is for 
adaptive action and mental representations are action-oriented; 3) cognition is distributed and 
extended across the environment and other people; 4) cognition is socially situated, being 
biologically grounded; 5) cognition is embodied, being grounded on sensorimotor 
experiences (e.g., Semin & Smith, 2002, 2013; Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 
2015; Smith & Semin, 2004, 2007).  
Below we describe these assumptions, from a cognition and communication point of 
view, emphasizing the important role of language. Thus, we are going to argue that: 1) 
linguistic communication is an emergent phenomenon; 2) language is a tool for adaptive 
action and co-regulation; 3) language is a tool to distribute and extend cognition, allowing to 
offload cognition into the environment, individuals and groups; 4) language is a tool for 
social coupling, and communication is biologically grounded; 5) language comprehension is 
embodied, being grounded on sensorimotor experiences.  
1.2.1. Linguistic communication is an emergent phenomenon 
The ideas of SSC are not new since they are embedded in previous studies of social 
and cognitive psychology. However, the assumptions underlying the cognition-action relation 
completely changed the level of analysis from micro to macro, once one considers the joint 
impact of body, mind, physical and social context on cognition (e.g., Barsalou, et al., 2003; 
Niedenthal, et al., 2005; Smith & Semin, 2004). Hence, cognition taken as an emergent 
phenomenon is a result of adaptive sensorimotor interactions with specific physical and social 
contexts, which are shaped by bodily and environmental constraints. The SSC sustains that 
the emergent phenomenon is driven by the higher level of organization, namely a situated 
context, and that it is this broad complex context that shapes the way the parts (i.e., individual 
functioning) work and are interlinked. Consequently, cognition can only be apprehended if 
one adopts a macroscopic level of analysis, promoting insights about the whole as a guiding 
perspective to understand the parts (see Semin, at al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 2015).  
Consider the case of language. If one attends only to its constituent set of basic 
components (i.e., phonemes, morphemes, phrase structure), then utterances cannot be 
understood. The combinations of these components generate something that cannot be 
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comprehended only by taking into consideration the individual components in isolation. 
Thus, “situated meaning” is only apprehended through utterances that create something that 
is not present in the discrete components of language (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000; Semin, 
2000). Therefore, the meaning of words in sentences is emergent. It emerges “from the mesh 
of affordances, learning history, and goals” (Glenberg & Robertson, 2000, pp. 388). More 
globally, only a macroscopic level of analysis can account for processes considered essential 
to communication such as common ground (e.g., H. Clark, & Schober, 1992), shared reality 
(Hardin & Higgins, 1996), interchangeability of perspectives (Schutz, 1962), or 
conversational conventions (Grice, 1975). All of these processes make it clear that a 
microscopic - individual-centered - analysis of communication is not sufficient (Semin, 
2000).  
Therefore, SSC represents a shift from a traditional view of social cognition 
sustaining an elementary, microscopic, individual, and symbolic approach, to a perspective 
that emphasizes the emergent nature of cognition, and the need to analyze the boundaries of 
cognition, language and action, from a macroscopic point of view.  
1.2.2. Language is a tool for adaptive action  
The traditional perspective on social cognition based on the information processing 
paradigm involves the construction and manipulation of inner representations, which are 
locked in the cranial vault. This perspective, detached from the physical and social context, 
cannot explain how individuals achieve sociality (intersubjectivity) since an individual-
centered perspective does not account for the active reciprocal and co-regulative nature of 
social behavior (Semin & Garrido, 2015). The socially situated cognition approach thus 
represents a change from the traditional question “What is cognition?” to the question “What 
is cognition for?” with the answer being “It is for action” (e.g., Semin et al., 2012; Semin & 
Garrido, 2015). 
The first assumption of SCC suggests that cognition did not evolve for its own sake, 
but for the adaptive co-regulation (e.g., the regulation of social interaction; Semin & 
Cacioppo, 2008, 2009) and adaptive action in a continuously changing physical and social 
world (e.g., Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 2015). The notion of the adaptive 
function of cognition had a major impact on the shift from the computer metaphor, 
illustrative of the traditional theories, to the biological metaphor. It suggests that cognition 
serves a self-regulatory purpose of an organism searching for the fulfilling of its survival 
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needs, which demands adaptive action in a specific social context (Caporael, 1997; Fiske, 
1992). Accordingly, since humans are social beings their adaptation to the social environment 
(and thus their survival) requires an adaptive regulation of theirs and others’ behavior. 
Therefore, socially situated cognition should explain the processes by which the adaptive 
regulation of others’ behavior and the co-regulation of social interaction are achieved (e.g., 
Semin & Garrido, 2015).  
The capacity to adapt is intrinsically connected to the capacity to communicate. 
Species’ survival depends highly on their capacity to communicate (Krauss, 2002), since 
communication, particularly though language, allows humans to adapt to continuously 
changing physical and social contexts. Language does not serve merely representational 
purposes, but it evolved as a tool to implement cognition in communication by conveying 
meaning (Semin, 2000). Namely, as it is a tool by which one can convey meaning it is the 
mean by which people can ultimately affect each other’s behavior (e.g., Holtgraves & 
Kashima, 2008). Hence, language can be considered as a transformational device by which 
changes in one’s social world can be implemented (Semin, 2000).  
Consequently, language is the means by which action is brought about and thus it is a 
device to implement practical activity (e.g., Higgins, 1981; Krauss & Fussell, 1996). Even 
when language use does not regard a current situation, it may still be a tool for the 
preparation of situated action (Barsalou, 1999b). Therefore, according to the SSC, if 
cognition is for adaptive action, language purpose is to facilitate adaptive action and co-
regulation, by being a tool designed to promote changes in the physical and social 
environment.  
In the last years, studies have revealed the adaptive nature of cognition by 
highlighting the context sensitivity of mental processes. For instance, specific physical 
features of the environment, such as warmth, close distance, and pleasant smells, have been 
shown to impact social cognitive processes (e.g., IJzerman & Semin, 2009; Williams & 
Bargh, 2008). Evidence has also revealed that attitudes are highly sensitive to a multitude of 
contextual effects (for review see Schwarz & Sudman, 1992). Moreover, variables such as the 
communicative context (Norenzayan & Schwarz, 1999), social context (e.g., Wittenbrink, 
Judd, & Park, 2001), context stability (Garcia-Marques, Santos, & Mackie, 2006), social or 
professional roles (e.g., Barden, Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004) and social status activated 
by the context (e.g., Richeson & Ambady, 2001), the target’s appearance (Livingston & 
17 
 
Brewer, 2002), and typicality (e.g., Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Wänke, 1995; Macrae, 
Mitchell, & Pendry, 2002) can modulate cognition.  
Importantly, research has also shown that communication and language are context 
sensitive. Take the following examples. The linguistic intergroup bias effect is described as 
the tendency of people to use more abstract language (e.g., adjectives) to describe positive in-
group’s behaviors and more concrete language to describe positive out-group’s behaviors 
(Maass, 1999). Semin and colleagues (2003) found that this effect was shown only when 
participants expected their descriptions to have a communicative function. Moreover, 
Norenzayan and Schwarz (1999) showed that when asked to provide causal explanations for 
a mass murder reported in a newspaper, participants responding to a questionnaire with a 
letterhead “Institute for Social Research” produced more situational explanations, whereas 
participants responding to a questionnaire for the “Institute of Personality Research” 
produced more dispositional explanations. These results show that there is not only an 
adaptive response of cognition and language to the situated properties of a situation, but also 
that the language used in communication constitutes per se a contextual constraint to 
cognition. .  
The considerations that language and cognition are for situated action, serving 
survival needs deeply contrasts with the representational view. The latter maintains a focus 
on frozen mental representations detached from the world, characterized by its automaticity, 
invariance, stability over time, and immunity to contextual constraints. Instead, according to 
the SSC, language and cognition should be understood as dynamic processes of an agent that 
is surrounded by and integrated in a continuously changing physical and social context.  
1.2.3. Language is a tool to distribute and extend cognition  
As referred in the previous section, cognition is for adaptive action. People adapt to 
complex contexts, promoting “good enough” responses, performed in “fast enough” times. 
However, if acquired knowledge would not be shared across time, space and people, complex 
goal-oriented action would hardly be achieved, if achieved at all. Thus, knowledge relies 
heavily on information embedded in the environment, other people and groups. The 
underlying idea is that the human mind is not wholly in our head/brain, but it is rather 
distributed in our brains, body and external devices (Clark & Chalmers, 1998), which extends 
human cognition beyond individual cognitive capabilities (see Borghi, Scorolli, Caligiore, 
Baldassarre, & Tummolini, 2013).  
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Imagine the following situation. Vasco da Gama discovered the maritime route to 
India, where he arrived in 1498. Now imagine he would have tried to do this travel with no 
astrolabes or compasses, and that he would not have taken advantage of the accumulated 
knowledge about navigation available at the time. Maybe he would have arrived to his 
destination, maybe he would have not, but he would surely have taken much more time. The 
journey would also have been longer (or it would have been impossible) if he, as an expert, 
did not communicate his intentions, did not share his knowledge and did not cooperate with 
his crewmembers to achieve his goals. Imagine that after this travel, there would be no record 
of the facts, adventures or incidents along the way. Imagine that nobody had done a map with 
all of the necessary information to arrive to India. The maritime route to India would 
probably be lost after many years, and everybody who participated in that journey was dead 
(see for a similar analogy Hutchins, 1995). 
To adapt to continuously changing and dynamic contexts one needs to structure the 
physical and social environment in ways that allow reducing complexity and releasing 
cognitive resources. This can be achieved by resorting to physical tools (e.g., compasses, 
maps, hammers, saws, drills) and other aspects of our environment that provide scaffolds for 
cognitive activity (A. Clark, 1997). There are several classical examples of tool use that 
provide scaffolds, such as solving difficult arithmetic operations (e.g., multiplying two three-
digit numbers) by using pencil and paper (A. Clark, 1999); leaving an empty milk bottle near 
the front door to remember buying milk the next day (Kirsh, 1995); or the way expert 
bartenders line up differently shaped glasses when confronted with several drink orders, 
reducing the cognitive effort of thinking about the order or type of drinks to be prepared and 
served (Beach, 1998). The last example consists of epistemic actions (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994) 
that, contrary to mere physical actions, release cognitive effort in such a way that makes 
computation easier, faster, and more reliable.  
In our example, when attempting to arrive to India, Vasco da Gama and his crew 
made use of physical tools that provide scaffolds for cognitive activity. Back in those days, 
they made use of tools such as compasses, astrolabes, log lines, and astronomical charts to 
find their way across the oceans. Moreover, they registered new information in log books that 
further would allow sharing this information with more people, and to come back to India 
using the same route (Wiesner-Hanks, 2006). Nowadays, they would probably recur to a GPS 
or to Google maps to make their journey faster and avoid getting lost, they would post their 
journey adventures on Facebook, and they would probably take notes in their iPads, and send 
19 
 
them by email to King Manuel I. These examples show how people use tools and the 
environment to download information and therefore cue, prioritize, and structure cognition 
(see for review Semin et al., 2012, 2013: Semin & Garrido, 2015).  
Besides being offloaded into the environment, cognition is also distributed across 
other individuals or groups. Language has particular relevant role in this process as a device 
that extends cognitive processes beyond the individual. In our example, each of the 
crewmembers had a particular and specialized knowledge about the activity to be performed. 
This specialized knowledge was transferred to the execution of discrete roles (identification 
of the navigational stars’ positions, identifying a landmark, etc.), which in turn integrate the 
use of specific tools (astrolabe, astronomical charts, compasses, etc.) (see for similar example 
Hutchins, 1995). In this team of experts, the knowledge of each individual is crucial for the 
performance of the task at hand. The success of the task is achieved in a series of coordinated 
activities among a number of different individuals who draw on each other’s expertise being 
scaffolded by the others in the team without having to know the details of the other member’s 
expertise (e.g., Semin et al., 2012).  
Language has a preponderant role as a tool allowing for the coordination and 
synchronization of communication (Semin, 1998) in this team of experts, and thus as a tool 
for the construction of this socially distributed knowledge (see Hutchins, 1995). This type of 
knowledge, which is collectively constituted, supersedes a single individual’s capabilities 
(see Hutchins, 1995) because the entire process is not a single person’s production but a 
collectively coordinated “cognition as action” (Semin et al., 2012). Therefore, extending 
cognitive processes beyond the individual, through the use of distributed knowledge, and the 
collective construction of shared mental representations, extends cognition (Semin et al., 
2013). If language use allows for the coordination and synchronization of social interactions, 
and the constitution of uniquely shared knowledge, then language constitutes a vital tool for 
the extension of cognition, in ways that would be not possible without such a device (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1997).  
In sum, cognition can be scaffolded, distributed across and extended by physical tools 
(charts, compasses, pen and paper), socially created tools (language), the environment, people 
and groups. Language has a central role to play as a device to offload information, and that 
ultimately extends cognition. Only the interpersonal, interdependent, collaborative, and 
synchronized nature of communication can allow for two way interactions connecting 
individuals with external entities, which creates coupled systems (Clark & Chalmers, 1997). 
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However, it is the social nature of these interactions, and the fact that they are biologically 
grounded, that makes these coupled systems unique, as described in the next section. 
1.2.4. Language is a tool for social coupling  
The forth pillar of SCC highlights the idea that social knowledge is ontologically 
different from general knowledge about the world, contrary to what traditional theories 
advocated. The SSC approach argues that social knowledge is not only socially, but also 
biologically grounded and distributed (e.g., Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 
2015). Firstly, this approach rejects the activation of static concepts detached from the world 
during interpersonal interaction and communication. On the contrary, it sustains that “social” 
is about two or more individuals in interdependence, establishing social coupling trough 
communication (Clark & Chalmers, 1997; Semin & Garrido, 2015). Secondly, it exposes the 
biological bases of sociality, referring to recent research on mirror neurons systems (e.g., 
Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
Should we analyze and interpret the interaction between two social agents in the same 
way as we analyze and interpret the interaction between an agent and an object? The answer 
is no. What makes the link between two agents unique is its sociality, and the agents’ 
capacity of mapping each other’s movements upon themselves. Through communication - 
gestures, movements, facial expressions and language, individuals express, apprehend and 
adapt to others’ intentions and actions. This link between two or more individuals through 
communication, particularly through language, establishes social coupling (e.g., Clark & 
Chalmers, 1997). Thus, the social nature of interaction between individuals, and the social 
coupling that is created, makes this type of interactions intrinsically different from non-social 
ones. 
For example, although differing in terms of sensory channel, message, and richness of 
content, talking, laughing and smiling are among the most common social signals, and all 
have preponderant roles in social communication and interaction. For instance, when 
someone laughs, a laughter/smile is automatically triggered in the audience. This implicates 
the reproduction in the perceiver of the pattern of movements originally generated in the 
sender. This unconscious reproduction of movements is a powerful social coupling process 
(Provine, 1992).  
Indeed, according to recent research (e.g., Iacoboni, 2009; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 
2004) there is evidence that the architecture of the human perceptuomotor system is specially 
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configured for the reproduction of movements of conspecifics in a privileged way (Semin & 
Cacioppo, 2008). Synchronization processes lead to this isomorphism in mapping 
movements, which allows for a correspondence between an executed and a perceived action. 
This correspondence gives human beings the capacity to access others’ states, movements, 
and actions. The mapping of others’ movements provides information that, not only allows 
for the interaction with them, but that is also part of meaningful interpersonal communication 
(Semin et al., 2012, 2013; Semin & Garrido, 2015). 
Thus, social cognition is different from “pure” cognition because it is grounded on the 
brain’s architecture that is specialized for a particular class of stimuli – social agents in 
interaction – rather than non-social stimuli (Semin & Cacioppo, 2008). Therefore, cognitive 
processes cannot happen in a cognitive vacuum, and interpersonal communication 
(particularly through language) cannot be understood as individuals separately producing and 
comprehending, but should be considered instead as a result of joint ventures between 
processes with social essence that are biologically grounded. This notion is intrinsically 
related with the next section. 
1.2.5. Language is grounded on sensorimotor systems 
The last assumption of SSC sustains that cognition is embodied, being grounded on 
our body architecture, especially on our sensorimotor systems. The embodied perspective 
contrasts with symbolic amodal approaches, for which representations are abstract, 
establishing arbitrary relations with their referents in the world (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; 
Fodor, 1998; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1984). In contrast, embodied approaches 
argue that our nervous systems developed for the control of our bodies. This happens because 
the organisms need to adapt their behavior to fulfill the bodily requirements in a continuously 
changing environment. Thus, the bodily architectures provide regularities and constraints to 
cognition, affect, motivation and action (e.g., Smith & Semin, 2004; Wilson, 2002).  
Embodied cognition is one of the central converging issues of current interest in fields 
such as philosophy (e.g., A. Clark, 1997; Prinz, 2009), linguistics (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999), robotics (e.g., Brooks, 1991), neurosciences (e.g., Martin, 2001, 2007), and 
psychology (e.g., Barsalou, 1999aa; Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). More 
specifically, the relation between the body, cognition and action was emphasized in the 
earlier works in social psychology (see for reviews Barsalou, et al., 2003; Niedenthal, et al., 
2005; Smith & Semin, 2004). Evidence for the embodied nature of cognition has been shown, 
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for example, in studies reporting that cognitive processes underlying attitudes (Cacioppo, 
Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Neumann & Strack, 2000; Wells & Petty, 1980) and memory 
(Förster & Strack, 1996; Palma, Garrido & Semin, 2011) are constrained by our bodies. 
Moreover, bodily activity can induce emotional states. Perceiving an emotional expression 
induces mimicry of that expression (e.g., Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000; Niedenthal, 
2007), and adopting specific emotional expressions (e.g., Strack, Martin & Stepper, 1988), 
postures (e.g., Duclos, et al., 1989; Stepper & Strack, 1993), head movements (Wells & 
Petty, 1980), or arm movements (Cacioppo, et al., 1993) induces the correspondent emotional 
states, which further influences attitudes and judgments.  
These findings were extended to the language field, where several behavioral and 
neuroscience studies have provided evidence that concepts and language comprehension are 
grounded on perception, emotion and action systems (see for review Barsalou, 2008; Borghi 
& Pecher, 2011; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Meteyard et 
al, 2012; Winkielman, et al., 2008). Depending on the relevance attributed to the 
sensorimotor systems in the activation of semantic representations, the approaches to 
language processing might be differently categorized: from the disembodied theories referred 
earlier, for which semantic information is exclusively symbolic (e.g., LSA, Landauer & 
Dumais, 1997); to secondary embodiment theories, for which the relation between 
representations and sensorimotor content is not arbitrary, but representations are still amodal 
(e.g., Mahon & Caramazza, 2008); to weak-embodiment and strong embodiment theories. The 
two later ones propose a preponderant role of the sensorimotor systems on the activation of 
semantic representations. However, whereas weak embodiment theories propose that 
sensorimotor information is only partially simulated (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Simmons & 
Barsalou, 2003), strong embodiment approaches (e.g., Glenberg, 2010; Glenberg & 
Robertson, 2000; Zwaan & Ross, 2004) stand for “full simulation” of the original modal 
states (see for review Meteyard et al., 2012).  
The embodied approach applied to the representation of language is particularly 
evident in the so-called Grounded Theories, like Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS; Barsalou, 
1999aa; 2008), arguing that meaning is activated through simulations of original experiences 
with a member of a category. Let´s take the previous example about experiencing a chair. 
According to PSS, when originally experiencing a chair modal states are activated in relevant 
brain systems – perceptual, motor, somatosensory and introspective systems – and then 
integrated in a multimodal representation stored in memory. More specifically, these 
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modality-specific states are partially captured in local association areas, creating a 
multimodal representation of knowledge. This multimodal representation corresponds to all 
the relevant sensorimotor information about the category: how the chair looks like, how it 
feels like, the actions one can perform with it (e.g., sitting on it), introspective states such as 
comfort and relaxation, among others. Then, when the category is activated upon hearing or 
reading the word chair, there are multimodal re-enactments aiming to partially simulate the 
original experience with the category (e.g., Barsalou, 1999aa, 2008; Barsalou, Simmons, 
Barbey, & Wilson, 2003).  
According to this modal view simulations are situated since they are limited by the 
bodily, physical, and social context of a goal-directed agent (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Yeh & 
Barsalou, 2006), and they are for adaptive action once they attempt to simulate states that are 
likely to occur when contacting with the category member (Barsalou, 1999a; 2008; Barsalou 
et al., 2008; Glenberg, 1997; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Moreover, the relationship 
between semantic representations and sensorimotor content is non-arbitrary, with the 
representations having a direct connection with the original modal states that have created 
them (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; 2008). Furthermore, according to the embodied approach, there 
is a connection between lower-cognitive processes, such as perception and action, and higher-
cognitive processes, such as language and thought (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Zwaan 
& Yaxley, 2003). 
The described simulation process occurs online and also offline (Wilson, 2002); it is 
assumed to occur when processing a word (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009; Zwaan & Yaxley, 
2003), and also when comprehending full sentences (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002); and 
occurs when processing both concrete and abstract words (Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; 
Glenberg et al., 2008; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; 1999). The simulation of abstract concepts is, 
actually, one of the main challenges to embodied theories. Whereas the notion of simulation 
applied to the processing of concrete concepts is largely accepted, the fact that 
representational processes highly depend on perceptual processes (Barsalou, 1999aa) presents 
a challenge to the embodied theories explaining the simulation f abstract concepts. 
The most influential theory that has been adopted to deal with abstract concepts is 
probably the Conceptual Metaphor Theory advanced by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999). 
According to this theory, human beings depend largely on their primary sensorimotor 
experiences to derive meaning, and use concrete domains to think and communicate about 
abstract concepts that they cannot experience physically. We talk about sad events that put us 
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down, a happy day that makes us feel high, we feel close to friends and family, and refer to 
people we know as warm or cold (see Azevedo, Garrido, Prada, & Santos, 2013).  
Thus, the use of conceptual metaphors allows for communication and understand of 
concepts we cannot access through our sensorimotor systems - we cannot touch, smell, or see 
– by grounding them in concepts that are based on primary sensorimotor experiences such as 
space, temperature, brightness, physical size, weight or distance (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). Metaphors are thus treated as mental associations between basic source concepts that 
are derived from interactions with the physical world and target concepts that represent 
relatively more abstract referents (e.g., Landau, Meier, & Keefer, 2010). Currently it is 
accepted that metaphors’ use does not entail exclusively a communication purpose, but that 
they reflect and structure cognition. Therefore, they have a preponderant role on the 
conceptual system serving representational goals (see Crawford, 2009; Landau, et al., 2010).  
For example, affect is grounded on temperature (e.g., someone who is appreciated is 
warm; e.g., IJzerman & Semin, 2009, 2010; Williams & Bargh, 2008); and time is grounded 
on space (i.e., the future is represented forward and to the right, the past behind or to the left), 
which can influence temporal judgments (see Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky & 
Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto, & Boroditsky, 2008), or the categorization of words with 
temporal connotation (e.g., Lakens, Semin, & Garrido, 2010; Torralbo, Santiago, & 
Lupiáñez, 2006). Moreover, vertical space grounds valence (i.e., good is up, bad is down; 
Meier & Robinson, 2004; see for discussion Azevedo et al., 2013), divine figures (God is up, 
Devil is down; Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007) and power (i.e., 
powerful is up, powerless is down; Schubert, 2005), which impacts judgments, categorization 
processes and memory. 
Further embodied theories identify differences between concrete and abstract 
concepts, namely in content. Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings (2005) argue that whereas 
abstract concepts (e.g., “freedom”) activate more frequently situations, events and 
introspective states (e.g., 'running on the grass', 'exiting from prison', etc.), when processing 
concrete concepts (e.g., “bottle”) people tend to focus generally in their perceptual 
characteristics, such as color, size, shape, matter, parts (e.g., 'green', 'plastic', 'neck'). In a 
consistent way, Vigliocco and colleagues (Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del 
Campo, 2011; Vigliocco et al., 2013) advanced a proposal sustaining that abstract and 
concrete concepts differ in content. Kousta and colleagues (2011) have shown that when 
keeping the imageability and context availability constant, emotional valence is a predictor of 
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concreteness ratings. Although concrete and abstract concepts entail similar emotional 
processing, concrete concepts are grounded mainly on the experience with the physical 
environment, whereas abstract concepts’ processing is grounded primarily on internal 
affective states. Recent brain imaging evidence (Vigliocco et al., 2013) has supported this 
proposal. 
Hence, recent evidence has shown that, although differing in terms of grounding 
content (c.f. Glenberg et al., 2008; Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002; Fischer & Brugger, 2011), the 
understanding of both concrete and abstract concepts entails simulation. We will briefly 
describe in the next section some evidence regarding the simulation of perception, action and 
affective states during language processing and comprehension. 
1.2.5.1. Perceptual Simulation  
A considerable amount of research has shown the relation between perceptual 
information and language comprehension, namely that when thinking about a concept’s 
meaning the perceptual information becomes available.  
Pecher, Zeelenberg and Barsalou (2003) have shown that switching attention from 
one modality to another incurs costs. For example, when verifying a property in the auditory 
modality (e.g., BLENDER-loud) participants were slower when doing so after verifying a 
property in a different modality (e.g., CRANBERRIES-tart) than after verifying a property in 
the same modality (e.g., LEAVES-rustling). These results show that simulating a concept in a 
specific modality during the verification of the property hinders subsequent processing of the 
concept in another modality. Thus, the authors have demonstrated that modality specific 
perceptual simulation is activated during feature processing.  
Moreover, Zwaan and Yaxley (2003) observed that judgments about semantic 
relatedness were faster when the words presented followed an iconic relation with their 
referents. For instance, when the word “attic” appeared above the word “basement”, 
cognitive judgments were faster than when “basement” appeared below ”attic”. Furthermore, 
Borghi, Glenberg and Kaschak (2004) have shown that language comprehension activates 
perceptual information, by leading people to adopt a spatial perspective. Participants adopted 
either an inside (“You are driving a car”), an outside (“You are washing a car”), or a mixed 
spatial perspective (“You are walking toward and entering a car”). Then, they had to verify if 
a subsequent probe word was or not part of the object. Judgments were faster when the parts 
of the object corresponded to the perspective the participants had just adopted – identifying 
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steering wheels faster when adopting an inside perspective, or tires when adopting an outside 
perspective (see also Stanfield & Zwaan, 2001; Yaxley & Zwaan, 2007; Zwaan, Stanfield & 
Yaxley, 2002). Similar results were observed regarding the activation of perceptual 
simulation when comprehending language depicting motion (Kaschak et al., 2005; Kaschak, 
Zwaan, Aveyard, & Yaxley, 2006).  
This evidence was supported by neuroimaging data. For example, when processing 
words for which visual properties are a defining feature (e.g., animals or fruits), an activation 
of visual brain regions was observed (Martin, Wiggs, Ungerleider, & Haxby, 1996). 
Moreover, Martin and colleagues used a property production task to probe knowledge of 
object-associated colors (and also actions). They verified that when generating color words, 
regions associated with color perception and object perception were activated (Martin, 
Haxby, Lalonde, Wiggs, & Ungerleider, 1995). There is a large amount of evidence for this 
pattern of results in fMRI studies, namely when participants are asked to verify object 
sensorial properties, such as color, shape, size, taste or touch, neural activity is revealed in 
cortical areas related with the processing of those properties (see for review Binder, Desai, 
Graves, & Conant, 2009; Martin, 2007).  
Together these findings suggest that language comprehension is grounded on 
perceptual and imaginal states, activating the same neural areas as perception. 
1.2.5.2. Motor Simulation  
Taking a perspective, grasping an explanation, giving an example, showing evidence 
– language is full of actions, making the investigation of the relation between language and 
movement of considerable importance. An embodied approach to this relation stresses that 
during language comprehension the same neural substrates activated during motor activities 
are recruited and activated.  
For example, Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) asked participants to make sensibility 
judgments of sentences describing actions away from the body (e.g., ‘You give Art the 
pencil’), toward the body (e.g., ‘Art gives you the pencil’) or nonsense sentences (e.g., ‘You 
give the pencil Art’). To indicate the sentence sensibility, half of the participants moved the 
hand to a response button away from the body and half moved the hand toward the body. 
Judgments were faster when the direction implied by the sentence matched the direction of 
the participants’ movement (toward/toward or away/away from the body). This action–
sentence compatibility effect (ACE) (see also Glenberg et al., 2008, Exp. 1; Zwaan & Taylor, 
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2006) is consistent with the indexical hypothesis, which suggests that meaning is grounded in 
action (Glenberg & Robertson, 1999).  
Recently, in a study recording event-related potentials (ERP’s), Aravena and 
colleagues (2010) provided evidence for a neural signature of ACE effects. Participants 
listened to sentences implying an open (e.g., “The show was praiseworthy, so Rocio 
applauded”) or closed hand shape (e.g., “He needed to drive the nail correctly, so Joseph 
hammered it”) and indicated their understanding by pressing a button with either an open or 
closed hand shape. In incongruent trials, where the hand-shape implied by the sentence did 
not match the hand-shape required by the response, an N400 effect was observed (associated 
with difficulty integrating stimuli into a given semantic context; Kutas & Federmeier, 2000). 
Moreover, the motor activation during language processing was also shown using 
fMRI. Hauk, Johnsrude, and Pulvermüller (2004) demonstrated that when participants 
silently read action verbs, such as kick, pick, and lick, the motor and pre-motor cortex were 
activated in a somatotopic way. Besides activating the language areas, understanding the 
word kick activated areas that control the leg, whereas comprehending the word pick 
activated areas that control the hand, and so forth (see also Pulvermüller, 2005). This 
specificity in the activation of brain areas was also found in other studies where participants, 
instead of reading, listened to action-related sentences (Buccino et al., 2005; Tettamanti et al., 
2005). Importantly, the motor system modulation during language processing was shown 
both for concrete and abstract concepts. Using TMS, Glenberg and colleagues (2008, Exp. 2) 
verified that processing concrete (e.g., “Marco gives you the papers”) and abstract (e.g., 
“Anna delegates the responsibilities to you”) transfer sentences similarly modulates the 
activity in the hand muscles.  
Together these behavioral, neuroimaging and neuropsychological data suggest that 
language comprehension involves, at least in part, the same neural activity as planning and 
performing action (see for review Pulvermüller, 1999), and that motor simulation during 
meaning comprehension happens for both concrete and abstract language processing 
(Glenberg et al., 2008). 
1.2.5.3. Affective Simulation  
When we listen to a story, watch a movie or read a book, we feel emotions. Although 
perceptual and motor simulation during language comprehension has received the most 
attention, some studies have shown that emotional simulation also occurs during language 
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processing. Overall, observing and imitating emotional facial expressions activates neural 
areas of emotion and action related with the mirror neuron system (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 2001). This is documented in studies showing that when observing emotional facial 
expressions, such as happy or angry faces (e.g., Dimberg, 1982; Dimberg, Thunberg, & 
Elmehed, 2000), or reading words related to those facial expressions or emotional states 
(Foroni & Semin, 2009) the facial muscles corresponding to expressions of happiness or 
frowning (i.e. zygomatic major and corrugator supercilii, respectively) are automatically 
activated in the observer.  
The embodied approach applied to language stresses that the comprehension of 
emotional language depends on the at least partial simulation of emotional states, recruiting 
the same neural and bodily mechanisms as during emotional experiences (Niedenthal, 2007). 
Evidence for this argument comes from studies showing that language about emotional states 
is better understood when those states are active during comprehension (Glenberg, Havas, 
Becker, & Rinck, 2005) and classification (Niedenthal, Halberstadt, & Innes-Ker, 1999). 
For example, reading emotion words activates the correspondent facial muscles in the 
perceiver, which impacts judgments when muscle activation is not blocked (Foroni & Semin, 
2009). Moreover, affective states also shape language processing. Processing words that 
name emotions (e.g., happy, angry) can be affected by emotional states (Niedenthal, 
Halberstadt, & Setterlund, 1997). But, most importantly, evidence suggests a congruent 
activation of the somatic systems during language comprehension, even when language does 
not explicitly describe emotions. In several studies, Havas, Glenberg, and Rinck (2007) have 
used the pen-in-mouth procedure (Strack, Martin, & Stepper, 1988) to induce positive or 
negative affect in their participants while they processed sentences with emotional content 
(e.g., describing a happy or sad situation). They verified a mood congruence effect: 
participants were faster to process sentences when their valence matched the valence of their 
induced mood. Moreover, Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, and Davidson (2010) 
blocked the activity in the corrugator superciili muscle, responsible for frowning, and 
showed impairment on the comprehension of sad and angry sentences (and not of happy 
sentences). Furthermore, Kousta and colleagues (2011) have shown that emotional content of 
language plays a role in automatic lexical processing of single words, as indicated by the 
effects of emotional valence in a lexical decision task (distinguishing words from non-
words).  
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In a neuroimaging study (fMRI), Wallentin and colleagues (2011) identified brain 
activity in both language and emotion areas (temporal cortices, left inferior frontal gyrus -
IFG), amygdala and motor cortices) while participants listened to a story. Moreover, 
Jiménez-Ortega and colleagues (2012) investigated how a paragraph of positive, negative, or 
neutral emotional valence affects the processing of a subsequent emotionally neutral 
sentence. They verified that the left anterior negativity (LAN), elicited by syntactic 
violations, was present in the negative and positive conditions, and was not visible in the 
neutral condition.  
Taken together, these behavioral, psychophysiological and neuropsychological data 
suggest a close relation between language and emotion, namely that language 
comprehension, both of concrete and abstract concepts, seems to be at least partially 
grounded on emotion simulation (e.g., Havas et al., 2007; Kousta et al., 2011). Firstly, the 
comprehension of emotional language activates the same somatic patterns as perceiving an 
emotional facial expression, and affects further judgments (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009). 
Secondly, impeding emotional simulation results an in impairment of language 
comprehension (Glenberg et al., 2010). Furthermore, a correspondence between emotional 
states and language content facilitates language understanding (i.e., mood congruency effect) 
(e.g., Havas et al., 2007). Finally, results suggest a modulatory effect of emotions on both 
lexical and syntactic processing of current and subsequent tasks (Jiménez-Ortega et al., 2012; 
Kousta et al., 2011).  
1.3. Summary and Conclusions of the Chapter 
Recently, research in psychology has changed its focus from an individual-centered 
and symbolic analysis of cognitive processes - detached from the physical and social context, 
and locked in the cranial vault - to an emphasis on the influence of the social and physical 
context, including the body, on the construction of knowledge about the world.  
This shift on the approach to human cognition had obvious implications for the way 
language is considered – from its final purpose of adaptive action; to its function as a tool to 
distribute and extend cognition; as a device that allows for sociality and confers uniqueness to 
social interactions; and as a tool that impacts and ultimately depends on our bodies and 
brains. Only the joint consideration of all these factors, and the conception of language 
comprehension as an emergent process, can allow the examination and, consequently, the 
understanding of meaning construction and representation.  
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Importantly, understanding how a native language is grounded may inform the 
investigation of how the acquisition and use of a second-learned language unfolds. Are first-
native (L1) and second-learned (L2) languages grounded in the same way? Is the simulation 
process the same? Does the linguistic context impact the way one perceives, processes and 
recalls information? Does it impact how one makes judgments and decisions, and the way 
one evaluates and experiences emotional information? The following chapter tries to address 
all of these questions. 
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2.1. Different languages, different thought? 
A substantial amount of accumulated evidence indicates that language processing 
activates the simulation of perception, emotion and action. But do different languages equally 
shape the way we experience the world, and thus the way we think, feel, and behave?  
A question that was raised almost 70 years ago is still object of interest and debate: 
“Are our own concepts of ‘time,’ ‘space,’ and ‘matter’ given in substantially the same form 
by experience to all men, or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular 
languages?” (Whorf, 1939/2000, p. 138). The Linguistic Relativity perspective, expressed in 
the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, suggests that two different languages present structural 
differences, which are reflected in non-linguistic cognitive processes that are different for the 
native speakers of two different languages. The strong Whorfian hypothesis considers that 
thought and action are entirely determined by language, and that people speaking different 
languages should perceive, think and act differently in objectively similar situations (see 
Boroditsky, 2003; Casasanto, 2008).  
This extreme view was highly criticized and eventually abandoned in the field (see 
Casasanto, 2008; Pinker, 1994). However, a less extreme approach of Linguistic Relativity 
has been feeding an ongoing debate about whether the language available to describe 
experience influences the experience itself (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto, 2010; Gentner 
& Goldin-Meadow, 2003). Recent evidence has contributed to this discussion of whether 
language influences cognition, in domains such as color (e.g., Drivonikou et al., 2007); 
number (e.g., Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, Carey, & Goldin-Meadow, 2011); shape (e.g., 
Roberson, Davidoff, & Shapiro, 2002); gender (e.g., Sera et al., 2002); space (e.g., 
Bowerman & Choi, 2001); and time (Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008) and 
the results suggest that that is the case.  
The study of these different domains has an implicit but important difference: while, 
for example, color, shape and space are concrete attributes that can be experienced through 
people’s direct experience with the physical world, abstract concepts, such as time, cannot be 
apprehended through our senses. However, according to recent embodiment perspectives, 
conceptual thought is implicitly grounded on physical experiences, and our capacity to 
represent abstract experiences (e.g., affect, time) relies largely on our ability to represent 
perceptual experiences (e.g., brightness, temperature, space, distance). Thus, the use of 
conceptual metaphors (e.g., “a long time ago”) allows talking about and understanding 
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concepts that cannot be accessed through the sensorimotor systems. The use of these 
metaphors does not entail exclusively a communication purpose, but also reflect and structure 
cognition (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
The extent to which conceptual metaphors vary for native speakers of different 
languages has been examined. For example, several studies have shown that people recur to 
spatial metaphors to think and communicate about time (Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Boroditsky 
& Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto et al., 2004; Casasanto & Boroditsky, 2008; Lakens, Semin, & 
Garrido, 2011). However, people describe time differently depending on the language they 
speak. Whereas in English people typically describe time as horizontal, in Mandarin people 
recur to vertical spatial metaphors to talk about time (see for review Casasanto, 2010). 
Specifically, Boroditsky (2001) observed that English speakers were faster to confirm that 
March comes earlier than April when they were presented with a horizontal (vs. vertical) 
prime, and the same was true for the Mandarin native speakers when they had just seen a 
vertical (vs. horizontal) prime. Importantly, when taught to talk about time using vertical 
spatial terms, English speakers presented the same vertical bias as native Chinese speakers.  
However, judgments about sentences containing spatial or temporal language only 
reflect the impact of language on linguistic cognition. If time is differently grounded as a 
function of the language one speaks, this pattern of results should be expressed also in non-
linguistic tasks. Casasanto and his colleagues (2004) explored this assumption comparing 
speakers of four languages: English and Indonesian who use distance terms to talk about time 
(e.g., English people say “long time”), and Spanish and Greek who use quantity related terms 
(e.g., in Spanish people say “mucho tiempo”, which translates to “much time”). In one 
experiment, participants made either distance estimates (i.e., how far lines in the computer 
screen would grow), or time estimates (i.e., how much time the lines would remain in the 
computer screen), whereas in the other one, they made either quantity estimates (i.e., the 
amount of water in a container), or time estimates (i.e., the amount of time the container 
would take to be filled). The estimates were made by clicking the mouse to indicate the 
beginning and the end of the spatial, quantity, or temporal intervals making these tasks non-
linguistic. Results revealed that “distance languages” speakers (English and Indonesian) 
showed a strong effect of distance on time estimation, whereas “quantity languages” speakers 
(Spanish and Greek) presented effects of quantity on time estimates. 
These and other studies suggest the important role of a native language in structuring 
both low-level and high-level thought, in both linguistic and non-linguistic tasks. These 
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results have revealed that not only speakers of different native languages talk about abstract 
domains differently, but also that they think about them in a different way.  
However, despite the great surge of interest in studying the relationship between 
language and cognition, and language and affect, research has been focused in monolingual 
populations in fields such as cognitive linguistics (e.g., Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999), linguistic anthropology (e.g., Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004), pragmatics (e.g., Gilbert, 
2001; Zhang & Patel, 2006), communication sciences (e.g., Krauss & Fussell, 1996), and in 
psychology, particularly in the embodied cognition domain (Foroni & Semin, 2009; 
Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). Most importantly, the association 
of each language one speaks - native (L1) and second language (L2) - to different 
sensorimotor experiences, and its impact on cognition and emotion, has been relatively left 
aside. Thus, the question is whether different languages represent different groundings for 
cognition and emotion from an embodied point of view. Are native and second languages 
embodied in the same way? A few studies with bilingual participants have already been 
trying to provide some answers to this question, as it will be described in the following 
sections. 
2.2. Bilingualism 
Imagine the following example of a current everyday life situation: You are at your 
parents’ home, talking with them in your native language. At the same time, you receive a 
WhatsApp message in English from a Dutch friend. Your French aunt calls your mother on 
Skype. A Spanish friend you met during Erasmus sends you a message in Italian on 
Facebook. This apparently chaotic scenario - using many communication channels and 
language(s) rather than one’s native - is a common everyday life situation for many people.  
Whether in family life, social interactions, or business negotiations, the use of a 
second language to communicate is an increasingly common phenomenon (e.g., European 
Commission Special Eurobarometer, 2006, 2012; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010, 2013). In fact, 
bilingualism is present in almost all countries in the world, in all classes of society, and in all 
age groups (Grosjean, 1994). There are many ways to become a bilingual: migrations of 
various kinds (economic, educational, political, religious), nationalism and federalism, 
education and culture, trade and commerce, or intermarriage, amongst others (e.g., Grosjean, 
1996). One can learn and use a second language at a younger age or later in life; at school or 
at home; one can use it with close relationships or only in a formal professional context; it 
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can be used frequently or only sometimes; one can be highly proficient or to have only a 
medium level of proficiency; one can master one, two, three, or more languages. Despite 
different why’s, how’s, and when’s, acquiring and using more than one language during the 
life span is an increasingly common phenomenon.  
Hence, the study of bilingualism has recently started to be considered as a necessary 
component to clarify the relation between language, cognition and emotion, namely to 
investigate if different languages are embodied in the same way. But who is bilingual?  
Generally speaking, the term “bilingual” is used to refer to someone who speaks two 
languages, whereas the word “multilingual” is employed to someone who speaks more than 
two languages (Pavlenko, 2005). Nevertheless, few areas are characterized by as many 
misconceptions as bilingualism (Grosjean, 1994). Common sense posits that bilinguals are 
people who are similarly proficient in two languages, typically learned from birth. However, 
the majority of bilinguals acquired their languages at different points in their lives, and they 
are rarely equally fluent in both languages (e.g., Baetens-Beardsmore, 1982; Grosjean, 1994). 
Thus, and in contrast with common sense, in academia and for research purposes, different 
terms and classifications are used to describe the complex phenomenon of bilingualism.  
Despite the variety of aspects inherent in a linguistic history, research has been 
emphasizing six variables to classify bilinguals: a) Order of acquisition (OoA) or the order in 
which the languages were learned; b) Language dominance, an increasingly relevant factor, 
since L1 is not necessarily the dominant language; c) Level of proficiency, or the level of 
competence reached in the second language; d) Frequency of use, or how often a person uses 
the second language; e) Context of acquisition (CoA), according to which bilinguals can be 
classified as having learned their second language in a naturalistic environment, in an 
instructional or classroom setting, or to have a mixed context of acquisition; f) Age of 
acquisition (AoA) or how early in life the acquisition of the second language has started (see 
Chin & Wigglesworth, 2007; Pavlenko 2012). 
Commonly accepted are the terms and abbreviations aiming to define the Order of 
Acquisition (OoA) of the several languages that bilinguals and multilinguals are able to 
master, such as first language (L1), second language (L2), and third language (L3). The term 
LX is used to refer to any language other than L1 (e.g., Pavlenko, 2006). However, LX and 
L2 are often employed interchangeably: L2 designates, not only the language learned 
chronologically after the first one, but also any language learned after the native language 
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(e.g., Pavlenko, 2006, 2012). Although L1 is often the dominant language, language 
dominance might shift towards L2 in some situations (for example, when language of 
schooling is L2). Importantly, language dominance is not necessarily the same as proficiency, 
but it reflects instead a perception of greater ease of use and lexical access, which results 
from daily use and higher levels of activation of the language (see Pavlenko, 2012). 
Level of proficiency and frequency of use have been employed not only to classify 
different types of bilinguals but also to define the term bilingualism itself. Actually, defining 
this term has been harder than it may appear, since there seem to exist as many definitions of 
the concept as researchers who have studied the topic. 
Although some researchers have defined bilinguals as individuals who have native-
like control in two or more languages (e.g., Bloomfield, 1933), this proficiency-based notion 
is not widely accepted because it would exclude the vast majority of people using regularly 
more than one language, but who do not have native-like proficiency in L2. Critiques to 
maximalist definitions have led researchers to propose other (minimalist) definitions of 
bilingualism such as: the ability of using two languages (Mackey, 1962); the ability to 
produce complete meaningful utterances in two (or more) languages (Haugen, 1953); a 
minimal proficiency in at least one of the four language skills - understanding, speaking, 
reading and writing – in a second language (Macnamara, 1969). Thus, language proficiency 
might refer to the overall level of achievement in a particular language, or to the achievement 
in discrete language skills, and it is commonly accessed through standardized language tests 
or self-reports (Pavlenko, 2012). 
As different languages are usually learned in different contexts, with different people, 
and for different purposes, bilinguals rarely present the same degree of achievement in both 
languages in all areas (i.e., complementary principle; Grosjean, 2008). Taking this 
perspective, Grosjean (1989, 1994) argues that bilingualism is not a matter of proficiency in 
two languages, but rather a question of frequency in using a second language. The author 
contends that the majority of bilinguals are those people using a L2 in their everyday lives, 
and not necessarily someone who has perfectly equivalent proficiency skills in two 
languages. Thus, this definition applies and ranges from an immigrant worker who speaks the 
host country’s language with some difficulty (and cannot write or read it), to a scientist who 
reads and writes articles in L2 (but rarely speaks it), to a professional interpreter who is 
totally proficient in two languages. Therefore, a bilingual is more than the sum of two 
monolinguals – he/she finds himself/herself, instead, at a specific point of a situational 
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continuum, which ranges from one end (i.e., monolingual speech mode) to the other (i.e., 
bilingual speech mode) (Grosjean, 1989). 
Furthermore, the language Context of Acquisition (CoA) might be naturalistic, 
instructed, or mixed (i.e., both). In the former, language acquisition results from natural input 
in the environment, without (necessarily) structured instruction and is usually learned from 
caregivers (parents or siblings). Individuals may also acquire a language in a structured 
setting, through formal instruction and usually the learning process occurs at school (see Chin 
& Wigglesworth, 2007; Pavlenko, 2005). Finally, people may acquire a language both at 
naturalistic and instructed settings, which is defined as a mixed context of acquisition.  
Finally, L2 age of acquisition (AoA) is also a key consideration when classifying 
bilinguals. Usually people are grouped in two categories: Early (EB’s) or Late (LB’s) 
bilinguals. The boundaries between the two groups are malleable because the age cut-off 
point is still not well established. There is comprehensive research on the relationship 
between AoA and proficiency (e.g., Johnson & Newport, 1989; Long 1990). This relationship 
is expressed in the critical period hypothesis (CPH)1, an approach that has been object of a 
long-standing debate, supporting that the younger the learner, the easier and the better the 
learning process of a second language is, and the consequent outcomes are (see Bialystok & 
Hakuta, 1999; Birdsong 1999; Lenneberg, 1967; Long, 1990; Singleton, 1995; Scovel, 
2000)2.  
It is generally accepted the onset of puberty as the end of the critical period for native-
like language acquisition (e.g., Lenneberg, 1967), and also as the cut-off point differentiating 
between EBs and LBs. However, the exact cut-off point at which the critical period ends, and 
after which native-like proficiency is hardly attained is controversial (Birdsong, 2005), 
ranging from 5 years (Krashen, 1973, 1975), to 6 years (Long, 1993), to 7 years (Johnson & 
Newport, 1989), to 9 years (Penfield & Robertson, 1959), to 12 years (e.g., Lenneberg, 1967; 
Scovel, 1988), or 15 years old (e.g., DeKeyser, 2000; Patkowski, 1990)3. Importantly, some 
                                                 
1
 There is much counter evidence against CPH: late learners can achieve native-like proficiency (Birdsong & 
Molis, 2001; Bongaerts, 1999); late learners can have advantages in L2 over younger learners (e.g., Cenoz, 
2003; Munoz, 2000); there are no changes in learning outcomes at the end of the critical period (Bialystok & 
Hakuta, 1999; Bialystok & Miller, 1999; Flege, 1999). 
2
 The explanations for CPH vary, ranging from the perspective of brain plasticity (Penfield & Roberts, 1959), 
the timing of lateralization of the brain (Lenneberg, 1967), and myelination (Pujol et al., 2003), to linguistic 
theories (Chomsky, 1986). 
3
 Usually critical periods are suggested for phonology and syntax, with authors claiming that there is no critical 
period for learning L2 vocabulary (e.g., Singleton, 1995; Slabakova, 2006). 
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authors suggest that there is no sudden drop-off in ability, but a gradual decline starting from 
early childhood and extending throughout life (Birdsong & Molis 2001; Hakuta, Bialystok & 
Wiley, 2003).  
Notably, linguistic, affective and socialization histories are considered fundamental 
modulators of the emotional experience in each language one communicates. Language is 
experienced as emotional because it is learned and used in emotional contexts (Harris, 
Gleason, & Ayçiçegi, 2006). Usually the contexts of early childhood are more emotional than 
the contexts of later childhood/adulthood, including an individual’s earliest encounters with 
the gamut of human emotions (Schrauf, 2000) and the bonding with caregivers (Harris, et al., 
2006). At an early age, linguistic development overlaps with the development of conceptual 
and emotional regulation systems, which is inseparable from the process of affective 
socialization. L1 is usually learned in the context of family life, which generally includes 
intense emotional experiences, and integrates information received from all sensory 
modalities, including kinesthetic and visceral (Pavlenko, 2008). For example, the smells and 
touch of the mother, the intense affection and fear that small children feel are usually 
experienced and simulated in native language or in native language contexts. On the other 
hand, L2 is frequently mastered in more emotionally neutral formal settings (e.g., school, 
work), that do not offer many opportunities for affective socialization, and takes place 
without significant involvement of the majority of sensory modalities (Pavlenko, 2008; 
Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). Thus, whereas L1 acquires affective and autobiographic 
dimensions, the latter acquisition of L2 does not necessarily offer the same opportunities for 
affective linguistic conditioning. 
Moreover, it is also during early childhood that language meaning is closely related to 
the body, because body processes play a large role in the life of a child. Within the four 
stages of cognitive development described by Jean Piaget, in the sensorimotor stage (birth-2 
years old) infants gain knowledge of the world from the physical actions they perform within 
it, whereas in the preoperational stage (2 to 7 years old) the child learns to speak while her 
motor skills are acquired and developed. Consequently, during the first few years of life 
thought is centered on a sensorimotor way of thinking and communicating. Hence, besides 
being a particularly emotional phase, childhood is also the moment in which an association 
between language and the body is established, and thus languages learned during this period 
are supposed to be strongly grounded in the sensorimotor system.  
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In sum, L1 and L2 have different linguistic, affective, and socialization histories, 
associated with different emotionality and sensorimotor experiences (e.g., LBs learning L1 in 
early childhood and L2 later in life; someone using L1 every day and L2 with less frequency; 
someone using L1 in mix contexts and L2 in formal contexts). Therefore it makes sense to 
argue that sensorimotor grounding and thus emotional resonance may differ across these two 
languages.  
Although there is no exact definition of bilingualism or agreement in the classification 
of bilinguals, there is considerable research investigating the impact of using different 
languages on cognition and emotion. We review some of this research in the following 
sections.  
2.3. Bilinguals’ Emotions - L2 Means Reduced Emotionality 
2.3.1. The distancing effect 
It is commonly stated that if the first language is the language of emotional 
expressiveness, the second language may be the language of emotional distance (e.g., 
Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2002; Marcos, 1976). Evidence of the distancing effect of L2 comes 
essentially from clinical cases describing language code-switching and language choice for 
the expression of emotions (e.g., Movahedi, 1996; Santiago-Rivera, Altarriba, Poll, 
Gonzalez-Miller, & Cragun, 2009; see for review Santiago-Rivera & Altarriba, 2002).  
The emotional detachment that bilinguals feel when using their L2 is frequently 
named the detachment effect - the second language serves an intellectual function and is 
relatively devoid of emotion, whereas the native language clearly expresses emotional 
content (e.g., Marcos, 1976). It is also contended that emotional expression tends to be more 
spontaneous and less inhibited in L1, whereas using a non-dominant language tends to elicit 
more defensive styles of behavior (Altarriba & Santiago-Rivera, 1994). Therefore, language 
code-switching - defined as ‘changes from one language to another in the course of 
conversation’ (Li, 2007, p. 14) - from L1 to L2, or choosing L2 over L1 to communicate, 
often serve a distancing function from the high emotionality triggered by the native language 
(e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986; Gumperz & Hernandez, 1971; Javier & Marcos, 1989). 
The accounts of code-switching to L2 or LX to discuss taboo, traumatic, or anxiety-
related topics are well illustrated in clinical reports (e.g., Amati-Mehler, Argentieri, & 
Canestri, 1993; Aragno & Schlachet, 1996; Gonzalez-Reigosa, 1976; Javier, 1995; 
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Movahedi, 1996). Freud and his disciples had already observed more than 100 years ago that 
their bilingual and multilingual patients favored their L2 or LX when using obscene words 
and discussing anxiety-inducing topics, such as sex (Freud, 1893). Consistently, Gonzalez-
Reigosa (1976) described bilingual patients who employed L2 when talking about anxiety-
arousing subjects, and when they wanted to convey a self-confident, calm and emotionally 
reserved impression. Moreover, the same author observed that Spanish-English patients 
reported more anxiety after reading a list of 10 Spanish taboo words compared to reading a 
list of 10 English taboo words. 
More recently, Santiago-Rivera and colleagues (2009) observed that during therapy 
sessions patients often changed between languages, depending on the distance they wanted to 
have from the topic under discussion. Spanish-English patients often switched from their L2 
to their L1 when they wanted to emphasize and discuss in greater detail a certain negative 
emotional event. If the negative impact of those events were too high, patients would switch 
to their L2 to have the opportunity to discuss those events without experiencing the strong 
arousal triggered by the native language. Thus, emotional distancing associated to later 
learned languages is well illustrated by the fact that bilinguals often feel it is easier to discuss 
embarrassing or emotionally charged topics in their second language, rather than in their 
native language, distancing themselves from the current situation. 
Moreover, it has also been observed that bi-multilinguals might change to or choose 
different languages depending on the type of emotion they wanted to express. In general, 
speakers switched into L1 to convey intimacy, we-ness, and to express their emotions, and to 
L2 to mark distance, out-group attitude, or to express emotions in a detached way (Grosjean, 
1982; Gumperz, 1982; Schecter & Bayley, 1997; Zentella, 1997). However, the same 
language may have different affective meanings in different contexts (see Pavlenko, 2005). 
For example, Movahedi (1996) observed that his patients would change to L2 or LX to gain 
distance from emotion speech acts that were too negative or too positive. Specifically, his 
patients preferred to express anger toward him in L2, rather than in the shared L1, as it felt 
safer and more polite. The same was observed when they wanted to express anger towards 
their family members, as if using L2 English would keep these revelations as secrets. On the 
other hand, bilinguals may prefer to use their native language when asked to talk about 
positive events in their lives (Javier, Barroso, & Muñoz, 1993), but may change to L2 when 
they want to gain some distance in the expression of intimate positive emotions (Movahedi, 
1996).  
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The conclusions of these clinical studies were supported by qualitative analyses from 
an online questionnaire about the experiences of multilingual patients. Results showed that 
bi- or multilingual patients reported to adjust the emotional tone of therapy sessions by 
choosing the language that provided either emotional distance or proximity (Dewaele & 
Costa, 2013). 
 Finally, Bond and Lai (1986) provided the only experimental study, to the best of our 
knowledge, arguing for the distancing function of L2. Female Chinese participants talked 
about embarrassing topics (i.e., sexual attitudes of Chinese and Westerners, and a description 
of a recently experienced personally embarrassing event) during a longer time when speaking 
in English (L2) than in Cantonese (L1), suggesting that using L2 can serve a distancing 
function.  
Overall, the described results suggest that L2 can be used with distancing purposes. 
However, the assumption that L2 leads to psychological distance and L1 to proximity was 
never tested and controlled experimentally, and relies mainly in a few case studies that 
essentially express the therapists’ perceptions rather than the patients’ perceptions and 
experiences. Self-reports, questionnaires, psychophysiological instruments, recall and 
priming tasks were thus used to fill in this gap, and to assess more precisely the true 
emotional experience induced by L1 and L2.  
2.3.2. Self-reports 
Many studies account for the emotional advantage of L1 over L2, as bilingual 
speakers often report that swearing, praying, and lying feel stronger when using their native 
rather than their second language (see for review Dewaele, 2010; Pavlenko, 2005).The 
Bilingualism and Emotions Questionnaire (BEQ; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2001-2003) was 
probably the largest questionnaire-based study administered online that generated a rich 
database covering many aspects of multilingual communication. 
Based on these data, Dewaele (2004) found that bi-multilinguals reported higher 
perceived emotional intensity of taboo and swearwords in L1, which was gradually lower in 
languages learned subsequently. Importantly, participants who learned L2 in a naturalistic or 
mixed instructed setting (vs. instructed), who started learning L2 at a younger age, who were 
more proficient in speaking that language, or who used it more frequently had higher scores 
in perception of emotional strength of taboo and swearwords in L2. Furthermore, in another 
study using data from BEQ, it was observed that the perceived emotional intensity of positive 
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phrases like ‘I love you’ was stronger in L1 than in other languages (e.g., Dewaele, 2008). 
This perception of intensity was associated with language dominance, L2’s context and age 
of acquisition, degree of socialization, nature of the network of interlocutors, and self-
perceived oral proficiency. 
Although many bilinguals report being different or feeling different in each of their 
languages (Wierzbicka, 2004) relatively little research has been conducted on the subject (see 
e.g., Ożańska-Ponikwia, 2011, 2012; Pavlenko, 2006; Veltkamp, Recio, Jacobs, & Conrad, 
2012). Dewaele (2010) examined the perceptions that pentalinguals have of their five 
languages (extracted from BEQ), regarding their perceived usefulness, colorfulness, richness, 
poetic character and emotionality. The results of this research indicated that L1 scored 
highest in all dimensions, and that there was a gradual decline in the ratings from L1 to L5. 
Participants who had acquired the language before puberty, the early bilinguals, tended to 
have higher scores in all dimension in L2. Frequency of use was also positively linked with 
the scores on various dimensions. Additionally, Dewaele and Nakano (2012) described in a 
recent study that multilinguals reported feeling gradually less logical, serious, and emotional 
and increasingly fake when using their L2, L3 and L4. This gradual decline mirrors the 
perceptions that pentalinguals had of their languages (Dewaele, 2010). Thus, the authors 
suggested that perceptions of the languages might be transferred to the perception of the self 
when using that language.  
This pattern of results has been also documented in more applied settings. For 
example, advertising slogans were judged to be more emotional when the messages were 
written in the native language rather than in the respondents' L2 (Puntoni, De Langhe, & Van 
Osselar, 2009). Importantly, the authors confirmed that this effect was not due to lack of 
comprehension in L2, but rather depends on the frequency with which words have been 
experienced in native versus second language contexts.  
Overall, studies based on self-reports have shown an emotional advantage of L1 over 
L2. However, conclusions drawn exclusively from self-report data might be distorted or 
biased, and might be considered only indirect evidence of emotional strength. Therefore, 
there have been attempts to conduct controlled experiments to reveal the different arousal 
associated to native and second language, namely by measuring psychophysiological 
responses to, and recall of different types of words presented in L1 and L2.  
2.3.3. Psychophysiological responses  
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Evidence for the differences in emotional strength triggered by native and second 
languages was provided by studies using psychophysiological indicators, such as skin 
conductance. Skin conductance is determined by the activity in the sympathetically 
innervated sweat glands, and increases monotonically with intensifying stimulation, namely 
with the arousal triggered by a stimulus or situation (Bernstein, 1969; Boucsein, 1992; 
Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000). Studies investigating emotional differences between native 
and second language suggested that, due to the lack of emotional connotation of L2, this 
language would trigger less arousal than L1, which would be manifested in lower skin 
conductance.  
For example, Harris, Ayçiçeği and Gleason (2003) asked Turkish native speakers that 
moved to the USA after the age of 18 (Late Bilinguals - LBs) to hear and read a variety of 
words in L1 and L2. The items included taboo (curse words, body parts, and sexual terms), 
aversive (cancer, kill, death), positive (bride, joy, kind), and neutral words (column, table), as 
well as childhood reprimands (‘Don’t do that!’). Participants were asked to rate each item for 
pleasantness, while skin conductance activity was being measured. Taboo words were the 
ones eliciting higher skin conductance responses (SCRs) yet both for L1 and L2. Contrary to 
what was expected, the only differences in SCRs between languages occurred for reprimands 
that triggered higher autonomic activity in L1 (vs. L2), both in the auditory and visual 
modalities. Moreover, words presented in the auditory modality elicited stronger SCRs than 
the ones presented in the visual modality, but only in L1. The authors suggested that modality 
effects might reflect distinct learning environments: the acquisition of language early in life 
occurs essentially via the auditory modality and thus richer language experiences might be 
associated with this modality. On the contrary, L2 words in the auditory and visual modalities 
might be more similar because a greater amount of experiences may take place with print, 
due to the learning context (e.g., school, work). 
Similar findings were reported by Harris (2004) for Spanish-English bilinguals. The 
author also reported that the only observed difference in SCRs between L1 and L2 was for 
childhood reprimands. Additionally, the results have shown that this effect occurred only for 
the LBs group, with no differences between languages registered for Early Bilinguals (EBs). 
Consistently, only LBs rated reprimands in L1 Spanish as more unpleasant than in L2 
English.  
However, in another study using similar materials and procedures, the results reported 
by Harris (2004) were not replicated (Caldwell-Harris, Tong, Lung, & Poo, 2011). A sample 
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of Mandarin-English bilinguals rated L1 reprimands as more unpleasant than L2 reprimands, 
but no difference in the SCRs for reprimands between L1 and L2 was observed. Moreover, 
neither age of acquisition, nor level of proficiency influenced the SCR’s elicited by emotional 
language. Furthermore, Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn (2009, Exp. 2) tested whether 
lying in different languages would elicit different emotional responses for Turkish-English 
bilinguals. Overall, reading out loud lies elicited larger SCRs compared to true statements, 
but contrary to what was expected, L2 English stimuli elicited larger SCRs than L1 Turkish. 
In contrast, ratings of how strongly participants felt they were lying revealed the inverse 
pattern of results: L1 lies were felt more strongly than L2 lies. The authors tried to explain the 
contradictory results by suggesting that lying in L2 elicited higher autonomic activity due to 
anxiety triggered by speaking a non-native language, whereas the results of self-reports 
suggested a higher arousal associated with lying in L1. Also in this study no correlation was 
observed between self-reports and SCRs.  
Finally, in a recent study, Greek-English bilinguals and English native speakers 
performed emotional and taboo Stroop tasks while skin conductance level (SCL) was being 
measured (Eilola & Havelka, 2011). No differences in the magnitude of the interference 
effect between languages were observed. However, as hypothesized, reading English 
negative words and taboo words was associated with higher skin conductance levels than 
reading positive and neutral words only for native English speakers (and not for Greek-
English bilinguals).  
Overall these findings supported the notion that some categories of words (i.e. taboo 
and reprimands) are less emotional in L2 than in L1 (e.g., Harris et al., 2003; Harris, 2004; 
see Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009, Exp. 1, for similar findings). Importantly, age of 
acquisition seems to play an important role in shaping the emotional resonance triggered by 
native and second languages (e.g., Harris, 2004; Harris et al. 2003).  
However, although bilingualism studies using skin conductance as an indicator of 
arousal represent a step forward regarding the establishment of controlled experimental 
methods, the results reported so far have been very inconsistent.  
2.3.4. Recall in L1 and L2 
The relation between recall and arousal has been widely investigated in the literature. 
Neuroimaging studies have consistently reported a correlation between long-term memory of 
arousing stimuli and the degree to which the amygdala is activated during encoding (Cahill et 
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al., 1996; Hamann, Ely, Grafton, & Kilts, 1999), as well as an amygdala activation 
enhancement during the retrieval of arousing items (Dolan, Lane, Chua, & Fletcher, 2000). 
Consistently, it was found that memory is generally better for pictures (Bradley, Greenwald, 
Petry, & Lang, 1992) and sounds (Bradley & Lang, 2000) rated highly in the arousal 
dimension, than for pictures and sounds rated low in arousal, regardless of stimulus valence. 
Likewise, studies have shown that emotion words (e.g., Altarriba & Bauer, 2004; Rubin & 
Friendly, 1986) and emotion-laden words (Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004) were better recalled 
than neutral words, a phenomenon commonly called emotion-memory effect.  
Similar effects were observed in bilinguals’ performance, with some differences 
across languages (e.g., Anooshian & Hertel, 1994; Ayçiçeği & Harris, 2004; Ayçiçeği & 
Harris, 2009; Ferré, García, Fraga, Sánchez-Casas, & Molero, 2010). For example, 
Anooshian and Hertel (1994) hypothesized that since emotion words in a second language 
lack the emotional connotations, their recall should not be superior to the recall of neutral 
words. The authors confirmed their hypothesis by showing that both emotion and emotion-
laden words were better recalled than neutral words, but only in the participants’ native 
language (and not in the L2 learned after the age 8), regardless of whether it was Spanish or 
English.  
Ayçiçeği and Harris (2004) reasoned that emotion and emotion-laden words used in 
Anooshian and Hertel’s (1994) study were mainly positive, and that the valence of the words 
might have different effects on recall. Thus, the authors tested the emotion-memory effect in 
L1 and L2 using auditory and visual word presentation, and added additional word categories 
to their study: positive words (joy, mother), negative words (anger, pain), neutral (table, 
column), childhood reprimands (Shame on you!) and taboo words (sexual and socially 
stigmatizing terms). They also introduced a recognition task. Contrary to previous findings, 
Turkish-English late bilinguals revealed stronger emotion-memory effects in L2 than in L1, 
in both recall and recognition tasks. More specifically, in the recall task only L1 taboo words 
showed an emotion advantage over neutral words, whereas in L2 all categories (except 
negative words) showed a recall advantage over the neutral words. Moreover, in L2, positive, 
negative and taboo words produced a recognition advantage over neutral words, whereas in 
L1, emotion-memory advantage was only observed for taboo words.  
This pattern of inconsistent findings was also reported by Ayçiçeği and Harris (2009) 
who found higher recall of reprimands in English (L2) than Turkish (L1). This result is 
particularly difficult to interpret since the authors used the same stimuli as Ayçiçeği and 
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Harris (2004) and Harris and colleagues’ (2003) skin conductance study. Finally, Ferré and 
her colleagues found the emotion-memory effect but for both L1 and L2, regardless of 
language dominance, the age and context of second language acquisition, or the similarity 
between languages (Ferré et al., 2010). 
In sum, recall studies have been failing to replicate the results initially reported by 
Anooshian and Hertel (1994) on the recall advantage for L1 words, and like studies 
measuring skin conductance have been presenting inconsistent results. 
2.4. Bilingual’s Word Processing: L2 Means Reduced Automaticity  
The emotional intensity associated to L1 and L2 has also been examined using 
implicit measures assessing low-level congruency and interference effects. The use of tasks 
such as the Priming task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), the Simon task 
(Simon, 1969), and the Stroop Task (Stroop, 1935) has permitted the experimental 
examination of the link between cognition and emotion for bilingual populations, overcoming 
some of the limitations associated with skin conductance and recall studies.  
In bilingualism studies congruency and interference effects have been extensively 
investigated to explore cognitive and linguistic processes, such as the structure of bilinguals’ 
lexicon (e.g., Tzelgov, Henik, & Leiser, 1990); between-language and within-language 
interference (e.g., Goldfarb & Tzelgov, 2007; MacLeod, 1991; Preston & Lambert, 1969; 
Sumiya & Healy, 2004); bilingual advantage in executive control (e.g., Bialystok & Craik, 
2010; Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & Viswanathan, 2004; Blumenfeld & Marian, 2014); and 
shared semantic concepts in L1 and L2 (see Altarriba & Basnight-Brown, 2007). 
Nevertheless, congruency and interference effects have also been used to examine the degree 
of automaticity in processing emotional content in L1 and L2 for bilingual populations. 
Many studies using bilingual populations have explored the reduced emotionality 
associated to L2 by showing less automaticity in processing emotionally charged words in 
this language. For example, Segalowitz, Trofimovich, Gatbonton and Sokolovskaya (2008), 
using an Implicit Affect Association Test (IAAT), asked English−French bilinguals to 
provide evaluative responses to pictures of facial expressions (happy or sad), pictures of 
objects (whole or broken), and neutral pictures (tools or food), followed by valenced phrases 
(e.g., positive or negative) in L1 and L2. As expected, in L1 the response times were slower 
in the incongruent condition (e.g., pressing the same panel for happy faces (or whole objects) 
and negative phrases) and faster in the congruent condition (e.g., pressing the same panel for 
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happy faces (or whole objects) and positive phrases) as compared to the neutral condition 
(e.g., pressing the same panel for pictures of tools and positive phrases). Notably, the 
interference effect observed in L2 was significantly smaller, and it was not correlated with 
the general efficiency of L2 lexical access (as measured by an Animacy Judgment Task). 
Furthermore, Colbeck and Bowers (2012) examined interference effects using a Rapid 
Search Visual Presentation task, where words are presented rapidly and sequentially: first a 
neutral or taboo word, and then a color word. In this task the accuracy in reporting the color 
word is reduced after the presentation of taboo words, due to interference or attentional blink. 
In this study, native English speakers made significantly more errors in the taboo condition 
than did Chinese-English bilinguals performing the task in L2 English.  
However, incongruent results have also been reported in the literature. For example, 
Sutton and colleagues (Sutton, Altarriba, Gianico, & Basnight-Brown, 2007) and Eilola and 
colleagues (Eilola, Havelka, & Sharma, 2007) explored the emotional Stroop effect in L1 and 
L2, for early Spanish-English bilinguals, and late Finnish-English bilinguals, respectively. In 
Sutton and colleagues’ (2007) participants saw negative and neutral colored words in L1 and 
L2, whereas Eilola and colleagues (2007) used negative, positive, neutral and taboo words in 
L1 and L2. Participants were asked to identify whether the print color of the words was either 
blue or green. Results revealed emotional Stroop effects, namely that participants’ responses 
were slower when processing emotionally charged words (i.e. negative words in Sutton’s 
study; negative and taboo in Eilola’s study) than neutral words. However, in both studies, and 
thus for early and late bilinguals, these effects did not differ across L1 and L2 (see Eilola & 
Havelka, 2011 for the same pattern of behavioral results). It was suggested that proficiency 
could be the key factor explaining this pattern of results since both early and late bilinguals 
were highly proficient in their L1 and L2.  
Furthermore, in Altarriba and Basnight-Brown (2011) studies, English monolinguals 
and Spanish-English bilinguals performed an Affective Simon Task, in order to assess the 
extent to which valence and emotionality were automatically processed when reading a word. 
Participants were asked to classify emotion words (e.g., happy; anger) and emotion-laden 
words (e.g., dream; shark) for valence (positive or negative) or color (blue or green). 
Bilinguals were presented with words both in English and Spanish. While emotion-laden 
words produced congruency effects in all languages and valence conditions, emotion words 
did not. Contrary to what was expected, congruency effects of emotion words were found for 
bilinguals in English (L2) for both negative and positive conditions, whereas these effects 
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were found only in the negative condition in the bilinguals’ L1 and for monolinguals. The 
authors tried to explain these results by stressing that bilinguals’ L2 was their dominant 
language instead of L1.  
Nevertheless, some studies have shown that the extent to which bilinguals process 
affective content less automatically in L2 than in L1 depends on the task at hand, and thus on 
the type of processing required. Namely, Degner, Doycheva, and Wentura (2012) tried to 
disentangle semantic priming and affective priming effects for bilinguals in L1 and L2. They 
asked proficient German-French and French-German bilinguals to perform both tasks in L1 
and L2. The authors observed semantic priming effects both in L1 and L2, with no 
differences across languages. However, affective priming effects were found only in L1. 
Importantly, affective priming effects in L2 were only observed for participants with a 
frequent everyday usage of L2, regardless of whether they were French or German native 
speakers. These results suggest that L2 is processed semantically but not affectively.  
Finally, in Winskel’s (2013) study a group of late Thai-English bilinguals and a group 
of English native bilinguals (explicitly differing in L2 AoA and proficiency level) were asked 
to perform two tasks: an emotional Stroop task (using negative, positive and neutral words) 
and an emotionality-rating task. Results showed that the emotional Stroop effect was 
observed for the native English group, and also in the bilinguals’ L1 but not in their L2. 
However, this pattern of results was not observed in the emotionality-ratings task, with 
similar results presented in both languages spoken by the bilinguals. Thus, while differences 
between L1 and L2 are shown when the task requires the affective content to be processed 
automatically (i.e., emotional Stroop task) by bilinguals, these differences are absent when 
the task involves a more in-depth conscious level of processing (i.e., emotionality-rating 
task).  
Taken together, the presented results of Segalowitz and colleagues (2008) and 
Colbeck and Bowers (2012) are consistent with bilinguals’ typical reports that despite 
knowing the meaning of L2 words, they do not feel it (Pavlenko, 2005). In these studies 
results seem to suggest that the automaticity in processing the affective content of words is 
higher in L1 than in L2. However, these results were inconsistent with some studies 
presenting no differences in the affective processing of L1 and L2 (see Altarriba & Basnight-
Brown, 2011; Eilola et al., 2007; Sutton, et al., 2007). Importantly, linguistic histories of L1 
and L2 (e.g., dominant language, proficiency) seem to play a determinant role in explaining 
some of the inconsistent observed results. Notably, the type of processing (i.e., semantic or 
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affective; automatic or in-depth) seems to be a key factor when analyzing these results. 
Namely, studies suggest that bilinguals process automatically the semantic content but not the 
affective content of L2 (e.g., Degner et al., 2012), and that a more in-depth type of processing 
overcomes the lack of emotionality associated to L2 (e.g., Winskel, 2013).  
2.5. Bilinguals’ Behavior: L2 Means More Rational Choices 
The extent to which behavior and decision-making are affected by the language in 
which a situation is presented was also explored in bilingualism literature.  
Evidence has shown that people make different choices regarding the same outcome 
depending on whether it is presented as a gain or a loss. Loss aversion bias refers to the fact 
that when a situation is framed in terms of losses, people are more willing to choose risky 
options in order to avoid negative outcomes. When the situation is framed in terms of gains 
people become much more conservative and opt for the safest choices (see for a review 
Kahneman & Frederick, 2006). Keysar, Hayakawa, and An (2012) investigated whether the 
effect of intuitive biases on decision-making may be minimized when the emotionality of a 
given situation is reduced. The authors reasoned that, as emotional resonance elicited by a 
foreign language seems to be lower than that elicited by a native language emotionally driven 
biases may be inferior in the former case. The authors found that when presenting the Asian 
disease problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) in a foreign language, to relatively low-
proficient speakers, participants’ choices were no longer affected by the way the problem was 
described.  
Furthermore, Costa, Foucart, Arnon, Aparici, and Apesteguia (2014) explored 
whether the foreign language effect, reported by Keysar and colleagues, was present in other 
types of framing problems that involve psychological accounting biases and not so much 
gain/loss dichotomies. In the first study they replicated Keysar and colleague’s results 
regarding the effect of a foreign language on loss aversion. Second, they have assessed the 
effects of a foreign language in psychological accounting – that is, the way people categorize 
economic outcomes and the extent to which this categorization impacts economic decision-
making. Usually, when accounting for the consequences of an act people tend to adopt 
minimal rather than global accounts (see the Ticket/Money Lost Problem and the Discount 
Problem; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The authors found that framing effects were reduced 
when the Ticket/Money Lost and the Discount problems were set in a foreign language, 
rather than in the native language. Moreover, they found that using a foreign language (vs. a 
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native language) to set problems reduced risk aversion bias, and promoted consistent choices 
by decreasing ambiguity aversion.  
In another study (Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa et al., 2014) participants were presented 
with moral dilemmas: a ‘‘footbridge’’ version of the trolley dilemma and a less emotional 
version of the trolley dilemma, the “switch” dilemma, either in their native or in their foreign 
language. In the trolley dilemma, when faced with the decision of whether to push a man in 
front of a train, killing him, but saving five people (i.e., utilitarian choice), participants chose 
differently depending on the language in which the problem was presented. Namely, 
significantly more participants chose the utilitarian option when L2 was used than when L1 
was used. In the switch dilemma, the situation was the same but participants had to decide 
whether to switch the train tracks killing one man, and saving five lives. In this less emotional 
task, participants selected the utilitarian choice equally, regardless of language of 
presentation. Notably, the results were influenced by level of proficiency, with higher levels 
of proficiency decreasing the difference in responses between L1 and L2. 
The presented results consistently suggest that the lack of emotional connotation of 
L2 may constitute an advantage under certain situations. Namely, when making decisions, 
certain psychological biases may be overcome in L2 (Keysar et al., 2012; Costa, Foucart, 
Arnon et al., 2014) since in this language choices are less influenced by emotionality than in 
L1 (Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa et al., 2014). 
2.6. Bilinguals’ Embodiment of L1 and L2 
Taking the previous findings together, literature seems to suggest that emotional 
resonance is hindered in a L2 context. However, only recently this question has been 
addressed within an embodied/grounded cognition framework. Behavioral and neuroscience 
studies have been providing evidence suggesting that language is embodied - language is 
grounded on perception, emotion and action systems and language comprehension requires, 
at least partially, simulation of previous experience (see for review Barsalou, 2008; Borghi & 
Pecher, 2011; Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Gallese, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Meteyard, 
Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012). However, embodied cognition studies have been 
mainly focused on monolingual populations, and on the impact of first language on thought 
and behavior (e.g., Barsalou, 2008; Foroni & Semin, 2009, 2013; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
Only recently, it has been argued that the reported differences between L1 and L2 
express different groundings of these languages leading to different simulations of 
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experience. Although L2 seems to be acquired through the same neural devices responsible 
for L1 acquisition (Perani & Abutalebi, 2005) and to share the same brain language systems 
(e.g., Frenck-Mestre, Anton, Roth, Vaid, & Viallet, 2005; Kovelman, Baker, & Petitto, 2008) 
the linguistic and socialization histories of these languages are different. Since L2 acquisition 
usually occurs in emotionally neutral context and takes place without significant involvement 
of the majority of sensory modalities (Pavlenko, 2008; Perani & Abutalebi, 2005), it seems 
plausible to argue that this language should not be grounded on the sensorimotor systems, at 
least to the same extent as L1.  
A few studies have acknowledged that L2 comprehension also requires experience 
simulation. In an fMRI experiment (De Grauwe, Willems, Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & 
Schriefers, 2014) German-Dutch bilinguals and Dutch native speakers were asked to make 
lexical decisions about motor and non-motor verbs presented in Dutch (their L2 and L1, 
respectively). Results showed a significantly increased activation in the region-of-interest for 
motor compared to non-motor verbs both in L1 and L2. Moreover, in Dudschig, de la Vega 
and Kaup’s (2014) study, participants saw L1 or L2 words referring to entities with up or 
down spatial locations (Experiment 1 & 2), or to positive or negative emotions (Experiment 
3). Participants should respond to the words’ ink color with an upward or downward arm 
movement. The authors found that words with an up spatial position (e.g., star) or referring to 
positive emotions (e.g., happy) facilitated upward movements, while words with a down 
spatial position (e.g., root) or referring to negative emotions (e.g., sad) facilitated downward 
movements. This pattern of results was found both in L1 and L2, even when L2 was learned 
late in life (age >11).  
However, some studies have suggested different groundings of L1 and L2. In a very 
recent study, Li, Liu and Ma (2015) explored the impact of L1 and L2 on the relation 
between sensorimotor information and thought. They investigated the vertical spatial 
metaphor of affect (“good” is represented “up”; “bad” is represented “down”; e.g., Meier & 
Robinson, 2004), and the impact of using a non-native language on this conceptual metaphor. 
Participants were presented with target affective words (positive or negative) in the upper or 
the lower part of a computer screen, in native or non-native languages. Prime and target 
valence was congruent, and participants were asked to judge the target’s valence. Results 
showed that participants’ reaction times were shorter for positive words presented at the 
upper (vs. lower) part of the screen, and for negative words presented at the lower (vs. upper) 
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part (Study 2). Importantly, this pattern of results was only observed in the participants’ L1, 
and not in their L24.  
The proposal of partial disembodiment in L2 was recently, and to our knowledge for 
the first time, examined by Foroni (2015) in an EMG study. Indeed, the author questioned 
whether the processing of L2 has any somatic bases (i.e., muscle simulation) and whether 
they were similar or different from the ones observed for L1 (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2013). 
Dutch native speakers, late learners of English (L2), read sentences that were either in the 
affirmative (‘I am laughing’) or negative form (‘I am not grinning), and that were either 
relevant (‘I am smiling’) or irrelevant (‘I am frowning’) for the activation of the zygomatic 
muscle. Results have shown that processing L2 affirmative emotion sentences involved 
simulation to the same extent as L1, but processing L2 negation sentences did not activate a 
significant relaxation of the relevant muscle, contrary to what was observed for L1 (Foroni & 
Semin, 2013). The author concluded that whereas the processing of emotional language in L1 
relies on simulations, in L2 simulations are only partial because they are not activated for 
more complex and abstract forms of thought (i.e., negation).  
Overall, these results seem to suggest that L2 is not grounded to the same extent as L1 
on the sensorimotor systems. Particularly, although both languages activate the same patterns 
of brain activation for simulation during language comprehension (De Grauwe et al., 2014), 
some categories of words seem to be more difficult to simulate in L2. Namely, the grounding 
of abstract concepts – such as affect (Li et al., 2015) and negation (Foroni, 2015) - in concrete 
physical experiences seems to be hindered in L2 (cf. Dudschig et al., 2014), suggesting that at 
least abstract thought is less influenced by contextual bodily states in this language. However, 
like in the other described fields, evidence is characterized by inconsistencies.  
2.7. Summary, Discussion, and Future Directions 
The diverse evidence presented in the previous sections suggests an overall emotional 
advantage of L1 over L2 and that these languages may not be grounded to the same extent. 
However, not all findings are consistent and the degree to which they can be generalized is 
limited.  
The described clinical cases, self-reports, and experimental results suggest that L2 can 
be used with distancing purposes. However, the assumption that L2 leads to psychological 
                                                 
4
 Although this pattern of results suggests different groundings for L1 and L2 the methodological problems of 
this study, namely the sample size, advise some caution in further interpretations. 
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distance and L1 to proximity can be mere speculation and was never experimentally tested. 
This assumption relies essentially on a few case studies, on therapists’ perceptions rather than 
on speakers’ perceptions, on qualitative data, or on indirect evidence that suggests a relation 
between emotional intensity, language code-switching or choice, and distance/proximity. 
Moreover, these studies approached bilingualism as a ‘‘generic’’ condition (Pavlenko, 2012), 
leaving aside relevant variables related with the patients’ language learning histories – such 
as dominance, order of acquisition, proficiency, frequency of use, age (AoA) and context 
(CoA) of acquisition - not allowing for meaningful comparisons and analysis between 
different groups of bilinguals. 
Hence, before assuming that choosing L2 or code-switching to this language serves a 
distancing function, it is important to examine experimentally whether a second language 
induces psychological distance to a greater extent than a native language. Notably, it is still 
unclear what type of psychological distance are these reports referring to. An event is 
psychologically distant whenever it is not part of one’s direct experience – when it takes 
place farther into the future or the past; as it occurs in more remote locations; as it happens to 
people less and less like oneself; and as it is less likely to occur (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 
2003). According to Construal Level Theory, these four types of psychological distance 
(temporal, spatial, social, and hypotheticality) are interrelated (Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, 
& Algom, 2007) and are anchored on the directly experienced reality of the self, here and 
now (e.g., Liberman & Trope, 2008). Thus, it would be important to clarify which type(s) of 
psychological distance is(are) affected by the use of different languages (L1; L2). 
Furthermore, it would be relevant to explore the psychological mechanism responsible for 
these effects.  
In the second set of reviewed studies, we presented evidence based on self-reports. 
The results of these studies suggest that more emotionality is attributed to L1, and that there 
are some modulators of the affective experience during language comprehension, such as age 
of acquisition, frequency of use and proficiency. However, self-reports are limited in what 
concerns the full comprehension of the individual emotional experience. Conclusions drawn 
exclusively from self-report data might be distorted or biased, namely participants’ answers 
might be affected by social desirability or self-deception (e.g., Dörnyei, 2003). Moreover, 
self-reports might be considered only indirect evidence of language emotional strength. 
Consequently, there have been attempts to conduct controlled experiments to reveal the 
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arousal induced by L1 and L2, namely by measuring psychophysiological responses and 
recall of different types of words presented in L1 and L2.  
The research that has been investigating the arousal triggered by L1 and L2, either 
measured directly via autonomic responses (i.e. SCRs), or measured indirectly through recall 
and recognition tasks, also argues for a L1 advantage over L2. Importantly, in these studies 
the variables associated with the languages’ learning and use histories (i.e., age of 
acquisition, context, proficiency, and language dominance) have been identified as 
fundamental modulators of the effect of language on emotional experience. However, the 
results presented in these experiments are far from being consistent or conclusive. In studies 
using SCRs the conclusions drawn from the observed results are often no more than 
hyperboles of the real effects. There is no consistent evidence for a general superiority in 
autonomic activity of L1 over L2, but instead a consistent effect of specific word categories 
(i.e., taboo words; childhood reprimands) that should not be generalized to all the other word 
categories. Moreover, the presented recall studies replicated the emotion-memory effect but 
most of the times for both L1 and L2, or presented even stronger effects in L2.  
Although psychophysiological measures may be considered more objective than self-
reports, they also have inherent limitations that might explain some of the results. On the one 
hand, skin conductance reflects autonomic arousal, but its psychological meaning varies with 
the context. Arousing, task-relevant, familiar stimuli can trigger SCRs (Tranel & Damásio, 
1985; Morris, Cleary, & Still, 2008) but sometimes novel or surprising stimuli, or stimuli that 
require higher internal cognitive effort, do too (Bernstein, 1969; Boucsein, 1992; Dawson, et 
al., 2000). Similarly, recall is also better for semantically (Hunt & Mitchell, 1982) and 
orthographically (Hunt & Elliot, 1980) unusual stimuli rather than usual stimuli, and for 
atypical rather than typical information (Davidson, 1994). Therefore, it might be argued that 
results showing equal arousal in L1 and L2 or higher arousal in L2 might reflect the lack of 
familiarity or novelty of the stimuli in L2, or the additional cognitive effort associated with 
L2 processing, especially for low proficient bilinguals. It is thus important to control, in 
addition to valence and arousal, for the familiarity of the stimuli, not only by running careful 
pilots but also by assessing familiarity during the study. It is also important to choose late 
bilinguals with at least a medium level of L2 proficiency, to avoid effects triggered by 
cognitive effort.  
Moreover, the failure in replicating results makes clear the lack of experimental rigor 
in some of these experiments. First, one of the difficulties of studying bilingual speakers is 
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that language learning histories are highly variable across people. These experiments are 
characterized by highly different samples of bilinguals. Experiments have been conducted 
with different populations, associated with different cultures and linguistic norms (e.g., 
Turkish, Spanish, Chinese, and Greek bilinguals, and English native speakers). Furthermore, 
across studies (e.g., Harris et al., 2003; Harris, 2004; Caldwell-Harris et al., 2011), late 
learners differed in several factors that are related to arousal - age of first exposure to L2, age 
of arrival in an English-speaking country, and self-rated proficiency in L2 – which 
complicates comparisons across studies and constrain the replication of results. 
Second, although it was hypothesized a difference in arousal between L1 and L2, the 
choice of stimulus materials and the judgments participants had to make did not always 
reflect arousal. According to the literature, emotional reactions to external cues are modulated 
by two dimensionally organized stimulus features: valence and arousal (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 
2000; Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, Hamm, 1993). Judgments of valence range from highly 
positive to highly negative (i.e., pleasure or displeasure), whereas the dimension of arousal 
ranges from calming or soothing to exciting or agitating. Notably, while some measures are 
better to discriminate the valence of emotional stimuli or experiences (e.g., self-reported 
valence; EMG - measuring corrugator and zygomatic muscles activation; startle blink 
magnitude; and heart rate), others are better to discriminate how arousing (i.e., self-reported 
arousal and skin conductance) the stimulus or experiences are (e.g., Bradley & Lang, 2000; 
Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 1998; Lang et al., 1993). For instance, in studies using a range of 
affective stimuli, skin conductance and recall increases directly with reports of arousal, 
independently of whether the experience is reported as pleasant or unpleasant (Bradley at al., 
1992; Bradley, Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 
2001; Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1990; Bradley & Lang, 2000; Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 
1989; Lang, et al., 1998).  
Besides all of this evidence suggesting that valence and arousal should be assessed 
using different and specific measures, and that skin conductance and recall are indicator of 
arousal, the stimulus materials of the reported studies were chosen based on ratings of 
pleasantness (i.e., valence). This fact might explain why only taboo words (characterized by 
their high arousal), and not negative and positive words, triggered stronger arousal than 
neutral words in several studies. Furthermore, it might also explain why, using the same 
stimuli (Handbook of semantic word norms; Toglia & Battig, 1978), the results reported by 
Harris and colleagues (2003) using skin conductance, and those reported by Ayçiçeği and 
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Harris (2004) and Ayçiçeği and Harris (2009) using recall tasks, were so inconsistent when 
these measures are supposed to be correlated.  
Additionally, the self-reports requested to the participants differed from experiment to 
experiment. For example, in Harris and colleagues (2003) and Harris (2004) participants were 
asked to rate the word or phrase for pleasantness; in Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn 
(2009) for emotional intensity; and in Caldwell-Harris and colleagues (2011) to think of a 
situation when the phrase was used, and to rate the emotional intensity of the situation. This 
might explain incongruent results and the lack of correlations between psychophysiological 
(SCRs) and behavioral (self-reports) indicators of arousal, between and within studies. 
Regarding affective processing studies, some evidence indicates that affective 
processing in L1 is more automatic than in L2, leading to less congruency and/or interference 
effects in L2. Importantly, this seems to be the case when the task requires an affective but 
not semantic processing (e.g., Degner et al., 2012), and when affective content is processed 
automatically but not in-depth (e.g., Winskel, 2013). Although L2 age of acquisition (AoA) 
was suggested as the main factor explaining the L1 and L2 congruency and interference 
effects, language dominance, L2 level of proficiency, and frequency of use were identified as 
relevant variables that might explain some of the inconsistent results. For example, 
interference effects were found both in L1 and L2 for both early (Sutton et al., 2007) and late 
(Eilola et al., 2007) bilinguals. The authors have suggested that bilinguals’ proficiency could 
explain these results since both early and late bilinguals of these studies were highly 
proficient both in L1 and L2. Consistently, Altarriba and Basnight-Brown (2011) tried to 
explain their unexpected results contending that participants’ L2 was their dominant language 
and not L1.  
Evidence in the field of decision-making has shown that decisions are shaped by the 
language in which the situation is framed: L2 leads to more rational and utilitarian choices 
than the emotional native language, and decision-making biases are reduced in this linguistic 
context. Overall the results observed in this domain are consistent within and between 
studies, which leaves some room to address new scientific questions. In most of these studies 
“better” choices were made in L2 because the best outcome possible in the situations implied 
more rational choices. However, would it be the case when the better outcome of a decision 
relies on emotion?  
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In Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa et al. (2014) study, emotionality is reduced in L2, and 
thus people are more willing to cause harm to someone to have a better outcome in this 
language. Would the same pattern of results be expected when the focus of the decision 
would be helping someone (i.e., prosocial behavior) and not be willing to cause harm? In 
extreme emergency situations, bystanders may become upset and distressed (Piliavin, 
Dovidio, Gaertner, & Clark, 1981), whereas in less critical situations, observers may feel sad 
(Cialdini, et al., 1987), tense (Hornstein, 1982), or concerned and compassionate (Batson, 
1991). This empathic arousal is fundamental to prosocial behavior since it motivates people 
to help others (Davis, 1994). Since affect is a fundamental element of many potential helping 
situations, would people be willing to help others to the same extent when the situation is 
framed in L2? Would the reduced emotionality associated with L2 impair prosocial behavior?  
Finally, only recently the differences in emotional resonance of L1 and L2 have been 
addressed within an embodiment framework. It has been argued that these differences reflect 
different groundings of these languages, which is expressed in different simulations of 
experience. Results in this field have been inconsistent but overall sustain the argument that 
L1 and L2 are not embodied in the same way. Particularly, although L1 and L2 evoke the 
same patterns of brain activation during language comprehension (De Grauwe et al., 2014), 
the grounding of abstract thought (affect - Li et al., 2015; negation - Foroni, 2015) on 
concrete physical experiences seems to be hindered in L2 (see Dudschig et al., 2014 for 
counter-evidence). This is particularly evident in Foroni’s studies using EMG (e.g., Foroni & 
Semin, 2013), which for the first time compared the emotional resonance induced by L1 and 
L2 (Foroni, 2015).  
However, the lack of studies addressing the affective grounding of L1 and L2 from an 
embodied perspective, and the inconsistencies obtained across studies, constrain the 
generalization of these findings. More studies are needed in this domain, and measuring 
emotional resonance of L1 and L2 through the use of facial EMG seems to be a good 
methodological option. First, because it is a measure that is not sensitive to the novelty and 
familiarity of the presented stimuli (like SCR, SCL and recall), which is perfect when using 
L2 stimuli with which participants are not always familiarized. Second, because it is a more 
objective measure of emotional experience and it is less biased by personal expectations, 
social desirability or self-deception. Finally, because it is a more direct measure of emotional 
resonance than affective priming tasks, since the latter only reflect the emotional resonance 
elicited by the stimuli, but do not measure the emotional resonance per se.  
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In this brief review, we tried to put together the most important studies suggesting 
differences in the emotionality triggered by L1 and L2. More specifically, we described 
studies based on clinical cases, self-reports, psychophysiological indicators, recall and 
recognition tasks, and using affective priming and decision-making paradigms. Finally we 
addressed the results of the presented literature within an embodied/grounding framework, 
describing recent evidence suggesting different affective groundings of L1 and L2.  
However, only a critical review and analysis of these topics might improve research 
practices, inform theoretical accounts and contribute with new perspectives to future 
research. To overcome methodological problems and to explore new research avenues is 
exactly the purpose of this thesis. In the next empirical chapters we will argue that since L1 
and L2 are not likely to be affectively grounded to the same extent, intra-individual (i.e., how 
one processes affective information; chapter 3), inter-individual (i.e., how one perceives and 
evaluates others in terms of social distance; chapter 4), and intergroup (i.e., how emotional 
information about social groups is simulated and evaluated; chapter 5) processes should be 
shaped differently by L1 and L2.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
AFFECTIVE PRIMING IN NATIVE (L1) AND IN 
LEARNED (2) LANGUAGES 
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The current reality of multicultural societies requires participation in two or more 
linguistic communities. Experiencing, processing and comprehending information in multiple 
linguistic "realities" present a number of challenges, for example, emotional communication 
in a first-native (L1) and second-learned language (L2). The significance of differences 
between L1 and L2 becomes particularly apparent in situations with affect-laden exchanges, 
which may involve managing relationships that are positive (e.g., bonding), negative (e.g., 
conflict) as well as calibrating an affective relationship (e.g., negotiation, consensus seeking, 
decision-making). 
The present research was designed to investigate differences in the use of affective or 
emotional language across L1 and L2 and is based on two central assumptions. First, 
emotional experiences are communicated predominantly by the use of affective language and, 
under certain conditions, their expression and comprehension may be hindered in L2. The 
second assumption regards the grounding mechanisms of affective language namely that they 
are not identical in L1 and L2. As we shall argue, L2 is assumed not to have the same 
embodied intensity as L1. 
The argument driving the first assumption rests on the socialization histories of both 
languages to explain why the intensity of emotional language may differ between L1 and L2 
(for reviews see Caldwell-Harris, 2014; Pavlenko, 2012). In L1, emotional language (e.g., 
words or sentences that denote emotional states) is usually learned and used in contexts that 
are affectively laden (e.g., Harris, Gleason, & Ayçiçeği, 2006), such as in family life or 
interaction with peers. In contrast, L2 is frequently mastered in emotionally more neutral 
settings (e.g., school, work; Bond & Lai, 1986). The mechanisms involved in the affective 
grounding of language are not yet fully known. Nonetheless, there is ample evidence showing 
the affectively laden quality of language in L1 relative to L2. 
Indeed, there is considerable research on bilingualism showing that there is stronger 
emotional intensity in L1 than L2 (e.g., Altarriba & Santiago-Rivera, 1994; Gonzalez-
Reigosa, 1976; Javier, 1989, for reviews see Caldwell-Harris, 2014; 2015). Bilinguals 
typically report that despite knowing the meaning of words in L2, they do not necessarily feel 
it (Pavlenko, 2005) and they switch to L2 to distance themselves from what they are saying 
(e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986). Moreover, bilinguals perceive the emotional intensity of both 
positive (e.g., the sentence "I love you", Dewaele, 2008) and negative information (e.g., 
taboo words such as ethnic slurs - Gawinkowska, Paradowski, & Bilewicz, 2013; swearwords 
- Dewaele, 2004; 2010) as stronger in L1 than in L2. This difference in emotional intensity 
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between L1 and L2 is further supported by research measuring autonomic arousal. For 
instance, larger skin conductance responses (SCRs) were observed for taboo words (e.g., 
"asshole") and childhood reprimands (e.g., "Go to your room!") in L1 relative to L2 
(Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009; Harris, Ayçiçeği & Gleason, 2003; Harris et al., 
2006).  
These language differences have significant implications for applied domains such as 
marketing, forensic or health contexts (for a review see Caldwell-Harris, 2015). For example, 
Puntoni, de Langhe, and van Osselaer (2009, Experiment 1) have shown that marketing 
slogans presented in L1 (vs. L2) were perceived as more emotional. Importantly, since 
language did not influence other complex appraisals (originality of the slogan), the L1 
advantage seems to be specific to emotionality. Other studies have shown that scenarios 
describing moral transgressions (e.g., eating a dead dog) presented in L2 were judged less 
harshly (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015a). Also, Caldwell-Harris and Ayçiçeği-Dinn 
(2009) showed that when lying, participants reported more affective discomfort in L1 than 
L2. The authors argued that suspects interrogated in L2 may feel less emotional, which can 
promote false confessions and lying. On the other hand, in some situations, lowering the 
emotionality level may be desirable (e.g., description of a traumatic event), with language 
switching emerging as a therapeutic technique (for a review, see Altarriba & Santiago-Rivera, 
2002). Moreover, Keysar, Hayakawa and An (2012) have also shown that decision-making 
biases are fewer in L2, an effect interpreted as evidence that a foreign language promotes 
greater cognitive and emotional distance than L1.  
Our second assumption is that L2 does not carry the same embodied intensity as L1. 
The argument driving this assumption relates to differences between L1 and L2 with respect 
to the sensorimotor processes that ground emotional language. The dominant perspective on 
embodiment emphasizes that knowledge representation is grounded by simulations of 
previous experiences acquired through primary sensorimotor systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; 
2008; Glenberg, 2008; Semin & Smith, 2008). Accordingly, language comprehension 
involves simulation of action (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), perception (e.g., Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001), and emotion (Foroni & Semin, 2009) through recruiting the same neural 
systems activated in the original experience. This argument is supported by recent research 
showing that people simulate bodily states, which permit the understanding of their own and 
others’ emotional states (e.g., Niedenthal, 2007). For instance, perceiving the facial 
expression of a target (e.g., smile/frown) activates the corresponding facial muscles in the 
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perceiver (e.g., Dimberg & Petterson, 2000). Furthermore, the same somatic responses are 
also activated by linguistic representations of these emotions, as indicated by 
electromyographic (EMG) measurement of facial muscles (Foroni & Semin, 2009; 
Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). The centrality of somatic activity 
to comprehension and judgment was further supported by Foroni and Semin's demonstrations 
that blocking the activation of somatic responses (muscle activity) neutralized the affective 
bases activated by visual (i.e., happy and angry facial expressions, Foroni & Semin, 2011) or 
verbal stimuli (i.e., words referring to emotional expression, Foroni & Semin, 2009) on 
judgments. 
A crucial empirical question is whether the processing of L1 and L2 are grounded to 
the same extent. Indeed, L2 learning and use does not seem to offer the same sensorimotor 
grounding opportunities as L1. Foroni and Semin (2013) have shown that reading sentences 
related with the activity of a specific muscle (zygomatic major) in L1, influenced facial 
muscle activity (measured by EMG). Specifically, when the sentences were affirmative (“I 
am smiling”) the zygomatic muscle was activated, whereas when they were negated ("I am 
not smiling”) the muscle was inhibited. Recently, Foroni (2015) has extended this research by 
investigating the effects of the same sentences presented in L2. Results showed that while 
affirmative sentences replicated the pattern found in L1, sentences involving negation did not. 
These findings suggest that processing emotional language in L1 relies on simulations of the 
affective meaning described by the words, whereas such simulation is considerably reduced 
in L2.  
There is already some research suggesting that processing affective information in L1 
differs from processing it in L2. However, most studies have been using self-report (e.g., 
word ratings) or physiological indicators (e.g., SCRs) and the results have not been always 
consistent and were often limited to particular types of stimuli (e.g., taboo words). Moreover, 
as argued by Degner, Doycheva and Wentura (2012), it is possible that previous differences 
found between L1 and L2 may derive from the intervention of confounding variables (e.g., 
language stereotypes, migration backgrounds). Thus, evidence for the assumption that 
emotional content is actually processed differently in L1 and L2, namely regarding the 
somatic processes resulting from the stimulus affective content, is still scarce.  
Recent studies using experimental paradigms (e.g., Stroop, priming) that rely on more 
implicit measures (e.g., RT) are particularly informative. For example, Colbeck and Bowers 
(2012) used a serial visual paradigm that included L1 and L2 taboo words and neutral words 
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as distracters and compared their impact on target word identification performance. When 
taboo words were presented in L1 performance was more impaired. Other studies used the 
Emotional Stroop task, in which participants are typically slower to name the color of 
emotionally laden words in comparison to neutral words. Results from studies comparing 
performance on this task across languages were not as clear-cut with both late (Eilola & 
Havelka, 2010; Eilola, Havelka, & Sharma, 2007) and early (Sutton, Altarriba, Gianico, & 
Basnight-Brown, 2007) bilinguals showing equal levels of interference in both languages. 
Altarriba and Basnight-Brown (2011) used an Affective Simon Task and also found similar 
patterns of response interference for monolingual and bilingual participants. Likewise, Ponari 
and colleagues (2015) showed that both native and highly proficient English speakers showed 
the same facilitation effect in processing emotionally valenced words (vs. neutral) in a lexical 
decision task.  
The affective priming paradigm constitutes an interesting tool to investigate automatic 
affective processing. Priming studies typically examine the impact of one stimulus (i.e., the 
prime) on the subsequent processing of another stimulus (i.e., the target). As a paradigm, 
priming is very flexible because it allows the manipulation of different types of relationships 
between primes and targets. In the semantic priming task (for a review see Neely, 1991) the 
prime-target relationship is semantic - when the stimuli are semantically associated (e.g., 
"bread" and "butter"), performance is facilitated (e.g., faster and/or more accurate responses 
to the target). When prime-target are unrelated (e.g., "nurse" and "butter") performance is 
inhibited. In the affective priming task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986; for a 
review see Herring et al., 2013) what is manipulated is the affective relation between prime 
and target and not their semantic relationship. Performance facilitation is observed when the 
prime-target relationship is affectively congruent (e.g., "happy" and "sunshine") and 
performance inhibition is observed in incongruent trials (e.g., "happy" and "death"). Affective 
priming effects are assumed to be: (a) general, being observed across a wide variety of 
stimuli (e.g., words, images, odors, sounds, etc.) and tasks (e.g., evaluative categorization, 
lexical decision, pronunciation, etc.), and (b) automatic, given that they have a quick onset, 
do not dependent on explicit evaluative goals or ample cognitive resources, and can even be 
prompted by stimuli presented without participant's awareness (for a review see, Hermans, 
De Houwer, & Eelen, 2001).  
Recent studies suggest that affective priming effects are driven by somatic processes. 
For example Foroni & Semin (2012) observed muscular activation in response to valenced 
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visual prime stimulus and that this activation facilitated response to congruent targets (Foroni 
& Semin, 2012). Notably, the same muscle activity was observed in response to verbal 
stimuli shaping subsequent judgments (Foroni & Semin, 2009). Importantly, in both studies, 
when facial muscle activity was blocked (inhibiting the muscular resonance to affective 
stimuli) processing time of affective stimuli was slower. This slow down was explained as 
resulting from the lack of differential somatic information (see for review Winkielman, 
Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008). Moreover, when the somatic activity of facial muscles was 
inhibited affective priming effects were not observed (Foroni & Semin, 2012). 
Studies using the affective priming task with verbal materials have typically included 
stimuli presented in L1. A few exceptions (see also Li, Liu, & Ma, 2015) can be found in the 
work by Segalowitz, Trofimovich, Gatbonton and Sokolovskaya (2008) using a task 
conceptually related to the affective priming paradigm (Implicit Affect Association Task - 
IAAT). The authors obtained the typical stimulus-pair congruency effect on RT in L1: in 
comparison with neutral trials, participants were faster (vs. slower) in congruent (vs. 
incongruent) trials. This interference effect was significantly smaller in L2 suggesting that the 
processing of valenced words in this condition is less automatic. Recently, Degner, 
Doycheva, and Wentura (2012) conducted a study with bilinguals aiming to assess automatic 
affective word processing that is central to the present work. Using both a semantic priming 
task and an affective priming task the authors found that semantic priming effects were 
independent of language. However, while affective priming effects were always found in L1, 
they only emerged in L2 for participants with high levels of language immersion and 
frequency of L2 use. 
3.1. Overview 
The current research is based on the assumption that L2 does not carry the same 
embodied intensity as L1. This assumption can be tested in an affective priming paradigm, 
comparing differences in performance across stimuli in L1 and L2. Thus, in two experiments, 
we examined whether the processing of affective prime-target combinations presented in L2 
(i.e., English for Portuguese native speakers) influences subsequent processing to the same 
extent as affective prime-target combinations presented in L1. Response time to target stimuli 
was the main dependent variable (e.g., Fazio et al., 1986). L1 and L2 was the within-
participants’ variable (language order counterbalanced). Experiment 1, used words as primes 
and targets, whereas Experiment 2 included both words and images (pictures of facial 
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expressions). In the latter, in half of the blocks words were used as primes and images as 
targets and in the other half the type of prime-target combination was reversed (see Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Word-Word task used in Experiment 1. 
Note: Face-Word and Word-Face task were used in Experiment 2. (A) and (C) are examples of congruent trials; 
(B) is an example of an incongruent trial. S.O.A. = Stimulus Onset Asynchrony. I.T.I = Inter Trial Interval. 
3.2. Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, using verbal stimuli only, we expected to detect affective priming 
effect (i.e., facilitation for congruent stimulus-pairs and inhibition for incongruent stimulus-
pairs) when the prime-target combinations were presented in L1, but not (or to a lesser 
extent) in L2.  
3.2.1. Method 
Participants and Design 
A sample of 114 university students (77.2% Females, Mage = 21.06, SD = 3.85) from 
ISCTE-IUL volunteered to participate in a laboratory study for partial course credit. All 
participants were native Portuguese speakers (L1), with good fluency in the English language 
as assessed through self-report (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Pavlenko, 2005).  
All participants reported starting learning L2 on a school setting, most of them when 
they were 10 years old (MoageL2 = 10, MageL2 = 8.41, SD = 2.14). The design included the 
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following factors: 3 (Prime valence: negative; neutral; positive) x 2 (Target valence: negative; 
positive) x 2 (Language: L1; L2). All factors were manipulated within-participants.  
Materials 
The prime stimulus set included 18 verbs (see Appendix A). Six verbs were negative 
("to enrage, to cry, to hate, to despise, to annoy and to terrify"), six were neutral ("to hammer, 
to seat, to answer, to hide, to cook and to swim") and six were positive ("to kiss, to smile, to 
entertain, to laugh, to love, to enjoy"). Most words were selected and adapted from the 
Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW, Bradley & Lang, 1999) adaptation for 
European Portuguese (Soares, Comesaña, Pinheiro, Simões, & Frade, 2012). The norms 
include the original English word and the Portuguese translation, so L1 and L2 words sets 
were alike. 
The target stimulus set included 12 adjectives. Half were negative ("upset, sad, 
selfish, sick, lonely, and unhappy") and the other half positive ("beautiful, kind, joyful, 
friendly, nice and happy"). These words were selected from the same normative set (Soares et 
al., 2012).  
Procedure 
Participants were invited to come to the laboratory to collaborate in a study aiming to 
“explore how people perceive and evaluate words”. All the procedures were conducted in line 
with the ethical guidelines of the host institution. After providing written consent, the 
instructions were presented using the E-Prime 2.0 software (Psychology Software Tools, 
2012). Each participant completed two blocks of trials - one in L1 and one in L2 - 
counterbalanced between participants.  
Standard affective priming instructions stated that pairs of words would be presented 
on screen, and that sometimes the words would be in Portuguese (L1) and other times in 
English (L2). Participants were then instructed to evaluate as quickly and accurately as 
possible the second word presented by pressing the corresponding key (S = Bad; L = Good; 
key assignment counterbalanced between-participants). The first task was a training phase 
that included four trials (one congruent and one incongruent trial per language). None of the 
stimulus used in the training phase were used in the experimental trials. Feedback was 
provided about response accuracy and response time. After the training phase, instructions 
stated that although feedback would not be provided in the subsequent tasks, participants 
should continue to answer as quickly and as accurately as possible. The affective priming 
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task was then introduced in two blocks (one L1 and one L2) of 36 trials each. A typical trial 
(see Figure 1) started with a fixation point (“*”, with a duration of 500 ms or 1500 ms, 
randomly defined). Next, the prime was presented (200 ms). After a blank screen (100 ms), 
the target was presented (S.O.A. = 300 ms). The target remained visible until a response was 
registered. The inter-trial interval was 3000 ms. The pairings between prime and target 
stimulus were randomized. The experiment lasted approximately 15 minutes. In the end of 
the experiment, participants were thanked for their participation and fully debriefed. 
3.2.2. Results 
Preliminary analysis  
Outliers were defined as below 300 ms and over 2500 ms (e.g., Bargh, Chaiken, 
Govender, & Pratto, 1992) and were excluded. This meant that 1.99 % of the data were 
removed. Then we calculated the proportion of overall hits per participant and per language. 
Whenever this proportion was below chance level (i.e., .50), we considered that the 
participant did not understand the tasks and thus was excluded from all analyses. This led to 
the exclusion of eight participants (seven of those obtained hit rates below chance in both L1 
and L2, final sample = 106). 
Response Accuracy 
The overall hit proportion was .92 (SE = .01) suggesting good performance on the 
task. In order to ascertain that the task was equally difficult in both languages a 2 (prime-
target congruency) x 2 (language) analysis of variance was performed on the overall hit 
proportion. As expected, we did not observe a main effect of language on hit proportion, 
F(1,105) = 1.34, MSE = .01, p = .250, ηp2 = .013, that was above .90 both for L1 (M = .92, SE 
= 0.01) and L2 trials (M = .91, SE = 0.01). The impact of congruency on hit proportion was 
only marginally significant, F(1,105) = 3.81, MSE = .05, p = .054, ηp2 = .035. Still, the 
pattern of means was in the expected direction with higher hit proportion when the stimulus 
pair was congruent (M = .93, SE = .01) versus incongruent (M = .91, SE = .01). The 
interaction between prime-target congruency and language was not significant, F < 1. 
In sum, the equivalent levels of accuracy observed in L1 and L2 indicated similar 
levels of comprehension (and task performance) across the two languages.  
Response Times (RT) 
Overall RT was 741 ms (SE = 17). Considering only the correct responses to the 
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target stimuli, a 2 (prime-target congruency) x 2 (language) analysis of variance was 
performed on RT. As expected, a main effect of Congruency was observed, F(1,105) = 5.97, 
MSE = 73777, p = .016, ηp2 = .054. Participants were faster to respond when the stimulus pair 
was congruent (M = 727, SE = 18) versus incongruent (M = 754, SE = 19). As expected, we 
also found a main effect of Language, with faster responses observed in L1 (M = 722, SE = 
20) versus L2 trials (M = 759, SE = 18), F(1,105) = 5.57, MSE = 147902, p = .020, ηp2 = 
.050. Importantly, the interaction between Congruency and Language was also significant, 
F(1,105) = 5.40, MSE = 45598, p = .022, η2 = .049 (see Figure 2). Specifically, and as 
predicted, the response to stimulus presented in L1 was faster in congruent trials (M = 698, 
SE = 19) than in incongruent ones (M = 745, SE = 23), t (105) = 3.06, p = .003. In contrast, 
RT to stimulus presented in L2 were similar in both congruent (M = 756, SE = 19) and 
incongruent trials (M = 762, SE = 20), t < 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Response times (ms) and standard errors as a function of prime-target congruency 
and stimulus language. 
We hypothesized that stronger affective priming effects would be observed in L1 
conditions (vs. L2). Data from Experiment 1 supports this prediction - when prime-target 
combinations were presented in L1, participants were faster to evaluate a target-word 
preceded by a congruent prime-word in comparison with incongruent trials. Prime-target 
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affective congruency did not have an impact on response times to prime-target combinations 
presented in L2.  
3.3. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2, we explored further the differences in automatic processing of 
affective stimuli in L1 and L2 by using words and photos as either prime or target stimuli. 
Previous studies have already shown that emotional facial stimuli induce facial muscle 
activation (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009; 2012) and that when this simulation processes is 
inhibited affective priming effects do not emerge. In this paper we argue that L2 does not 
offer the same sensorimotor opportunities as L1. As shown in Experiment 1, affective 
priming did not emerge in L2, suggesting that L2 is not affectively grounded to the same 
extent as L1 is.  
In Experiment 2, when emotional facial expressions are presented either as primes or 
targets, the effects of simulating valenced facial expressions may override the constraints 
imposed by the weak grounding of a second language. Both words (e.g., Bargh et al., 1992; 
Fazio et al., 1986) and images (e.g., Hermans, Spruyt, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003; Hermans, 
De Houwer, &, Eelen, 1994) are commonly used as both prime and target stimulus. Yet, in 
some studies primes and targets differ regarding presentation format: images used as primes 
and words as targets (e.g., Hermans et al., 2003; Foroni & Semin, 2012, Carroll & Young, 
2005) or vice-versa (e.g., Klauer, Eder, Greenwald, & Abrams, 2007). However photos of 
facial expressions are known to: (a) constitute strong affective cues; (b) recruit perceivers’ 
somatic activity, thus producing the same emotional expression in them (e.g., Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000), and (c) are processed very fast (De Houwer & Hermans, 
1994). Therefore, in Experiment 2, we expected the typical affective priming effects for L1 
since both types of prime-target combinations (L1 words as primes and facial expression 
photos as targets and vice-versa) are affectively grounded. For L2, two distinct patterns may 
emerge. On the one hand, in line with the predictions for Experiment 1, it is possible that 
when prime-target combinations are presented in L2, the impaired simulation process for L2 
may impede affective priming effects. However, the images of facial expressions (either as 
targets or primes) can nevertheless lead to affective priming effects regardless of language. 
This would indeed corroborate the strength and ease of processing of facial stimuli and the 
simulation processes they activate. In our view, and in line with an embodiment approach, the 
latter prediction is more likely. 
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3.3.1. Method 
Participants and Design 
A sample of 88 students (77.3% Females, Mage = 20.38, SD = 3.91) volunteered to 
participate in a laboratory study for monetary compensation. All participants were native 
Portuguese speakers (L1), with good fluency in the English language as assessed through 
self-report (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Pavlenko, 2005). All participants reported starting learning L2 
on a school setting, most of them when they were 11 years old (MoageL2 = 11, MageL2 = 9.81, 
SD = 2.22). The design included the following factors: 3 (Prime valence: negative; neutral; 
positive) x 2 (Target valence: negative; positive) x 2 (Language: L1; L2) x 2 (Priming task: 
words-faces; faces-words). All factors were manipulated within-participants. 
Materials 
The word stimulus set comprised the 12 valenced stimuli used as targets in 
Experiment 1, as well as six neutral ("shy, odd, moody, smooth, quick and astonished") 
words in Portuguese and in English (see Soares et al., 2012).  
The image stimulus set included 18 pictures selected from the Karolinska Directed 
Emotional Faces (Goeleven, De Raedt, Leyman, & Verschuere, 2008; Lundqvist, Flykt, & 
Öhman, 1998). Twelve images presented models displaying either a frowning expression 
(negative) or a smiling expression (positive). Six images portrayed models with a neutral 
facial expression. Half of the models were female. Images were presented in grey scale (232 
x 314 pixels). These image and word stimuli sets were used as primes or targets according to 
the specific affective priming task (see Appendix A). 
Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 1 with slight modifications. Participants 
were invited to come to the laboratory to collaborate in a study aiming to “explore how 
people perceive and evaluate different types of stimuli”. All the procedures were conducted 
in line with ethical guidelines of the host institution. After providing written consent, each 
participant completed two affective priming tasks (i.e., words-faces and faces-words, order 
counterbalanced between participants). Each of the tasks included two blocks: one block in 
which verbal stimuli was presented in L1 and the other in L2 (blocks were assigned in a 
random order).  
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Instructions stated that pairs of faces and words would be presented on the screen, and 
that sometimes the words would be in Portuguese (L1) and other times in English (L2). 
Participants were then instructed to evaluate as quickly and accurately as possible either the 
face presented after each word (words-faces task) or the word presented after each face 
(faces-words task). In order to respond participants were to press the corresponding key (S = 
Bad; L = Good; keys counterbalanced between-participants). 
Each task began with a training phase (eight trials, two congruent and two 
incongruent per language). None of the stimuli used in this phase appeared in the 
experimental tasks. As in Experiment 1, feedback about response time and accuracy was only 
provided during the training trials. Each affective priming block included 36 trials (trial 
features were also identical, see Figure 1). All the pairings between prime and target stimulus 
were randomized. Participants could rest between blocks of trials. The average duration of 
each session was 20 minutes. In the end of the session, participants were thanked for their 
collaboration and fully debriefed. 
3.3.2. Results 
As in Experiment 1, we excluded responses below 300 ms and over 2500 ms 
(removing 0.81% of the data) and calculated the overall hits proportion by participant, by 
language and by task. We also excluded all participants with hits proportion equal or below 
chance level. This led to the exclusion of six participants (two of those obtained hit rates 
below chance in both L1 and L2, final sample = 82). 
Response Accuracy 
The overall hit proportion was .93 (SE = .01) suggesting a good performance on the 
task. In order to verify that task performance in both languages was equally difficult, a 2 
(prime-target congruency) x 2 (language) x 2 (task) analysis of variance was performed on 
hits proportion. As expected, a higher proportion of hits was observed when the stimulus pair 
was congruent (M = .95, SE = .01) versus incongruent (M = .92, SE = .01), F(1,78) = 15.76, 
MSE = .10, p < .001, ηp2 = .168. Congruency interacted with task, F(1,78) = 13.72, MSE = 
.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .150. Specifically, when the task was to evaluate Faces, a higher hits 
proportion was observed when the stimulus pair was congruent (M = .96, SE = .01) versus 
incongruent (M = .91, SE = .01). In contrast, when the task was to evaluate Words, the hit 
proportion observed with congruent stimulus pairs (M = .94, SE = .01) was identical to the hit 
proportion observed in incongruent pairs (M = .94, SE = .01). No other effect reached 
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significance, F <1. Again, the absence of accuracy differences due to stimulus presentation 
language indicated that participants were equally efficient in performing both tasks in L1 and 
L2. 
Response Times  
Overall RT was 604 ms (SE = 12). Considering only correct responses to the target 
stimuli, a 2 (prime-target congruency) x 2 (language) x 2 (task) analysis of variance was 
performed on RT. Similarly to Experiment 1, a main effect of language emerged with faster 
RT observed with stimuli presented in L1 (M = 590, SE = 12) versus L2 (M = 620, SE = 13), 
F(1,78) = 22.55, MSE = 137118, p < .001, ηp2 = .224. Also, there was an interaction between 
language and task, F(1,78) = 8.43, MSE = 59220, p = .005, ηp2 = .097 (see Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Response times (ms) and standard errors according to affective priming task and 
stimulus language. 
When the task was to evaluate Words, participants were faster in L1 (M = 588, SE = 
12) than in L2 (M = 637, SE = 13), t(78) = 5.33, p < .001, d = 1.21. When the task was to 
evaluate Faces, participants were equally fast irrespective of whether the prime was in L1 (M 
= 592, SE = 14) or in L2 (M = 602, SE = 17), t(78) = 1.11, p = .268, d = 0.25. Therefore, 
when participants’ task was to evaluate target words, L2 represented a disadvantage that was 
not observed when the task was to evaluate target faces, t(78) = 2.48, p = .015, d = 0.56. 
As expected, we found a congruence main effect of on response times, with faster 
responses observed when the stimulus pair was congruent (M = 589, SE = 11) versus 
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incongruent (M = 621, SE = 14), F(1,78) = 52.31, MSE = 162076, p < .001, ηp2 = .401. 
Congruency interacted with task, F(1,78) = 5.51, MSE = 20435, p = .021, ηp2 = .066 (see 
Figure 4), revealing that affective priming seems to be stronger when the task was to evaluate 
faces. Participants were faster in evaluating faces in congruent (M = 576, SE = 12.82) than 
incongruent trials (M = 619, SE = 17.69), t(78) = 5.50, p < .001, d = 1.25. When evaluating 
words, the difference between response times in congruent (M = 602, SE = 12) and 
incongruent trials (M = 623, SE = 12), was smaller but still significant, t(78) = 4.22, p < .001, 
d = 0.96. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Response times (ms) and standard errors of the interaction between task and prime-
target congruency. 
The three-way interaction was not significant, F(1,78) = 1.63, MSE = 4267, p = .205, 
ηp
2 
= .020, and neither were the other effects (F <1).  
3.4. General Discussion 
In the present work, we systematically examined the differences in automatic 
affective processing between L1 and L2 using the affective priming paradigm. Experiment 1 
included verbal stimuli, and each participant classified a target word presented either in L1 or 
L2 in terms of its valence. The typical affective priming effect was found for L1: faster 
responses to the target in congruent trials in comparison to incongruent trials. As predicted 
these effects were not observed in L2. Importantly, we observed the same accuracy levels in 
both languages. Thus, it is highly unlikely that our results are due to differences in stimuli 
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comprehension. Moreover, we also found an overall advantage of processing affective 
information in L1. The fact that participants were slower to evaluate stimuli in L2 suggests 
that simulation is more difficult in this case (see Foroni, 2015; Foroni & Semin, 2012).  
In Experiment 2 we included two types of stimuli (valenced words and faces) both as 
primes or targets. Affective priming was observed in both L1 and L2 suggesting that the 
simulation of valenced facial expressions reduced the constraints imposed by a second 
language. As in the Experiment 1, accuracy levels were independent of language and overall 
response times were slower in L2. 
Although comparisons between studies are to be made with caution, overall response 
times were faster when images of facial expressions were included. Indeed, despite having 
the same simple dichotomous evaluation task, in Experiment 2 participants were about 130 
ms faster than in Experiment 1 (see De Houwer & Hermans, 1994). This also corroborates 
the idea that, in comparison with words, images of faces are powerful in conveying affective 
cues and facilitate simulation. It should be noted that in a comparison of the two tasks in 
Experiment 2, overall classification was faster when the targets were photos than when the 
words. Moreover, congruent responses were faster to photo targets than to word targets were. 
Our findings are potentially relevant for several research domains. First, they are 
relevant for the bilingualism research by confirming an advantage in the processing of 
affective verbal information in L1 compared to L2. Second, experimental studies in L2 are 
still scarce, particularly in an embodiment framework. Our results are consistent with a 
simulation account suggesting that whereas L1 is predominantly embodied L2 is more 
representational, that is, less grounded by sensory motor processes. Third, our findings are 
also informative for the affective priming domain by demonstrating the robustness of the 
effect with different types of stimulus formats (i.e., photos and words). 
In an increasingly globalized world, distances and differences between people can be 
reduced by means of a powerful tool – a common language. Such a shared tool promotes the 
effectiveness of communication as well as the acquisition and sharing of knowledge. 
Nonetheless, past research has suggested that communicating emotion in a native language 
differs from doing so in a foreign language. There is considerable evidence suggesting that 
processing information in L1 differs from processing language in L2. In line with previous 
research, our view is that such differences emerge because L2 does not carry the same 
embodied intensity as L1. 
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It is virtually impossible to imagine human life without communication. Importantly, 
communication takes place nowadays in a multicultural world, where distances and 
differences are shortened trough the utilization of a powerful tool – a common language. The 
increasing need of using a common language has led many to become bilingual. Indeed, more 
than half of the world’s population knows at least two, and often more, languages (Grosjean, 
2010).  
Behavioral and neuroscience studies have been providing evidence that language is 
embodied - language is grounded on sensorimotor systems and language comprehension 
requires, at least partially, experience simulation (see Barsalou, 1999a, 2008; Fischer & 
Zwaan, 2008; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012, Meteyard, Cuadrado, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2012). 
For example, studies have shown that sensibility judgments were faster when the direction 
implied by the sentence matched the direction of the participants’ hand movement (Glenberg 
& Kaschak, 2002); that reading emotion words (e.g., angry; happy) automatically activates 
the correspondent facial muscles (i.e. corrugator supercilii and zygomatic major, 
respectively) in the perceiver, with impact on his/her judgments (Foroni & Semin, 2009); and 
that language comprehension activates perceptual information, by leading people to adopt 
spatial perspectives that were consistent with the sentences content (Borghi, Glenberg, & 
Kaschak, 2004).  
However, studies in language embodiment have been mainly focused on monolingual 
populations, and on the impact of first-native language (L1) on thought and behavior (e.g., 
Barsalou, 2008; Foroni & Semin, 2009; 2013; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). On the contrary, the 
implications of experiencing, processing and comprehending a second-learned language (L2) 
have been hardly investigated. Only recently, a few studies have acknowledge that L2 
comprehension also requires experience simulation (e.g., De Grauwe, Willems, 
Rueschemeyer, Lemhöfer, & Schriefers, 2014; Dudschig, de la Vega, & Kaup, 2014), 
although not to the same extent as L1 comprehension (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Vukovic & 
Shtyrov, 2014). 
Importantly, simulations are situated, since they are limited by the bodily, physical, 
and social context of a goal-directed agent (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; Yeh & Barsalou, 2006). 
The level of construal at which an event is represented (Maglio & Trope, 2012), and the 
linguistic context (i.e. L1 or L2; Foroni, 2015; Li, Liu, & Ma, 2015) are some of the 
identified contextual constraints to simulation, constituting boundaries for the impact of 
bodily information on thought.  
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In this article we will examine whether different linguistic contexts – L1 and L2 - 
provide distinct groundings for cognition and action, by arguing that they are embodied in 
different ways. More specifically, we will investigate whether the lack of association between 
L2 and concrete sensorimotor experiences will induce a more abstract higher level mindset, 
relative to L1, which in turn will result in higher perceived psychological distance from social 
targets. This argument relies essentially on evidence from bilingualism, Construal Level 
Theory (CLT) and embodied cognition frameworks, which will be briefly described in the 
following sections. 
Second Language and Psychological Distance 
It is commonly stated that if the first-native language is the language of emotional 
intensity, the second language may be the language of emotional distance (e.g., Dewaele & 
Pavlenko, 2002). Bilinguals are often described as presenting a detachment effect – with L2 
serving an intellectual function relatively devoid of emotion, and L1 clearly expressing 
emotional content (e.g., Marcos, 1976). Therefore, language code-switching - defined as 
“changes from one language to another in the course of conversation” (Li, 2007, p. 14) - from 
L1 to L2 often serves a distancing function from the high emotionality triggered by the native 
language (e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986; Gumperz & Hernandez, 1971; Javier & Marcos, 1989).  
More than 100 years ago Freud and his disciples had already observed that their bi-
multilingual patients favored their L2 or LX (i.e., a language that is not L1) when using 
obscene words and discussing anxiety-inducing topics (e.g., Freud, 1893). Studies of code-
switching describe how using a second-language often serves a distancing function (Gumperz 
& Hernandez, 1971; Javier & Marcos, 1989). Moreover, patients code-switched to L2 when 
they wanted to convey a self-confident, calm and emotionally reserved impression (e.g., 
Gonzalez-Reigosa, 1976), and when they wanted to discuss negative emotional events 
without experiencing the strong arousal triggered by L1 (e.g., Santiago-Rivera, Altarriba, 
Poll, Gonzalez-Miller, & Cragun, 2009).  
Bond and Lai (1986) also observed that when interviewing one another in Cantonese 
(L1) and English (L2) female participants spoke longer about embarrassing topics (e.g., 
sexual attitudes of Chinese and Westerners) in L2 than in L1. Overall, speakers switch into 
L1 to convey intimacy, we-ness, and to express their emotions, and to L2 to express emotions 
in a detached way, outgroup attitudes, and to mark distance from what they are saying (see 
Pavlenko, 2012).  
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The described results suggest that L2 can be used to distance oneself from the high 
emotionality triggered by L1. Indeed, research on bilingualism not only confirms the greater 
emotional resonance of L1 over L2 (e.g., Dewaele, 2004, 2008; Harris, Ayçiçegi, & Gleason, 
2003), but also specifies when this difference between languages is expected (see Perani & 
Abutalebi, 2005). 
The reported differences between L1 and L2 have been explained in terms of their 
learning and usage histories (i.e. language dominance, frequency of use, proficiency, context 
and age of acquisition). Language is experienced as emotional because it is learned and used 
in emotional contexts (Harris, Gleason, & Ayçiçegi, 2006). L1 is usually learned in the 
context of family life, which generally includes intense emotional experiences, and integrates 
information received from all sensory modalities, including kinesthetic and visceral 
(Pavlenko, 2008). In contrast, L2 is frequently mastered in more emotionally neutral formal 
settings (e.g., school, work) (Bond & Lai, 1986), and its acquisition takes place without 
significant involvement of the majority of sensory modalities (Perani & Abutalebi, 2005).  
Furthermore, the contexts of early childhood are usually more emotional than the 
contexts of later childhood/adulthood (e.g., Harris et al., 2006), and it is during this phase that 
language meaning is closely related to the body. In the sensorimotor stage (birth-2 years old) 
infants gain knowledge of the world from the physical actions they perform within it, while in 
the preoperational stage (2-7 years old) the child learns to speak while motor skills are 
acquired and developed. Furthermore, in the concrete operational stage (7-11 years old) 
children can apply logic but only to physical concrete objects (Piaget's theory of cognitive 
development; see Fischer, 1980). Therefore, besides being a particularly emotional phase, 
during childhood, thought is centered on a sensorimotor way of thinking and communicating.  
Although L2 seems to be acquired through the same neural devices responsible for L1 
acquisition (Perani & Abutalebi, 2005) and to share the same brain language systems (e.g., 
Frenck-Mestre, Anton, Roth, Vaid, & Viallet, 2005; Kovelman, Baker, & Petitto, 2008), the 
patterns of brain activation associated with linguistic processing in those languages are 
modulated by several factors, such as the amount of language exposure, and particularly, 
proficiency and age of acquisition (e.g., Park, Badzakova-Trajkov, & Waldie, 2012; Perani & 
Abutalebi, 2005; Wartenburger et al., 2003). Brain imaging studies typically report that in 
subjects with comparable levels of proficiency, late bilinguals (LBs) present a higher amount 
of activation in L2 than in L1 (e.g., Kovelman et al., 2008; Perani et al., 2003; Vingerhoets et 
al., 2003; Wartenburger et al., 2003). Moreover, subjects learning their L2 later in life (LBs) 
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activate distinct regions of the brain for L1 and L2, while for early bilinguals (EBs) an 
overlapping activation for L1 and L2 was observed (see Hagen, 2008).  
Thus, from an embodied perspective different physical, social and cognitive effects 
may arise from L1 and L2, for people learning L1 during childhood and L2 later in life (LBs), 
because the two languages have different sensorimotor groundings. On the contrary, for 
people acquiring L1 and L2 in the context of childhood (EBs) these differences are at least 
subtler, because the two languages are associated with similar sensorimotor experiences.  
Recent studies have shown that subjective reports of the perceived emotional intensity 
of phrases like ‘I love you’ or of taboo words were perceived as stronger in L1 than in L2 
(e.g., Dewaele, 2004; 2008), and that L2 perceptions of emotional strength decreased with 
higher age of acquisition (AoA), lower proficiency and frequency of use, among others. 
The argument of lower emotional resonance of L2 was further supported by 
psychophysiological indicators, namely by weaker skin conductance responses (SCRs) 
triggered by childhood reprimands in L2 relative to L1 (Harris et al., 2003). Importantly, this 
difference was only observed for LBs who have also rated L1 reprimands as more unpleasant 
than L2 ones (Harris, 2004). However, the inconsistent findings reported in this domain (see 
(Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009; Caldwell-Harris, Tong, Lung, & Poo, 2011), and 
their limitation to childhood reprimands, required further examination of whether emotional 
resonance occurs to a less extent for L2 than for L1.  
Other studies have shown a reduced effect of biases on decision-making in L2, 
relative to L1, suggesting an impaired emotionality in this linguistic context (Costa, Foucart, 
Arnon, Aparici, & Apesteguia, 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012). Consistently, when 
facing a moral dilemma, more utilitarian and less emotional choices were made in a L2 than 
in a L1 linguistic context (e.g., Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa et al., 2014; Geipel, Hadjichristidis, 
& Surian, 2015b). Moreover, moral violations (e.g., consensual incest) were judged less 
harshly in L2 than in L1 by LBs (Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015a). 
Other findings seem to suggest that processing affective valence is less automatic in 
L2 than in L1, which reduces interference effects in this language (Segalowitz, Trofimovich, 
Gatbonton, & Sokolovskaya, 2008). In another study, it was shown that while semantic 
priming effects were observed both in L1 and L2, affective priming effects were found only 
in L1. Importantly, affective priming effects in L2 were only observed for participants with a 
frequent everyday usage of L2 (Degner, Doycheva, & Wentura, 2012).Taking these findings 
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together, literature suggests that emotional resonance is hindered in a L2 context. However, 
only recently this question has been addressed within an embodied/grounded cognition 
framework. It has been argued that the reported differences between L1 and L2 express 
different embodiments of these languages, which lead to different simulations of experience.  
In a very recent study, Li and colleagues (2015) explored the impact of the 
communicative context on the relation between sensorimotor information and thought, 
namely on the vertical spatial metaphor of affect (“good is up”; e.g., Meier & Robinson, 
2004). LBs participants were faster to judge congruent pairs of words (e.g., positive word 
presented up) when the words were presented in L1 but not in L2. These results indicate that 
the grounding of abstract domains in concrete physical experiences is hindered in L2.  
The proposal of partial disembodiment in L2 was recently, and to our knowledge for 
the first time, examined by Foroni (2015) who investigated whether the somatic bases (i.e., 
facial muscle simulation) of L2 were similar or different from the ones observed for L1 (e.g., 
Foroni & Semin, 2013). Dutch native speakers, who were English LBs, read emotion 
sentences that were either in the affirmative (‘I am laughing’) or negative form (‘I am not 
laughing), and were either relevant (‘I am smiling’) or irrelevant (‘I am frowning’) for the 
activation of the zygomatic major muscle. Results indicated that reading affirmative 
sentences involved simulation in both L1 and L2, but reading L2 sentences in the negative 
form did not activate a significant relaxation of the relevant muscle, contrary to what was 
observed for L1 (see Foroni & Semin, 2013). Thus, whereas processing emotional language 
in L1 relies on simulations, in L2 simulations are only partial because they are not activated 
for more complex and abstract forms of thought (i.e., negation).  
The results of Li and colleagues (2015) and Foroni (2015) indicate that L2 seems to 
lack, to a certain extent, previous relevant sensorimotor experiences to be encoded in the 
multimodal system to be fully simulated, which attenuated the influence of contextual bodily 
states on cognition in L2. 
Construal-Level and Psychological Distance 
According to CLT, any given person, object, or event can be represented at different 
levels of construal, on a continuum of concreteness-abstractness (Liberman & Trope, 2008; 
Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 
2007). Whereas low-level construals are concrete, contextualized, situated representations, 
including subordinate and incidental features of events, high-level construals are abstract, de-
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contextualized, coherent, and prototypical representations that emphasize superordinate, core 
features of events (Liberman & Trope, 2008). Thus, moving from a low to a high-level 
representation requires the retention of central features and the omission of incidental 
characteristics of an object or event (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Vallacher and Wegner’s (1987) action identification theory suggests that actions may 
be represented in terms of superordinate (“why”) or subordinate (“how”) goals, being the 
former related with more abstract and the later with more concrete aspects of an action. For 
instance, the action “attending a class” may be construed in relatively concrete terms by 
thinking in “sitting in a classroom” and “listening to a professor”, or more abstractly, as 
“gaining knowledge” and “learning about psychology”. Whereas the concrete representations 
of an action make the place and with whom – contextual features – available, the abstract 
representation can take place in many contexts and with different people. Notably, concrete 
representations focus one’s attention on the actions that can be performed with one’s body, 
such as sitting and listening, while this information is absent in a more abstract frame of 
mind. Hence, sensorimotor information responsible for grounding cognition constitutes per se 
an incidental, and thus concrete low-level feature of a situation.  
For example, Maglio and Trope (2012) investigated whether different mindsets might 
hinder or facilitate the influence of bodily states on cognition. Participants in the low-level 
mindset made longer length estimates when wearing, rather than not wearing a backpack 
(Study 1; see Proffitt, Stefanucci, Banton, & Epstein, 2003) and higher importance estimates 
when holding a heavy, rather than a lighter clipboard (Study 2; see Jostmann, Lakens, & 
Schubert, 2009), with no differences in estimates found in the high-level condition. These 
results indicate that the effects arising from concrete sensorimotor cues are stronger in a 
concrete frame of mind. When thinking abstractly, mental representation and judgment are 
less influenced by bodily states, suggesting that an abstract frame of mind is associated with 
disembodied cognition.  
Hence, from a socially situated cognition point of view (e.g., Semin & Garrido, 2015; 
(Semin, Garrido, & Palma, 2012, 2013; Semin & Smith, 2002, 2013; Smith & Semin, 2004), 
our construal of events is flexible and adaptive to the demands of a continuously changing 
social and physical environment. Therefore, the analysis of how people construe events must 
consider the communication context in which events take place (Jiga-Boy, Clark, & Semin, 
2013). If the communication context impacts the level at which an object or event is 
represented, it should also affect the perceived psychological distance from that object or 
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event, since construal-level and psychological distance are inherently related to each other 
(e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2010).  
An event is psychologically distant whenever it is not part of one’s direct experience – 
for example, when it happens to people less and less like oneself, people from whom one 
perceives a high social distance (e.g., Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2011). Social distance, as 
one dimension of psychological distance, is affected by the level at which an event is 
construed. For example, dimensions reflecting social distance (i.e., politeness) increased 
when the addressees were construed abstractly (Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2010). 
Moreover, a concrete mindset, rather than an abstract mindset, produced an increase in 
perceived social closeness between the self and a target. This pattern of results was found 
when social distance was measured both as perceived familiarity, similarity to the self, and 
resources allocation (Stephan et al., 2011). 
Overall, the revised literature shows that construal level is sensible to the context, and 
that changes in construal level affect judgments of perceived social distance. It is, therefore, 
possible that different linguistic contexts, such as using L1 or L2, may activate different 
levels of construal and, consequently, induce differences in perceived social distance. 
4.1. Overview 
In the following studies we aim to experimentally test whether L2 leads to higher 
perceived social distance than L1. We will also investigate what is the psychological 
mechanism explaining this relation. The results outlined in the previous section suggest that 
the linguistic context may affect perception of psychological distance, namely that L2 may 
lead to higher psychological distance than L1. If that is the case, the language in use should 
influence the judgments of a specific dimension of psychological distance – social distance – 
in a consistent way. Moreover, in an abstract mindset, concrete sensorimotor cues are 
omitted, as they seem to be in L2. We argue that as sensorimotor information is considered a 
concrete cue (Maglio & Trope, 2012), and processing L2 (but not L1) seems to lack the 
integration and the opportunity for simulating these concrete physical experiences at least for 
LBs (Foroni, 2015; Li, et al., 2015), the level at which L2 is processed should be more 
abstract than L1 for LBs. Finally, we argue that as level of construal affects social distance 
judgments (e.g., Stephan et al., 2010, 2011), for LBs level of construal should be the 
mechanism underlying the relation between linguistic context and social distance.  
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In three studies we will experimentally test whether L2 (vs. L1) leads to higher 
perceived social distance, measuring social distance as perceived familiarity, similarity to the 
self (Study 1) and amount of resources allocation (Study 3). Moreover, we will investigate 
whether L2 triggers higher-level conceptual (Study 2) and perceptual (Study 3) construal than 
L1, for LBs. Finally, we will test the complete model, that is, whether for LBs the linguistic 
context (L1 vs. L2) affects social distance judgments through level of construal (Study 3).  
Previous studies found that positive mood broadens people’s information processing, 
whereas negative mood leads to more local information processing (e.g., Gasper & Clore, 
2002; Isen & Daubman, 1984). Thus, participants’ mood was also assessed to rule out the 
possibility that level of construal, and consequently social distance, are affected by this 
variable. 
Before taking part in the experiment, potential participants were asked to complete the 
Cambridge English Questionnaire online5 to assess their English level. Participants scoring at 
least 13 in this 25 multiple-choice questionnaire (medium level of English), identifying 
Portuguese as their native language (L1) and nationality, and English as a non-native learned 
language (L2) were selected to participate in the experiments. In contrast with previous 
studies that approached bilingualism as a ‘‘generic’’ condition (Pavlenko, 2012), we will 
include L2 Age of Acquisition (AoA) in our analyses, in line with previous findings showing 
that this is one of the most important modulators of linguistic effects (e.g., Harris, 2004; Park, 
et al., 2012; Perani & Abutalebi, 2005; Wartenburger et al., 2003). The comparison between 
EBs and LBs, absent from previous studies (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Li et al., 2015), will support 
and strengthen the claim that differences between L1 and L2 are due to different previous 
sensorimotor experiences with these languages.  
4.2. Experiment 1 
Results reported in the bilingualism literature suggest that L2 can be used with a 
distancing purpose. However, this assumption mainly derives from a few case studies, on 
therapists’ perceptions, and on qualitative data and was hardly empirically tested.  
Experiment 1 experimentally examines whether the linguistic context impacts 
perceptions of social distance, as well as the association of positive social traits (i.e. social 
positivity) to social targets. Participants will read about social targets actions and write small 
                                                 
5
 http://www.cambridgeenglish.org/in/test-your-english/adult-learners/ 
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narratives about their behaviors in L1 or L2. Then, they will evaluate each target on measures 
of social distance and social positivity. 
We predict that L2 induces social distance, measured as perceived familiarity and 
similarity to the self (see Stephan et. al, 2011), to a greater extent than L1. Moreover, as 
familiar and similar stimuli tend to be seen as more positive, pleasant and likable (e.g., 
Zajonc, 1968; see for review, Bornstein, 1989) and even induce positive mood (Garcia-
Marques & Mackie, 2000) we expect that L2 will also lead to the association of less positive 
social traits (i.e., friendly, nice, and intelligent) to social targets than L1. As the relation 
between familiarity and positive affect exert a bi-directional influence (e.g., Garcia-Marques, 
Mackie, Claypool, & Garcia-Marques, 2010) participants’ mood will be measure to assure 
that the effects of linguistic context on familiarity and similarity are not mediated by different 
affects triggered by different linguistic contexts. 
Importantly, one forms impressions, makes judgments and decisions regarding people 
that are present in the here and now, but also regarding people that are removed from direct 
experience. Therefore, we will assess judgments of social distance and social positivity 
regarding social targets placed in the participants’ here and now (the experimenter), and 
targets with whom participants do not have direct contact with (fictitious social targets).  
4.2.1. Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred twenty-five native Portuguese students (74.4% female, Mage = 22.3, 
SDage = 3.71) participated in this experiment in exchange for a 5€ voucher. Ten participants 
were excluded from the analyses6: Two groups of bilinguals were created based on the self-
reported L2 Age of Acquisition: the EBs (AoA ≤ 9 years old) and the LBs (AoA ≥ 10 years 
old). Importantly, in Portugal, English formal instruction officially starts in the 5th grade 
when most students are 10 years old.  
EBs and LBs groups reported significantly different levels of L2 general Proficiency 
(M = 5.77, SD = 0.68 vs. M = 5.36, SD = 0.65; t(113) = 3.27; p = .001), as assessed by 
averaging the proficiency self-reports (in 7 point scales) of L2 speaking, understanding, 
reading and writing for each participant. Moreover, both EBs and LBs, reported better 
                                                 
6
 Four participants were excluded because their native language was both Portuguese and English or because 
they had double nationality; and the remaining six because their general self-reported proficiency assessed at the 
end of the experiment was below the scale midpoint (below 4). 
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general proficiency in L1 (M = 6.80, SD = 0.46; M = 6.87, SD = 0.24, respectively) than in 
L2 (M = 5.77, SD = 0.68; M = 5.36, SD = 0.65, both ps = .001), being participants in both 
groups unbalanced bilinguals.  
 In our final 2 X 2 between-subjects design the L1 condition included EBs (n = 31) 
and LBs (n = 25), and the L2 included EBs (n = 32) and LBs (n = 27) participants.  
Materials and Procedure  
After signing the informed consent participants were randomly assigned either to the 
L1 or L2 condition, by an experimenter who was blind to the experimental conditions. In the 
L1 condition all the information presented as well as participants’ answers were in 
Portuguese and in the L2 condition in English. Participants were told they were going to 
participate in a study about social judgments that intended to explore how people think about 
actions performed by others. Afterwards, they read six short descriptions about fictitious 
social targets (e.g., “Alice is feeding a stray cat”; “Daniel is inviting guests to a party”; 
“Diana is smoking in the park” adapted from Stephan et. al, 2011, Study 3), and a final 
description about the experimenter (“Catarina is collecting data in the laboratory”) (see 
Appendix B). They were told they should imagine each situation and write about it as much 
as they could. 
After writing for 1m about a behavioral description, they completed the respective 
social distance and the social positivity scales. Social distance was measured as perceived 
Familiarity (e.g., “How familiar does Alice seem to be?”) in a scale from “1- Not at all 
familiar” to “7- Very Familiar”; and Similarity to the self (e.g., “How similar to you does 
Alice seem to be?”) in a scale from “1-Not at all similar” to “7-Very similar”. Social 
Positivity judgments were measured by asking how friendly (from “1-Not at all friendly” to 
“7-Very friendly”), nice (from “1-Not at all nice” to “7-Very nice”), and intelligent (from “1-
Not at all intelligent” to “7-Very intelligent”) a social target seemed to be (see Liviatan, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2008; Stephan et. al, 2011). 
Subsequently, participants indicated their general mood by answering to the question 
“How do you feel at this moment?” in a 7-point scale (from “1- very bad” to “7-very good”) 
(Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Liberman & Förster, 2009a). Finally, they filled an 
adaptation of the Bilingualism and Emotions Questionnaire (BEQ; Dewaele & Pavlenko 
2001–2003), answering to questions regarding their L1 and L2’s linguistic histories: 
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dominant language, L1 and L2 context of acquisition, proficiency (speaking, understanding, 
reading and writing), frequency of use and age of acquisition (AoA). 
4.2.2. Results and Discussion. 
Measures of social distance and social positivity, regarding the fictitious social targets 
and the experimenter, were submitted to separate Univariate Analyses of Variance 
(ANOVAs) with Linguistic Context (L1; L2) and AoA (EBs; LBs) as between-subjects 
variables. None of the analyses revealed AoA main effect or Linguistic Context *AoA 
interaction (all Fs < 1.97; all ps > .16). Thus, the subsequent analyses include AoA in the 
statistic model, but only Linguistic Context main effects will be reported. 
Social Distance  
The two Univariate ANOVAs performed on the Familiarity and Similarity indexes 
concerning fictitious social targets did not reveal any effects of the Linguistic Context (both 
Fs <1). However, these effects were observed on Familiarity and Similarity ratings about the 
experimenter. Participants evaluated the experimenter as significantly more familiar in the L1 
(M = 5.07, SD = 1.66) than in the L2 condition (M = 4.34, SD = 1.94), F(1,114) = 5.32, p = 
.02, η2 = .046. Moreover, they considered the experimenter to be more similar to the self in 
the L1 (M = 4.30, SD = 1.82) than in the L2 condition (M = 3.66, SD = 1.87) albeit the effect 
was only marginal, F(1,114) = 3.63, p = .059, η2 = .032.  
Social Positivity  
The three Univariate ANOVAs performed on the Niceness, Friendliness and 
Intelligence indexes regarding the fictitious social targets, did not yield any Linguistic 
Context main effect (all ps > .15). Again, when evaluating the experimenter, Linguistic 
Context main effects were observed for both Niceness F(1,114) = 4.63, p = .03, η2 = .04, and 
Friendliness ratings F(1,114) = 6.87, p = .01, η2 = .058. Participants in the L1 condition 
considered the experimenter to be nicer (M = 5.27, SD = 1.12) and more friendly (M = 5.29, 
SD = 1.17) than in the L2 condition (M = 4.81, SD = 1.12 and M = 4.71, SD = 1.11, 
respectively). No Linguistic Context main effect was observed for intelligence ratings (F <1). 
Mood  
Mood was not affected by the Linguistic Context condition or its interaction with 
AoA (both ps > .17). Although mood correlated positively with judgments of how nice (r = 
.23, p = .01) and how intelligent (r = .24, p = .01) the experimenter was (the other 
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correlations p = n.s), the pattern of the influence of linguistic context on ratings of familiarity, 
similarity, niceness, friendliness (all ps < .05) and intelligence (p = .91) of the experimenter 
remained the same when controlling for mood, as determined by analyses of covariance 
(ANCOVAs).  
Overall the results from Experiment 1 suggest that our predictions were partially 
confirmed. Judgments of perceived social distance (familiarity and similarity) as well as of 
social positivity (niceness and friendliness) were lower in L2 than in L1 condition. The 
linguistic context did not affect intelligence ratings, probably because familiarity is 
essentially related with pleasantness and likability (see Garcia-Marques, et al., 2010; Zajonc, 
1968), which are more associated with social rather than cognitive traits. Notably, mood was 
ruled out as possible mediator of the relations between Linguistic Context and both Social 
Distance and Social Positivity. However, these findings did not generalize to fictitious social 
targets and AoA did not play a role in the described effects. These finding will be further 
discussed in the final section. 
4.3. Experiment 2 
Several studies have shown that the impact of sensorimotor information on thought is 
limited by cognitive and contextual boundaries, whether they are one’s level of construal 
(Maglio & Trope, 2012) or the linguistic context (Foroni, 2015; Li et al., 2015). Could these 
two dimensions be interrelated? We suggest that probably yes.  
L2 learning and use takes place in contexts that do not provide the same opportunities 
as L1 for the integration of sensorimotor information in conceptual thought (Pavlenko, 2008; 
Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). If processing L2 seems to lack the integration and simulation of 
concrete sensorimotor experiences for LBs (Foroni, 2015; Li, et al., 2015), and these 
experiences are discounted from an abstract frame of mind (Maglio & Trope, 2012), we 
predict that L2 will be more likely associated with higher level Conceptual Construal than 
L1, at least for LBs. On the other hand, as native language integrates concrete information 
received from all sensorimotor modalities, which is re-enacted during language 
comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 2008), we predict that the processing and comprehension of 
the same sentences in L1 will be more likely associated with lower level Conceptual 
Construal than in L2, at least for LBs. For EBs, no differences in level of Conceptual 
Construal between languages are expected, as they are likely to be equally grounded in 
concrete sensorimotor experiences.  
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To test this hypothesis, participants were asked to write a narrative about their 
everyday lives either in L1 or L2. Then they were asked to complete a task measuring their 
level of conceptual construal.  
4.3.1. Method 
Participants and Design  
One hundred one native Portuguese (76.2% female; Mage = 21.5, SDage = 4.42) 
participated in this experiment in exchange of a 5€ voucher. Six participants were excluded 
from the analyses7.  
As in Experiment 1, different groups of bilinguals were created. EBs (L2 AoA ≤ 9) 
and LBs (L2 AoA ≥ 10) who reported the same level of L2 general Proficiency (M = 3.72, 
SD = 0.49 vs. M = 3.65, SD = 0.55; t(93) = .83; p > .52), as assessed by averaging the 
proficiency self-reports (in 5 point scales) of L2 speaking, understanding, reading and writing 
for each participant. Moreover, both EBs and LBs, reported better general Proficiency in L1 
(M = 4.70, SD = 0.41 and M = 4.72, SD = 0.45, respectively) than in L2 (M = 3.72; SD = 0.49 
and M = 3.65; SD= 0.55, p < .001), being unbalanced bilinguals. L1 condition was constituted 
by EBs (n = 24) and LBs (n = 22), and L2 condition was composed by EBs (n = 20) and LBs 
(n = 29). 
Materials and Procedure 
 Participants were informed they were going to participate in a pre-test about 
Construction of Narratives, which examined how people interpret different events in their 
lives (adapted from Liberman et al., 2007). After signing the informed consent and being 
randomly assigned to the L1 or L2 conditions by an experimenter who was blind to the 
experimental conditions, participants were informed that they should write in English 
(Portuguese) about an average, normal, typical weekday in their lives. A neutral task was 
used to avoid effects of valence on construal level (see Gasper & Clore, 2002).  
After writing for seven minutes, participants’ level of Conceptual Construal was 
assessed using the Behavior Identification Form (BIF; Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). In BIF, 
each of the 25 action-sentences (e.g., Pushing a door bell) is followed by a higher level (e.g., 
“Seeing if someone’s home”) or a lower level restatement (e.g., “Moving a finger”), and 
                                                 
7
 Two participants were excluded because their L1 was both Portuguese and English, and the remaining four 
because their self-reported general proficiency was below the midpoint of the 5-point scale. 
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participants should choose the one they think best describes the action-sentence (see 
Appendix B). In the L1 condition participants read and answered to the Portuguese 
translation of the BIF sentences. In the L2 condition the task was the same but included a 
third option “I do not understand the meaning of some of these behaviors” to avoid responses 
derived from lack of understanding. Abstract choices were coded as 1, concrete choices as 0. 
The total number of abstract choices was divided by the total number of items participants 
knew the meaning of. Thus, higher scores correspond to more abstract choices. Finally, like 
in Experiment 1, participants answered to the mood scale and then filled an adaptation of the 
BEQ, assessing their L1 and L2 linguistic histories. 
4.3.2. Results and Discussion 
Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was performed on the BIF scores with 
Linguistic Context (L1 vs. L2) and AoA (EBs vs. LBs) as between-subjects variables. Results 
yielded a Linguistic Context main effect F(1,94) = 3.92, p = .05, η2 = .041, qualified by an 
interaction between Linguistic Context and AoA F(1,94) = 4.75, p = .03, η2 = .05 (see Figure 
5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean scores and standard errors of conceptual abstractness as a function of 
linguistic context and AoA. 
Participants’ level of conceptual construal was more abstract in the L2 (M = .59, SD = 
.18) than in the L1 condition (M = .52, SD = .17). Importantly, Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
revealed that, as predicted, this pattern of results was observed only for LBs, who processed 
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the conceptual information more abstractly in L2 (M = .62, SD = .18) than in L1 (M = .48, 
SD = .13; p = .003). For EBs no significant differences were observed between L1 (M = .55, 
SD = .19) and L2 (M = .54, SD = .18; p = .89).  
Finally, EBs reported better mood (M = 4.89, SD = 1.13) than LBs (M = 4.41, SD = 
1.12) F(1,94) = 4.73, p = .03, η2 = .05, but mood was not affected by the Linguistic Context 
or its interaction with AoA (both ps > .26). Importantly, the interaction between Linguistic 
Context and AoA remained the same after adjusting for mood in an ANCOVA F(1,94) = 
4.83, p = .03, η2 = .05. 
As expected, conceptual processing was more abstract higher-level in L2 than L1 and 
this difference was only observed for LBs, and not for EBs. Importantly, mood was not a 
mediator of these effects. However, using data derived from strictly linguistic tasks, limits the 
inferences that can be made about non-linguistic cognition (see Pinker, 1994). Moreover, any 
experiment relying on comparing performance across translations may incur in a confound: 
differences between conditions may be confounded with differences between items 
(Casasanto, 2008). Thus, the results of Experiment 2 should be replicated using a non-
linguistic measure.  
4.4. Experiment 3 
In our final study, we aimed to replicate and extend the findings observed in 
Experiments 1 and 2. First, we investigated the relation between level of conceptual and 
perceptual construal established in the embodiment literature for a native language, and 
extended these findings for second-learned language processing. High-level cognition derives 
from, and is connected to, perception (Barsalou, 1999a), which is supported by studies 
showing correlations between perceptual and conceptual attention tasks (Witkin, Dyk, 
Faterson, Goodenough, & Karp, 1962), and suggesting that perceptual simulation underlies 
conceptual processing (e.g., Borghi, et al., 2004; Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2003). 
Thus, we hypothesized that, for LBs, L2 should also activate more global perceptual 
processing than L1. Like in Experiment 2, no differences were expected for EBs. 
Moreover, we suggest that the relation between linguistic context and social distance 
should be mediated by construal level. Our proposal derives from the fact that global versus 
local processing is a mechanism through which situational factors influence how people 
attribute meaning to a stimulus to successfully self-regulate their behavior (see Eyal & 
Fishbach, 2010; Förster & Dannenberg, 2010). Thus, the linguistic context, as a situational 
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factor, should influence the meaning attributed to a social target (e.g., “Is he/she distant or 
proximal from me?”), and consequently judgments of perceived social distance, through the 
level of perceptual processing. Therefore, if an event framed in L2 is processed more 
globally, it should also lead to judgments of higher social distance, consistently with the 
revised literature (e.g., Stephan et al., 2011).  
Furthermore, it is expected that the effect between Linguistic Context and Social 
Distance through Level of Perceptual Construal will be observed for LBs (and not for EBs) 
because only for this group L2 leads to more abstract thought than L1 (Experiment 2).  
Experiment 3 examines these hypotheses using the same manipulation of Linguistic 
Context used in Experiment 2. Construal level was also evaluated but this time with a 
perceptual task. Like in Experiment 1, judgments of social distance regarding both fictitious 
social targets and the experimenter were obtained, but this time using Resources Allocation 
as measure of Social Distance.  
4.4.1. Method 
Participants and Design 
Ninety-nine native Portuguese (73.7% female; Mage = 23.84, SDage = 4.41) 
participated in this study in exchange of a 5€ voucher. Again two groups were created. EBs 
(L2 AoA ≤ 9) and LBs (L2 AoA ≥ 10) reported the same level of L2 general Proficiency (M 
= 3.85, SD = 0.68 vs. M = 3.76, SD = 0.43; t(97)= .83; p > .40), on a 5 point index. Moreover, 
for EBs and LBs, general Proficiency reported in L1 (M = 4.82, SD = 0.35 and M = 4.91, SD 
= 0.23, respectively) was higher than in L2 (M = 3.85, SD = 0.68; M = 3.76, SD = 0.43, both 
ps < .001). Thus, EBs and LBs were both unbalanced bilinguals. L1 condition was 
constituted by EBs (n = 25) and LBs (n = 25), and L2 condition was composed by EBs (n = 
25) and LBs (n = 24). 
Procedure and Materials  
After signing the informed consent and being randomly assigned to one of the two 
linguistic context conditions by an experimenter who was blind to the experimental 
conditions, participants were instructed about the pre-test “Construction of Narratives” (see 
Experiment 2). After writing for 7 minutes, they were presented with the Shape Task (Kimchi 
& Palmer, 1982), which assesses level of Perceptual Construal.  
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On each of the 24 trials, participants had to indicate which of two comparison figures 
(A or B) was more similar to a target figure (see Appendix B). If participants’ choice was 
based on the overall similarity between target and comparison figure (e.g., a square of 
triangles goes with a square of squares) it was considered a global choice. If the choice was 
based on the figures’ individual elements (e.g., a square of triangles goes with a triangle of 
triangles) it was considered a local choice. Twelve combinations were presented twice, to 
counterbalance whether the global (or local) match appeared on the right or the left of the 
computer screen. Global choices were rated as 1 and local choices as 0, and the total number 
of abstract choices was divided by the total number of trials. Thus, higher scores correspond 
to more global choices. 
Afterwards, a dictator game paradigm was introduced, where participants received an 
amount of goods and should choose either to keep them all to themselves or to share some, or 
all of them, with a social target. We operationalized social distance as the amount of 
resources allocation since feeling close to someone promotes allocation of resources (e.g., 
Dovidio, et al., 1997; Nadler, 1999).  
Participants were randomly presented with six scenarios about fictitious social targets, 
and a final one regarding the experimenter (see Appendix B). For example, they could read 
“Imagine that you arrive to a theatre, but the performance was cancelled. Another person who 
arrived to see the same play, Matilde, is looking for the information about it. Now imagine 
that after complaining to the directors, you (but not Matilde) were offered 8 tickets to other 
performances. You can either keep all the tickets to yourself or give some to Matilde” 
(adapted from Stephan et al., 2011, Study 4). In this case, participants should choose a 
number between 0 and 8 to be allocated. Each of the six choices made for fictitious targets 
was divided by the maximum number of resources that could be allocated in the specific 
situation. The six scores were averaged within-subjects. A score was also computed regarding 
the resources allocated to the experimenter. Lower scores of Resources Allocation correspond 
to higher perceived Social Distance. Finally, like in Experiments 1 and 2, participants 
answered to the mood scale and then filled an adaptation of the BEQ, assessing their L1 and 
L2 linguistic histories. 
4.4.2. Results and Discussion 
Level of Perceptual Construal  
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To test our first hypothesis, an Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
performed on the Shape Task scores with Linguistic Context (L1 vs. L2) and AoA (EBs vs. 
LBs) as between-subjects variables. Results revealed an interaction between Linguistic 
Context and AoA F (1,98) = 5.63, p = .02, η2 = .06 (see Figure 6). Bonferroni post-hoc test 
indicated as expected that the L2 condition lead to significantly more global choices (M = 
.72, SD = .26) than the L1 condition (M = .54, SD = .25; p = .02), but only for LBs. As 
predicted, no differences in level of perceptual processing were found between L2 (M = .59, 
SD = .31) and L1 (M = .66, SD = .24; p = .33) conditions for EBs. No main or interaction 
effects were observed on mood (Fs < 1), and the reported effects of the interaction between 
Linguistic Context and AoA remained the same after adjusting for mood in an ANCOVA F 
(1,98) = 5.74, p = .02, η2 = .06. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean scores and standard errors of perceptual abstractness as a function of 
linguistic context and AoA. 
Social Distance from the Fictitious Social Targets 
Subsequently we explored the relation between Linguistic Context and Social 
Distance (i.e., resources allocation) through level of perceptual construal. Moderated 
mediation analyses were performed (see Edwards & Lambert, 2007; Preacher, Rucker, and 
Hayes, 2007), in which the mediated effect was expected to vary across levels of the 
moderator variable (for EBs and LBs). 
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We used the Model 7 of PROCESS 2.13 macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2013), which is a 
computational tool to analyze “conditional process models” (see Hayes, 2013, 2015; Hayes & 
Preacher, 2013) that are path analysis based, and that estimate direct and conditioned effects, 
controlling for at least one variable. A bootstrap-based procedure (5000 samples8) was used 
and we introduced Linguistic Context (L1 coded 0; L2 coded 1) as IV, AoA (EBs coded 0, 
LBs coded 1) as moderator, Perceptual Construal (Shape task scores) as mediator, and the 
Resources Allocation scores as DV in the model. Neither the direct effect of Linguistic 
Context on Resources Allocation (B = .001, S.E = .32, p = 1.00; 95% CI [-.63, .63]), nor the 
relation between Perceptual Construal and Resources Allocation were significant (B = .23, 
S.E = .59, p = .70; 95% CI [-.95, 1.39]), and thus we can exclude a mediation model with 
these variables for fictitious social targets (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Results of Experiment 3 for Direct, Indirect, and Conditional Indirect Effects on 
Resources Allocation to Fictitious Social Targets. 
     95% Confidence Interval 
Predictor variable B SE t p Lower Bound Upper Bound 
DV: Level of Perceptual Construal (Mediator variable model) R2 = .06, p = .09 
Constant. .66 .05 12.40 .000 .55 .77 
Linguistic Context. -.07 .08 -.97 .33 -.22 .08 
AoA. -.12 .08 -1.59 .11 -.27 .03 
Interaction. .25 .11 2.37 .02 .04 .47 
DV: Resources Allocation to fictitious targets (outcome variable model) R2 = .002, p = .92 
Constant. 3.34 .42 8.00 .000 2.51 4.17 
Level of Perceptual 
Construal .22 .59 .38 .70 -.94 1.39 
Linguistic Context. .001 .32 .004 1.00 -.63 .63 
Conditional indirect effect(s) of Linguistic Context on Resources Allocation to fictitious 
social targets through Level of Perceptual Construal, for EBs and LBs. 
EBs. -.02 .06 -- -- -.22 .06 
LBs. .04 .11 -- -- -.16 .29 
Overall index of the moderated mediation effect 
 δ SE LLCI ULCI   
 .06 .15 -.23 .38   
Note. DV = Dependent variable. Bootstrap = 5.000.  
                                                 
8
 Hayes (2015) suggests that more than 1000 samples should be used in these bootstrap-based procedures.  
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Social Distance from the Experimenter 
We then used the same model but with the scores of Resources Allocation to the 
experimenter as DV9. Results confirmed that Linguistic Context positively interacted with 
AoA to affect Perceptual Construal, Binteraction = .25, S.E = .11, p < .05, 95% CI [.04, .47]. 
Moreover, it was observed that Perceptual Construal negatively affected Resources 
Allocation, B = -.20, S.E = .10, p < .05, 95% CI [-.39, -.006], and hence, as expected, higher 
scores (more global choices) of perceptual construal corresponded to lower scores of 
Resources Allocation (higher Social Distance). No direct significant effect of Linguistic 
Context on Resources Allocation was observed, B = -.06, S.E = .05, p = .23, 95% CI [-.17, 
.04].  
Finally, results of the conditional indirect effect were significant (δ = -.05, S.E = .04, 
95% CI [-.16, -.0007]), since zero is not contained in the confidence interval. More 
specifically, the indirect effect of Linguistic Context on Resources Allocation through 
Perceptual Construal was negative and significant for LBs (B = -.04, S.E = .03, 95% CI [-.10, 
-.0008]) but it was not significant for EBs (B = .01, S.E = .02, 95% CI [-.009, .08]) (see Table 
2). 
Table 2. Results of Experiment 3 for Direct, Indirect, and Conditional Indirect Effects on 
Resources Allocation to the Experimenter. 
     95% Confidence Interval 
Predictor variable B SE t p Lower Bound Upper Bound 
     DV: Level of Perceptual Construal (Mediator variable model) R2 = .06, p = .09 
Constant. .66 .05 12.40 .000 .55 .77 
Linguistic Context. -.07 .08 -.97 .33 -.22 .08 
AoA. -.12 .08 -1.59 .11 -.27 .03 
Interaction. .25 .11 2.37 .02 .04 .47 
     DV: Resources Allocation to the experimenter (outcome variable model) R2 = .06, p < .05 
Constant. .68 .068 9.96 .000 .54 .81 
Level of Perceptual 
Construal -.20 .10 -2.05 .04 -.39 -.01 
Linguistic Context. -.06 .05 -1.21 .23 -.17 .04 
                                                 
9
 The Linear Interpolation method was used to deal with a missing case. PROCESS macros use listwise deletion 
based on all variables in the model. Thus, when some case is missing on X, it will throw all those cases out of 
the analysis when estimating all the effects. Although leaving the missing case yielded the same pattern of 
significant results, we decided to use this method to have the same values resultant of the interaction between 
Linguistic Context*AoA for fictitious social targets and the experimenter.    
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Conditional indirect effect(s) of Linguistic Context on Resources Allocation to the 
experimenter through Level of Perceptual Construal, for EBs and LBs. 
EBs. .01 .02 -- -- -.01 .08 
LBs. -.04 .02 -- -- -.10 -.001 
Overall index of the moderated mediation effect 
 δ SE LLCI ULCI   
 -.05 .04 -.16 -.001   
Note. DV = Dependent variable. Bootstrap = 5.000.  
 
Results of Experiment 3 have shown that LBs processed perceptual information more 
globally when inserted in an L2, relative to a L1 linguistic context, and that participants’ 
mood did not mediate this effect. Moreover, as expected, for LBs the level of Perceptual 
Construal mediated the relation between Linguistic Context and Social Distance from the 
experimenter. More specifically, LBs processed perceptual information in L2 more globally 
than in L1, which in turn lead to higher perceived social distance (less resources allocation) 
from the experimenter in L2 than in L1. As predicted, and consistently with Experiment 2, no 
effects were found for EBs. Like in Experiment 1, neither the linguistic context condition, nor 
its interaction with AoA affected directly or indirectly the perceived Social Distance from 
Fictitious Social Targets.  
4.5. General Discussion 
This article examined the impact of Linguistic Context on judgments of Social 
Distance. Results from Experiment 1 suggest that a L2 context, relative to a L1 one, leads to 
higher perceived social distance (measured as familiarity and similarity to the self) and to less 
positive evaluations (measured as friendliness and niceness) of social targets when these are 
situated in one’s here and now. These results are in line with clinical observations reported in 
the bilingualism literature regarding the distancing function of L2 (e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986; 
Santiago-Rivera et al., 2009). Moreover, these results extend the CLT literature, by showing 
how Social Distance and Social Positivity are intrinsically interconnected, and that effects on 
one dimension should be expected in the other dimension (c.f., Stephan et al., 2011).  
In Experiments 2 and 3 we tested the role of Construal Level as a possible mediator in 
the relation between Linguistic Context and Social Distance. We proposed that L2 could be 
associated with higher level conceptual construal than L1 for LBs, since under a low level 
mindset sensorimotor cues are omitted (Maglio & Trope, 2012), as they seem to be in L2 
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(Foroni, 2015; Li, et al., 2015). To be sure the results would be due to different embodiments 
of L1 and L2, another bilingual group, absent from Li and colleagues (2015) and Foroni 
(2015) studies, was added in these experiments– the Early Bilinguals.  
Results of Experiment 2 indicated that for LBs, L2 Linguistic Context activates higher 
level conceptual construal than L1 Linguistic Context. These results suggest that for LBs the 
integration and simulation of concrete sensorimotor information is usually impaired in L2 
relative to L1 (e.g., Foroni, 2015). Moreover, results indicate that as for LBs the concrete 
sensorimotor information is not activated to the same extent during L2 processing and 
comprehension, a more abstract mindset is induced by this Linguistic Context. This idea is 
strengthened by the fact that for EBs no differences in construal level were observed, which 
suggests that for this group both L1 and L2 are associated with concrete physical experiences 
which are re-enacted during language comprehension. 
In Experiment 3 we have replicated and extended these finding using a non-linguistic 
task. Results from Experiment 3 showed that LBs process perceptual information more 
globally in L2 compared with L1, with no differences observed for EBs. Thus, not only does 
language in use affect the level of Conceptual Construal but also the level at which 
Perceptual information is processed. These findings are in line with embodied approaches to 
cognition, suggesting that cognition derives from, and is connected to, perception and that 
conceptual and perceptual systems are both re-enacted during language comprehension (e.g., 
Barsalou, 1999a, 2008; Borghi et al., 2004). Furthermore, in Experiment 3, we tested the 
complete proposed model. Results indicated that the relation between Linguistic Context and 
Social Distance (measured as Resources Allocation) was explained by a conditional indirect 
effect: for LBs, L2 induced more global perceptual processing than L1, and more global 
perceptual processing lead to judgments of higher Social Distance from the experimenter. For 
EBs, no effects reached significance.  
Importantly, in Experiment 2 and 3 where AoA had an important role, EBs and LBs 
were unbalanced bilinguals with a similar degree of L2 proficiency which excludes the 
possibility that differences in construal-level are a result of differences in linguistic fluency 
between groups (see Alter & Oppenheimer, 2008). Also, and across the three experiments the 
Linguistic Context did not affect participants’ mood, which excludes mood as a possible 
mediator between Linguistic Context and Construal Level (see Gasper & Clore, 2002; Isen & 
Daubman, 1984), and consequently, Social Distance. 
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In both Experiments 1 and 3 significant results were only obtained regarding a 
specific type of social target – the experimenter. Similar findings were reported in the CLT 
literature for spatial and temporal distances. Liberman and Förster’s (2009b) observed that 
priming level of construal affected spatial distance estimates between the participant and a 
sticker in the room, but it did not impact the spatial distance estimates between the 
experimenter and a marked desk in the room. Consistently, level of construal did not affect 
estimates of temporal distance that were not anchored on now (e.g., “How much time after 
receiving an invitation would you go to the dentist?”). Our results replicate these findings, but 
this time with Social Distance judgments, namely construal level did not affect social 
distance judgments when the evaluated social targets were not anchored in the present 
situation.  
Contrary to what was observed in Experiment 1, in Experiment 3 a direct effect of 
Language on Social Distance did not emerge. One possible explanation is that Familiarity 
ratings and Resources Allocation constitute different measures of the same construct of 
Social Distance. Moreover, Resources Allocation implies an action. To give more to someone 
while remaining with less constitutes a cost to the self, while passively evaluating someone’s 
familiarity does not constitute a loss. It is possible that to be willing to incur in costs to the 
self implies a really high social proximity from a target, whereas evaluating someone as 
familiar or similar to the self does not require being so close to someone. We believe it would 
be important to replicate these findings and to investigate whether these measures, sometimes 
used indiscriminately, differ in such a way. We also suggest that more direct measures of 
social distance, such as the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 
1992) should be used.  
Considering that nowadays the use of a second language is a common phenomenon 
and that important decisions are made in this language we recommend that further studies 
replicate and explore these effects. For example, as the four dimensions of psychological 
distance – social, temporal, spatial, and hypotheticality - are interrelated (e.g., Bar-Anan, 
Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007) we suggest that the effects of Linguistic Context on Social 
Distance should be replicated in further studies for the other dimensions of psychological 
distance. This work extends bilingualism literature by revealing the relation between 
linguistic context and social distance. Moreover, the effects of the linguistic context on both 
conceptual and perceptual processing provide strong support to our claim that linguistic 
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context affects construal-level. Finally, our results extend the embodiment literature typically 
based on findings from a native-language, to a second-language.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
SIMULATING AND EVALUATING THE AFFECTIVE 
CONTENT OF SENTENCES: THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE 
AND GROUP MEMBERSHIP  
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Communication is what confers a unique social essence to human interactions. It 
allows us to share experiences, express intentions, understand each other’s thoughts and 
feelings and ultimately to relate with others (Vaughan & Hogg, 2014). Nowadays people 
communicate in a highly technologic multicultural world, where face-to-face interactions are 
losing preponderance to the written word, and the use of a second language is an increasingly 
common phenomenon (e.g., European Commission Special Eurobarometer, 2006, 2012; U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2010, 2013). Since socio-cognitive processes and affective experience cannot 
be fully understood without considering the physical and social contexts where they take 
place (see for review, Garrido, Azevedo, & Palma, 2011; Semin & Garrido, 2015; Semin, 
Garrido, & Palma, 2012, 2013; Semin & Smith, 2002; Smith & Semin, 2004, 2013), 
contextual cues should be considered when investigating linguistic communication. 
The goal of the present article is to advance our understanding on the influence of 
contextual cues such as group membership and the language one is using on affective 
linguistic communication. Specifically, the present research was designed to investigate the 
impact of processing affective information about different social groups (in-group and out-
group) in a native (L1) or second (L2) language. First, we will argue that since more positive 
attitudes (e.g., Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers, 2008) and affect (e.g., Otten & 
Moskowitz, 2000) are directed towards in-group than out-group members, group membership 
should impact both judgments and simulation of sentences describing social targets in 
emotional situations. The second assumption regards the grounding mechanisms of affective 
language in L1 and L2. As we shall argue, L1 and L2 are not embodied in the same way (e.g., 
Foroni, 2015), and thus judgments and simulation of emotional sentences should be different 
across languages. Finally, considering the last two assumptions, we will argue that the 
differences in judgments and simulation of emotional sentences regarding in-group and out-
group targets should be enhanced when using L1 and reduced when using L2.  
Judgments and group membership 
Our first argument relies on the fact that people classify themselves into distinct social 
groups. The social categorization process provides the grounds for the distinction between us 
(the in-group) and them (the out-group), which is acknowledged as a sufficient condition to 
elicit in-group favoritism - the tendency to favor one’s own group and its members over an 
out-group and its members (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 
1979; see for review Vala & Costa-Lopes, 2015). This in-group bias is reflected into different 
judgments (e.g., Wang et al., 2014), behaviors (e.g., Turner, Brown, & Tajfel, 1979) and even 
108 
 
in distinct patterns of facial mimicry (e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008) elicited by social targets 
belonging to different social groups.  
In-group favoritism is expressed in many different ways, namely in more positive 
attitudes (e.g., Likowski et al., 2008) and affect (e.g., Otten & Moskowitz, 2000) towards in-
group compared to out-group members. Moreover, more positive characteristics are ascribed 
to in-group members (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 
1990; Rustemli, Mertan, & Ciftci, 2000), and their negative behaviors are less remembered 
than out-group members’ behaviors (e.g., Howard & Rothbart, 1980). Behaviorally, people 
tend to allocate more resources to in-group than out-group members (e.g., Turner, Brown, & 
Tajfel, 1979), even when group membership is artificially created (e.g., Billig & Tajfel, 1973; 
Tajfel et al., 1971).  
Importantly for this work, previous research consistently found that group 
membership influence judgments of emotional facial expressions. For instance, when asked 
to choose the facial expression that would be more appropriate in emotionally neutral 
situations, European descents attributed more often neutral faces to the out-group, and more 
often and more intense smiles to the in-group (Beaupré & Hess, 2003). Furthermore, 
Hutchings and Haddock (2008) have found that White (in-group) participants rated racially 
ambiguous angry faces as more likely to be Black (out-group) compared to either racially 
ambiguous neutral or racially ambiguous happy faces. The same authors found that 
participants scoring high in implicit prejudice judged the same racially ambiguous angry 
faces as being emotionally more intense when they judged them as out-group rather than in-
group members. Consistently, in another study from Wang and colleagues (2014), Chinese 
participants judged the out-group (White) negative expressions - anger, sadness and fear - as 
emotionally more intense than the in-group negative expressions (see also Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003, 2004).  
These studies indicate that judgments of emotional facial expressions are influenced 
by group membership. Additionally, the essential role of group membership is also 
extensively reported in the emotional mimicry literature. 
Emotional mimicry and group membership 
The embodied cognition approach sustains that knowledge is grounded in modality-
specific systems (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a, 2008; Glenberg, 1997; Semin & Cacioppo, 2008). 
According to this approach, processing emotional information involves the partial re-
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experience (i.e., simulation) of that emotion or particular emotional cue (e.g., Niedenthal, 
2007; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005; Niedenthal, 
Winkielman, Mondillon, & Vermeulen, 2009). A large body of research has shown that 
overlapping areas of the mirror neuron system are activated both when one performs an 
action and when one observes or understands someone else’s actions (e.g., Buccino et al., 
2001; Buccino, Binkofski, & Riggio, 2004; see for review Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004; 
Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001). Indeed, merely observing others’ emotional facial 
expressions activates the same facial muscles in the observer (e.g., Dimberg, 1982, 1990; 
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000), a process known as emotional mimicry. 
Recently, the automatic nature of mimicry has been challenged and it has been argued 
that emotional mimicry works as a social regulator (see Hess & Fischer, 2013, 2014), 
fostering social coordination (e.g., Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003), social bonds, 
understanding and empathy (e.g., Fischer, Becker, & Veenstra, 2012). According to this 
perspective, patterns of emotional mimicry only become meaningful when the relation 
between observer and expresser, and the emotion being mimicked are taken into account 
(e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Fischer et al., 2012; Hess & Fischer, 2013). 
Individuals are more likely to mimic the emotional reactions of similar ones (vs. 
dissimilar; e.g., McIntosh, 2006), of liked ones (vs. disliked ones; e.g., Likowski, et al., 
2008), and of in-group members (vs. out-group members; e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; 
Herrera, Bourgeois & Hess, 1998; Van der Shalk et al., 2011). Additionally, people tend to 
mimic smiles of strangers to a greater extent than their frowns when they do not have access 
to any other information (Hinsz & Tomhave, 1991). This happens because smiles are positive 
and highly affiliative signals. They signal that everything is well, and have low social costs 
because they do not require an action from the observer. On the contrary, anger expressions 
signal threat and lack affiliative intent. Mimicking anger expressions may lead to unwanted 
social signals, which may have social costs for the mimicker (e.g., starting or reinforcing a 
conflict; e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; Van der Shalk et al., 2011; see for review Hess & 
Fischer, 2013). Thus, emotional mimicry depends on the displayed emotion, since different 
emotions signal distinct affiliative intents and represent different social costs for the observer. 
These notions have been supported by research showing that anger displays of in-
group members were mimicked to a greater extent than those of out-group members, but only 
when anger was clearly directed at a common adversary, and not when it was directed at the 
observer. Importantly, happiness displays were mimicked across in-group and out-group 
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targets (Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Van der Schalk and colleagues (2011) replicated these 
findings verifying that participants mimicked in-group’s (vs. out-group’s) anger and fear 
displays to a greater extent, and mimicked in-group and out-group happiness displays to the 
same extent. Although mimicry of happy faces may overcome group boundaries, it may be 
reduced or absent when one is facing an enemy or out-group member target of negative 
attitudes (e.g., McHugo, Lanzetta, & Bush, 1991), even when these are newly formed (e.g., 
Likowski et al., 2008). Furthermore, negative attitudes towards out-group members may 
evoke patterns of counter-mimicry (i.e., divergent facial expressions). Some examples of 
counter-mimicry are smiling when seeing a competitor in pain (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989); 
smiling at expressions of sadness and frowning at expressions of happiness of out-group 
members (Herrera et al., 1998); showing fear at out-group anger displays and aversion at out-
group fear displays (Van der Schalk et al., 2011).  
In conclusion, there is accumulated evidence showing that people simulate the 
emotions of others and that group membership impacts both simulation and judgments of 
emotional facial expressions. Importantly, embodied theories suggest that linguistic 
representations (i.e., words, sentences) of emotions or of emotional facial expressions should 
give rise to the same emotional simulation processes. However, the role of group membership 
in modulating these processes remains to be examined. 
Simulating language affective content 
The embodiment approach to language stresses that language comprehension also 
involves simulation of action (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002), perception (e.g., Stanfield & 
Zwaan, 2001), and emotion (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009). Thus, consistent facial responses 
are activated in the observer not only when perceiving others’ emotional facial expressions, 
but also by linguistic representations of emotional states (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009, 2013; 
Niedenthal et al., 2009).  
Behavioral evidence for this argument comes from studies showing that when 
participants’ facial expressions (i.e., positive or negative emotions) and the valence of 
sentences with emotional content (e.g., describing a happy or sad situation) matched 
judgments of sentences valence and sensibility were faster than when they mismatched 
(Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007). Moreover, when the activity in the corrugator muscle, 
responsible for frowning, was blocked the comprehension of sad and angry sentences was 
impaired (Havas, Glenberg, Gutowski, Lucarelli, & Davidson, 2010). Furthermore, Foroni 
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and Semin (2009) found that reading emotional expressions (e.g., to smile, to frown) 
activates the correspondent facial muscles in the perceiver. The authors also verified that 
reading emotional expressions impacted judgments, but only when the activation of facial 
responses was not blocked. The same authors (Foroni & Semin, 2013) further found that 
affective simulation occurs when reading different types of sentences: affirmative sentences 
(“I am smiling”) activated the zygomatic muscle, whereas reading their negation ("I am not 
smiling”) inhibited the muscle activation. 
In sum, perceiving someone’s facial expression or reading emotion sentences recruit 
the same neural systems and activate the same somatic responses. Moreover, if contextual 
cues, such as group membership, modulate emotional mimicry effects when photos or videos 
of social targets are presented, the same effects should be observed for affective simulation of 
emotional sentences about social targets belonging to different groups. However, we argue 
that this should be the case when language comprehension is grounded on the sensorimotor 
systems and affective states, which is the case of a native language.  
Language simulation in L1 and L2 
Bilingualism literature presents extensive research showing the stronger emotional 
intensity of L1 over L2 (see for review Caldwell-Harris, 2014, 2015; Pavlenko, 2012) and the 
distancing effect of L2 (e.g., Azevedo, Garrido & Semin, 2016b; Bond & Lai, 1986). 
Although L2 seems to be acquired through the same neural devices responsible for L1 
acquisition (Perani & Abutalebi, 2005) and to share the same brain language systems (e.g., 
Frenck-Mestre, Anton, Roth, Vaid, & Viallet, 2005; Kovelman, Baker, & Petitto, 2008), the 
socialization histories of both languages are usually distinct which may explain their 
differences in affective grounding. L1 is usually learned and used in contexts that are 
affectively laden (i.e., family and peers; e.g., Harris, Gleason, & Ayçiçeğiet al, 2006), and its 
acquisition and use integrates information received from all sensory modalities, including 
kinesthetic and visceral (e.g., Pavlenko, 2008). This language is usually learned during 
childhood when language meaning is closely related to the body (see Azevedo, Garrido & 
Semin, 2016b). In contrast, L2 is frequently mastered in more emotionally neutral formal 
settings (i.e.., school, work; e.g., Bond & Lai, 1986), and its acquisition takes place without 
significant involvement of the majority of sensory modalities (Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). 
Differences between L1 and L2 were shown in studies in which bilinguals judged the 
emotional intensity of positive (e.g., Dewaele, 2004) and negative information (e.g., 
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Dewaele, 2004, 2010; Gawinkowska, Paradowski, & Bilewicz, 2013) as stronger in L1 than 
in L2. These differences were supported by studies reporting higher skin conductance 
responses (SCRs) for taboo words and childhood reprimands in L1 relative to L2 (e.g., 
Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009; Harris, Ayçiçeği & Gleason, 2003; Harris et al., 
2006). Moreover, decision-making biases were fewer (Costa, Foucart, Arnon, Aparici, & 
Apesteguia, 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 2012) and utilitarian (vs. emotional) choices 
were more frequent when one is in a L2 rather than in a L1 linguistic context (e.g., Costa, 
Foucart, Hayakawa et al., 2014; Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015b). Additionally, 
moral transgressions (e.g., consensual incest) were judged less harshly in L2 than in L1 
(Geipel, Hadjichristidis, & Surian, 2015a). Finally, affective priming and interference effects 
were found in L1 but were absent or reduced in L2 (e.g., Degner, Doycheva & Wentura, 
2012; Segalowitz, Trofimovich, Gatbonton & Sokolovskaya, 2008). 
Taken together, the presented evidence indicates that affective processing is less 
intense and less automatic in L2. However, only recently this question has been addressed 
within an embodied/grounded cognition framework. It has been argued that due to their 
socialization histories L1 and L2 are differently grounded on the perceptual-motor and 
somatovisceral systems, resulting in different simulations of affective experience and 
judgments in each of these languages.  
Azevedo, Garrido and Semin (2016a) argued that sensorimotor mechanisms 
grounding affective communication might be responsible for the observed differences in 
emotional intensity between L1 and L2. Using an affective priming paradigm presenting 
valenced words as primes and targets, they have found the typical affective priming effect 
(faster responses when the prime-target’s valence matched) in L1 but not in L2, despite the 
equal hit rates observed in both languages (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2 they have used 
words-photos (facial expressions) and photos-words pairs as primes and targets. Notably, 
when photos were introduced, the affective priming effect emerged in both languages 
suggesting that processing facial expressions overruled the lack of affective grounding 
associated to L2. Moreover, Azevedo and colleagues (2016b) found that a social target (the 
experimenter) was judged as more socially distant when participants where in L2 rather than 
L1 linguistic context. Notably, this effect was only found for participants who were L2 Late 
Bilinguals (LBs) for whom L2 is not affectively grounded. The authors also found that the 
mechanism explaining the relation between L2 and social distance for LBs was a more 
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abstract level of information processing (both conceptual and perceptual), a characteristic 
associated to disembodied cognition (see Maglio & Trope, 2012). 
Finally, while positive affirmative sentences (“I am smiling”) activated and negation 
sentences ("I am not smiling”) lead to a relaxation of the zygomatic muscle (Foroni & Semin, 
2013) when presented in L1, in L2 affirmative sentences activated the zygomatic muscle but 
negation sentences did not produce a relaxation in this muscle (Foroni, 2015). These results 
suggest that processing emotional language in L1 relies on simulation of the language 
affective meaning, whereas such simulation is reduced or does not happen to the same extent 
in L2, at least for more abstract and complex type of information (i.e., negation). 
5.1. Overview 
Research has shown that more negative judgments and less (or divergent) emotional 
mimicry are activated by out-group (vs. in-group) members’ emotional facial expressions. 
Notably, these results are expected when out-group members are target of negative 
evaluations and attitudes.  
Our first study was conducted to identify the social groups that are more positively 
and negatively evaluated by Portuguese participants. For this purpose we examined the 
perceived identification, similarity, belonging and attitudes towards several social groups in 
the Portuguese society. Based on these evaluations we aimed to select two social groups to 
represent the in-group and the out-group in the subsequent experiments.  
Experiments 1 and 2 examined the impact of group membership and language on 
affective simulation and judgments of sentences with emotional content. Different studies on 
intergroup relations have shown that positive (negative) facial expressions are attributed more 
often and judged as more intense when displayed by in-group (out-group) members (e.g., 
Beaupré & Hess, 2003; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008). In Experiment 1 we aimed to replicate 
these results using a different methodology. Participants were asked to judge the intensity, 
probability and valence of sentences describing in-group and out-group members in 
emotionally positive (i.e. happiness) and negative (i.e., anger) situations. Moreover, based on 
the assumption that L1 and L2 are embodied in different ways (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Azevedo 
et al., 2016a,b), sentences were presented both in participants’ L1 and L2. In our second 
experiment participants performed this same task while the activity of their corrugator 
supercilii and zygomatic major muscles was recorded.  
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In Experiments 1 and 2 we expected higher intensity and probability, and more 
positive judgments of sentences describing in-group (vs. out-group) targets in positive 
emotional situations, while higher intensity and probability, and more negative judgments 
were expected for out-group (vs. in-group) targets in negative emotional situations. 
Furthermore, in line with the emotional mimicry literature (e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008; 
Van der Schalk et al., 2011), in Experiment 2 we expected that sentences describing in-group 
members in anger and happiness situations would be simulated to a greater extent than 
sentences describing out-group members in the same emotional situations. Furthermore, since 
L2 lacks affective grounding (e.g., Azevedo et al., 2016a,b) affective simulation and 
judgments of both positive and negative sentences were expected to be stronger and more 
extreme when sentences were presented in L1 (vs. L2).  
Finally, we considered the joint impact of group membership and language on 
simulation and judgments. The affective content of words (e.g., Azevedo et al., 2016a) and 
sentences (e.g., Foroni, 2015) is processed more automatically and to a greater extent in L1 
than in L2, because the former is supposed to be more affectively grounded. Thus, the 
affective content of sentences describing the in-group (e.g., positive, liked, familiar, similar, 
proximal to the self) and the out-group (e.g., negative, disliked, non-familiar, non-similar, 
distant from the self) should be activated more automatically and in a stronger way in L1 (vs., 
L2), producing a higher affective differentiation between in-group and out-group targets. 
Hence, differences in simulating and judging sentences regarding the in-group and the out-
group are expected to be enhanced in L1.  
5.2. Pilot Study 
In this pilot we aimed to explore the perceptions of a Portuguese sample regarding 
several social groups. Specifically we wanted to identify which were the social groups 
perceived as more/less socially distant, more/less similar, evaluated with the lower/higher 
degree of identification and belonging, and target of the most negative/positive attitudes.  
5.2.1. Method 
Participants 
Thirty-five Portuguese white students (91.4% female; Mean age = 21. 23, SD= 6.60) 
of ISCTE-IUL agreed to voluntarily participate in this study. Four non-white participants and 
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one with double nationality (Portuguese and Spanish) were excluded from the analyses. In the 
end 30 participants were considered in the analyses. 
Materials and Procedure 
Participants voluntarily participated in the pilot study during class and all the 
procedures were in line with the ethical guidelines of the host institution. In the beginning of 
the questionnaire participants could read “Our social life implies that we all belong to one or 
more groups. From these various groups stand out those based on nationality (e.g., 
Portuguese, Spanish, German, Chinese, etc.), on ethnicity (e.g., Caucasians, Africans, Asians, 
Gypsies, etc.), on race (e. g, white, black, etc.), religion (e.g., Catholics, Jews, Muslims, 
Hindus, etc.), among others”.  
Afterwards participants were asked to fill in several scales evaluating the following 
groups: Portuguese, Caucasian, Africans, Asians, Chinese, Indians, Gypsies, Germans, 
Brazilians, Eastern Europeans, Arabs, and Spanish. First, they filled the Self-Group Overlap 
item of the Overlap of Self, In-group, and Out-group (OSIO; Schubert & Otten, 2002).  
Specifically, participants were asked to choose one of the seven pictorial 
representations of closeness for each of the groups, with higher ratings meaning higher 
overlap between the self and the group and lower ratings meaning higher distance between 
the self and the group. Furthermore, participants were told to identify, using 7-point scales 
their a) degree of identification (1 - Low identification; 7 - High identification); b) perceived 
similarity (1 - Very different; 7 - Very similar); c) belonging (1 - No belonging; 7 - High 
belonging); d) and attitudes (1 - Very negative; 7 - Very positive) towards the above 
mentioned groups (see Appendix C).  
5.2.2. Results and Discussion 
We contrasted the social distance, identification, similarity, belonging and attitudes’ 
ratings of each group against all the other groups using paired samples t-tests (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Means (and Standard Deviations) of Ratings of Social Distance (SDist), Similarity 
(Sim.), Identification (Ident.), Belonging (Bel.) and Attitudes (Atti.) Towards Different Social 
Groups. 
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SDist. 6.07a 
(1.34) 
5.93a  
(1.53) 
4.43b  
(1.43) 
4.23b  
(1.50) 
4.27b  
(1.51) 
3.43c  
(1.55) 
3.23cd  
(1.55) 
3.13cd  
(1.43) 
3.00cd 
(1.60) 
2.90d 
(1.45) 
2.57e 
(1.43) 
2.20f 
(1.27) 
Sim. 
 
6.50a 
(0.90) 
6.47a 
(1.20) 
5.33b 
(1.40) 
4.77b 
(1.38) 
4.20c 
(1.47) 
3.67c 
(1.65) 
3.90c 
(1.69) 
3.23d 
(1.63) 
3.20d 
(1.73) 
3.13de 
(1.68) 
2.87e 
(1.57) 
2.37f 
(1.47) 
Ident. 
 
6.30a 
(1.06) 
6.20a 
(1.32) 
5.03b 
(1.33) 
4.53bc 
(1.46) 
4.37c 
(1.35) 
3.63d 
(1.54) 
3.60d 
(1.63) 
3.27de 
(1.31) 
3.13ef 
(1.59) 
3.03f 
(1.33) 
2.63g 
(1.30) 
2.33g 
(1.60) 
Bel. 
 
6.50a 
(1.07) 
6.60a 
(0.97) 
4.70b 
(1.53) 
4.30b 
(1.60) 
3.47c 
(1.76) 
2.97cd 
(1.76) 
3.30c 
(1.74) 
2.60e 
(1.75) 
2.67de 
(1.77) 
2.53ef 
(1.74) 
2.37fg 
(1.45) 
2.07g 
(1.51) 
Atti. 6.37a 
(0.96) 
6.27a 
(1.11) 
5.67b 
(0.99) 
5.00c 
(1.36) 
5.47b 
(1.36) 
4.50d 
(1.59) 
4.70cd 
(1.66) 
4.80cd 
(1.63) 
4.73cd 
(1.55) 
4.63cd 
(1.67) 
3.90e 
(1.59) 
2.93f 
(1.68) 
Note. Means with the same superscript within rows are not significantly different at the p < .05. 
Portuguese and Caucasians were the groups evaluated as closer (all ps < .001) and 
more similar to the self (all ps < .001), as well as the groups with which participants mostly 
identified with (all ps < .001), felt they belong to (all ps < .001), and towards which 
participants expressed the most positive attitudes (all ps ≤ .001), with no significant 
differences observed between these two groups in all measures. In contrast, Gypsies were 
evaluated as the most socially distant (all ps ≤ .025) and less similar to the self (all ps < .05), 
and the target of the most negative attitudes (all ps ≤ .001). Gypsies (and Arabs) were also the 
groups towards which participants reported the lowest degree of identification (all ps < .01) 
and belonging (all ps < .05).  
This data is consistent with previous studies showing the persistence of blatant racism 
against Gypsies around the world, and particularly in Portugal. While subtle racism, the most 
common expression of racism, is characterized by the absence of positive sentiments and the 
denial of positive emotions to out-group members, blatant prejudice is characterized by the 
presence of strong, overtly negative attitudes and evaluations, towards out-groups (e.g., 
Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). People tend to present more frequently and overtly in-group 
favorable rather than out-group unfavorable evaluations because the latter is considered anti-
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normative (see for a review on positive-negative asymmetry, Mummendey & Otten, 1998; 
Otten & Mummendey, 1999).  
Participants’ evaluations are in line with previous studies showing that while most 
minorities are target of subtle racism (see Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) in the United States 
(e.g., Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983) and Europe (e.g., Vala, Brito, & Lopes, 1999a,b) that 
does not seem to be the case of Gypsies. More specifically, in Portugal, while subtle racism 
has predominance against blatant prejudice for the majority of social groups (e.g., Blacks; 
Vala, 1999; Vala, Brito, & Lopes, 1999a,b), blatant racism against Gypsies seems to persist 
(e.g., Correia, Brito, Vala, & Pérez, 2005).  
In our pre-test the evaluations about the Gypsy group expressed this blatant prejudice, 
with participants presenting overtly negative judgments and attitudes towards this social 
group (Gypsies were rated below 3 in all 7-point scales). Considering these results, 
Portuguese Caucasian was chosen to be the in-group and Portuguese Gypsy was chosen to be 
the out-group in the subsequent experiments. The targets’ nationality (Portuguese) was kept 
constant, so that the ethnicity was the only characteristic of group membership to be 
manipulated. 
5.3. Experiment 1 
Experiment 1 examines whether the judgments of intensity, probability and valence of 
emotional sentences were influenced by group membership (in-group or out-group) and 
language (L1 or L2). The blatant prejudice against Gypsies in Portugal should impact 
judgments, namely judgments of intensity and probability should be higher and judgments of 
valence should be more positive for sentences describing in-group (vs. out-group) targets in 
emotionally positive situations (i.e., happiness), while judgments of intensity and probability 
should be higher and judgments of valence should be more negative for sentences describing 
out-group (vs. in-group) targets in emotionally negative situations (i.e., anger). We also 
expected more extreme judgments in L1 (vs. L2), and that differences in evaluations of in-
group and out-group sentences would be accentuated in L1, since the processing of affective 
content is more intense and automatic in this language. 
5.3.1. Method 
Participants and Design 
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Eighty students (67.6% female; Mean age = 23.39, SD = 5.17) of ISCTE-IUL 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Six participants were excluded from 
the analyses. Two because their first language was not Portuguese and four because their L2 
age of acquisition was ≤ 4 years old. For these Early Bilinguals both languages are expected 
to be similarly embodied (see Azevedo et al., 2016b) and thus should not have different 
impact on judgments. The experiment had a 2 (Emotion: Anger vs. Happiness) X 2 (Group 
Membership: In-group vs. Out-group) X 2 (Language: L1 vs. L2) within-participants design. 
Materials 
A total of 32 sentences, half in L1 (Portuguese) and half in L2 (English) were 
presented to all participants. Half of the sentences displayed anger-related 
(Frowning/Carrancudo(a); Angry/Zangado(a) ) and the other half happiness-related 
(Smiling/Sorrir; Happy/Feliz) content associated to four social targets. Half of the presented 
sentences concerned two in-group targets (João and Ana) and the other half two out-group 
targets (Sandro and Salomé) (see Appendix C). The Intensity of the emotions expressed in 
the sentence was evaluated in a 7-point scale (from 1- Not intense at all to 7- Very intense), 
as well as the Probability of the described emotional situation to happen (1- Not probable at 
all; 7- Very probable), and the sentence Valence (1- Very negative; 7- Very positive).  
The attitudes towards the four experimental targets were reported in a 7-point scale 
(from 1- I do not like him/her at all to 7- I like him/her very much). The closeness between 
the self and each experimental target was evaluated with the Inclusion of Other in the Self 
scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) and the closeness between the self and each social 
group was measured with an adaptation of the Self-Group Overlap (Schubert & Otten, 2002). 
Both measures were 7-point scales in which 1 represents the larger social distance between 
the self and the target or group, and 7 the strongest perceived social proximity. The 
Bilingualism and Emotion questionnaire (BEQ; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2001-2003) was used 
in the end of the experiment to assess the linguistic variables of interest concerning L1 and 
L2, such as age of language acquisition, proficiency, frequency of use and context of 
acquisition. 
Procedure 
In the informed consent participants could read that the experiment was about 
impression formation. They were told that impressions are spontaneously formed even when 
people do not have much information about the social targets. All the procedures were 
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conducted in line with ethical guidelines of the host institution. In the beginning of the 
experiment four targets were presented to the participants. They were asked to pay attention 
to the information because some related questions would be asked in the end of the 
experiment. They could read “João is a Portuguese Caucasian boy; Ana is a Portuguese 
Caucasian girl; Sandro is a Portuguese Gypsy boy; Salomé is a Portuguese Caucasian girl”. 
Participants were told they would be presented with several sentences about the four targets 
in different emotional situations and they should imagine each situation while reading the 
sentences and form an impression about the target.  
 In each trial participants saw a blank screen during 3 seconds followed by a fixation 
point (1 second). Then, an emotion sentence (e.g., Sandro is angry; Ana is smiling) was 
presented for 3 seconds and after seeing it participants should evaluate its Intensity, 
Probability and Valence. The order of language presentation was counterbalanced across 
participants and, in each language block, the order of emotions-related content and target was 
randomized. After reading and evaluating all emotional sentences concerning the four targets 
in the two languages, participants were asked to indicate how much they liked each of the 
four targets and how close they felt from each one of them. Participants were also asked to 
indicate how close they felt from each social group (Portuguese Caucasian and Portuguese 
Gypsy). In the end of the experiment participants filled the Bilingualism and Emotion 
questionnaire (BEQ; Dewaele & Pavlenko, 2001-2003). 
5.3.2. Results 
Data regarding targets with the same group membership were averaged within-
participants. T-tests were performed to assess attitudes and perceived social distance towards 
the experimental targets, and towards different social groups. All three dependent measures 
were separately submitted to a 2 (Emotion: Anger vs. Happiness) X 2 (Group Membership: 
In-group vs. Out-group) X 2 (Language: L1 vs. L2) repeated-measures ANOVA. Bonferroni 
post-hoc tests were used to explore the interactions. Finally, we used planned t-tests to test 
our a priori hypothesis, namely that the differences in judgments of in-group and out-group 
sentences would be more emphasized in L1 than in L2 (see Table 4). 
Manipulation check 
Participants reported to equally like the Portuguese Caucasian (M = 4.82, SD = 0.99) 
and the Portuguese Gypsy targets (M = 4.72, SD = 1.33), t(73)= 0.58, p = .56. However, 
participants reported feeling closer to the Portuguese Caucasian (M = 3.05, SD = 1.69) than to 
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the Portuguese Gypsy experimental targets (M = 2.39, SD = 1.45), t(73) = 3.60; p = .001. 
Consistently, participants reported feeling closer to the Portuguese Caucasian (M = 5.20, SD 
= 1.64) than to the Portuguese Gypsy social group (M = 2.82, SD = 1.49) t(73)= 10.14; p < 
.001. Importantly, all participants identified correctly the targets’ ethnicity in the end of the 
experiment. 
Self-Reports 
Intensity. The results revealed an Emotion main effect F(1, 73) = 55.38, p < .001, η2 
= .43, with happiness sentences (M = 5.39, SD = 0.98) being evaluated as more intense than 
anger sentences (M = 4.83, SD = 0.95). Moreover, a significant interaction between Emotion 
and Language was observed F(1, 73) = 5.96, p = .017, η2 = .08. While happiness sentences 
were rated as equally intense in L1 (M = 5.35, SD = 1.02) and L2 (M = 5.43, SD = 1.00, p > 
.20), anger sentences were rated as more intense in L1 (M = 4.90, SD = 1.03) than in L2 (M = 
4.76, SD = 0.99) although this difference did not reach significance (p =. 09). None of the 
other main effects or interactions were significant (all ps = ns). None of the planned t-tests 
were significant (all ps = ns.). 
Probability. The results revealed an emotion main effect F(1,73) = 43.75, p < .001, η2 
= .37, with happiness-related situations being rated as more likely to occur (M = 5.25, SD = 
0.91) than anger-related ones (M = 4.34, SD = 1.13). This effect was qualified by an 
interaction between Emotion and Group Membership F(1,73) = 5.87, p = .02, η2 = .07. As 
expected, happiness-related situations were considered more likely to occur to the in-group 
(M = 5.34, SD = 0.93) than to the out-group (M = 5.15, SD = 1.02, p = .02), and anger-related 
situations were rated as marginally more likely to happen to the out-group (M = 4.42, SD = 
1.17) than to the in-group (M = 4.26, SD = 1.21, p = .07). The other main effects and 
interactions were non-significant (all ps > .13). Planned t-tests revealed that happiness 
situations were considered to be more likely to occur to the in-group (M = 5.37, SD = 1.02) 
than to the out-group (M = 5.09, SD = 1.14) only when the sentences were presented in L2, 
t(73) = 2.91, p = .005. None of the other contrasts reached significance (all ps = ns.). 
Valence. Finally, the analysis on valence ratings yielded an emotion main effect 
F(1,73) = 255.95, p < .001, η2 = .78, with happiness-related sentences (M = 5.67, SD = 0.86) 
being evaluated as more positive than anger-related sentences (M = 2.83, SD = 0.87). 
Furthermore, a Group Membership main effect also emerged F(1,73) = 10.53, p = .002, η2 = 
.13, with in-group sentences (M = 4.31, SD = 0.44) being evaluated more positively (less 
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negatively) than out-group sentences (M = 4.19, SD = 0.43). The other effects did not reach 
significance (all ps > .24). Planned t-tests revealed that anger sentences were considered 
significantly more negative when the target was an out-group (M = 2.80, SD = 0.93) rather 
than an in-group (M = 2.95, SD = 0.94) member, only when the sentences were presented in 
L2, t(73) = 2.40, p = .02. None of the other contrasts reached significance (all ps = ns.). 
Table 4. Means (and Standard Deviations) for Intensity, Probability and Valence Ratings as 
a Function of Group Membership and Language. 
 L1   L2  
 In-group Out-group t  In-group Out-group t 
Intensity         
Happiness 5.36 (1.07) 5.33 (1.05) 0.50  5.48 (1.04) 5.38 (1.06) 1.36 
Anger 4.85 (1.13) 4.95 (1.06) -1.22  4.79 (1.05) 4.72 (1.04) 0.88 
Probability         
Happiness 5.32 (0.91) 5.21 (1.03) 1.18  5.37 (1.02) 5.09 (1.14) 2.91** 
Anger 4.27 (1.33) 4.42 (1.23) -1.47  4.25 (1.23) 4.43 (1.23) -1.88 
Valence         
Happiness 5.75 (0.97) 5.62 (0.96) 1.82  5.71 (0.94) 5.60 (0.91) 1.55 
Anger 2.82 (1.07) 2.75 (1.03) 1.12 
 
2.95 (0.94) 2.80 (0.93) 2.40* 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
Results from Experiment 1 revealed that, as expected, group membership plays an 
important role in the evaluation of positive and negative emotional content. However, the role 
of language, and the joint impact of language and group membership in these judgments was 
not clear. Our pattern of results is consistent with studies showing that explicit measures (i.e., 
self-reports) do not always assess objectively the true affective experience triggered by L1 
and L2, as it was revealed by the discrepancies in results between data from self-reports and 
from psychophysiological measures (e.g., Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-Dinn, 2009). 
Therefore in Experiment 2 we used implicit measures to examine affective experience 
towards in-group and out-group in L1 and L2. 
5.4. Experiment 2 
In Experiment 2 we aimed to extend the findings from Experiment 1 by examining the 
role of group membership, language and the joint impact of language and group membership 
on both affective simulation and judgments. Since conclusions drawn exclusively from self-
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report data might be distorted or biased, and might be considered only indirect evidence of 
emotional strength, we considered that a more direct and implicit measure of emotional 
experience (EMG) would be more adequate to fully understand the impact of group 
membership and language on affective simulation. Thus, in the following experiment both 
self-reports and EMG will be used.  
We predicted that in-group positive (out-group negative) sentences would be 
evaluated with higher intensity, probability and more positive (negative) valence. Moreover, 
sentences would elicit larger activation of the respective muscles (i.e., larger corrugator 
activity for anger-related sentences, and larger corrugator relaxation and zygomatic activity 
for happiness-related sentences) when presented in L1 than in L2, since simulation of 
affective content is impaired in L2 (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Azevedo et al., 2016a). Finally, we 
predicted that differences in simulating in-group and out-group sentences (i.e., larger and 
more convergent patterns of facial activation for in-group sentences) would be enhanced in 
L1 (vs. L2), since affective processing, and thus affective responses, should be more 
automatic and stronger in this language.  
5.4.1. Method 
Participants and Design 
Thirty-eight white female students (Mean age = 22.71; SD = 5.97) from ISCTE-IUL 
participated in this study in exchange for course credit. Six participants were excluded from 
further analyses: two due to technical problems during EMG recordings and four because 
their L2 age of acquisition was between 1 and 4 years old. For these Early Bilinguals both 
languages were expected to be similarly embodied and thus linguistic context should not 
moderate emotional mimicry. The experiment had a 2 (Emotion: Anger vs. Happiness) X 2 
(Group Membership: In-group vs. Out-group) X 2 (Language: L1 vs. L2) within-participants 
design. 
Materials and Procedure 
Materials and procedure were the same as in Experiment 1. The only difference was 
the recording of psychophysiological indicators (i.e., EMG). In the informed consent 
participants were told that people are able to form impressions about other people 
spontaneously, and that studies indicated that impression formation and body temperature 
were related. Therefore, during the experiment, electrodes would be measuring their bodily 
temperature. We used this cover story to reduce the possibility that participants were aware 
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that electrodes were measuring their facial expressions. After signing the informed consent, 
the electrodes were attached to the participants’ faces. All the procedures were conducted in 
line with the ethical guidelines of the host institution.  
Facial EMG data recording and treatment 
Activity of the corrugator supercilii and the zygomatic major muscles was recorded 
on the left side of the face using bipolar placements of 13/7 mm Ag/AgCl surface-electrodes, 
and all pairs were referenced to a forehead electrode placed near the midline (Fridlund & 
Cacioppo, 1986). The impedances of all electrodes were reduced to less than 10 kOhm. The 
raw EMG signal was measured with a BIOPAC-EMG- 100C module amplified with a Gain 
of 1000 Hz, and a sampling frequency of 1000 Hz. Raw data was filtered online with a 10-
500 Hz bandpass filter, and a 50 Hz notch filter.  
The raw EMG data was Root Mean Squared offline and integrated with a 250ms time 
constant. The signals were screened for movement and electrical artifacts. Trials containing 
artifacts (5.03%) were removed prior to analysis. Baseline values for each trial were 
calculated as the average root mean squared EMG activity in the 1000 ms prior to sentence 
onset, and the trial mean activity was calculated as the average root mean squared EMG 
activity during the 3000 ms from sentence onset. All EMG data were z-transformed within 
participants and muscle site attenuating the impact of highly reactive individuals on group 
scores (Tassinary & Cacioppo, 2000).  
The reported EMG activity is a change score expressing the change in activity from 
the baseline level to the mean activity during sentence presentation. Before statistical 
analyses, EMG data was collapsed over trials containing the same Muscle (Corrugator, 
Zygomatic), Emotion (Anger, Happiness), Group Membership (In-group, Out-group), and 
Language (L1, L2). Patterns consistent with frowning are indicated by corrugator activity and 
patterns consistent with smiling by corrugator relaxation and zygomatic muscle activation. 
5.4.2. Results 
Data from targets with the same group membership were averaged within-participants 
for all the DV’s. Paired samples t-tests were used in the manipulation check. The five 
dependent measures (i.e., intensity, probability, and valence evaluations, as well as corrugator 
and zygomatic activity) were separately submitted to a 2 (Emotion: Anger vs. Happiness) X 2 
(Group Membership: In-group vs. Out-group) X 2 (Language: L1 vs. L2) repeated-measures 
ANOVA. Bonferroni post-hoc tests were used to explore the interactions. Planned t-tests 
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were used to test our a priori hypothesis, namely that in L1 differences in judgments and 
affective simulation between sentences describing in-group and out-group targets would be 
more accentuated than in L2 (see Table 5).  
Manipulation check 
Participants reported to like more the Portuguese Caucasian (M = 4.88, SD = 0.92) 
than the Portuguese Gypsy experimental targets (M = 4.27, SD = 1.05), t(31)= 2.36; p= .02. 
Furthermore, the Portuguese Caucasian targets were perceived as closer to the participants (M 
= 3.38, SD = 1.62) than the Portuguese Gypsy targets (M = 2.33, SD = 1.19), t(31)= 4.07; p < 
.001. Consistently, participants reported to feel closer to the Portuguese Caucasian (M = 5.88, 
SD = 1.21) than to the Portuguese Gypsy (M = 2.75, SD = 1.24) social group t(31)= 10.64; p 
< .001. Importantly, all participants correctly identified the targets’ ethnicity in the end of the 
experiment.  
Self-Reports 
Intensity. Results revealed an Emotion main effect F(1, 31) = 26.95, p < .001, η2 = 
.47, with happiness sentences (M = 5.73, SD = 0.55) being evaluated as more intense than 
anger sentences (M = 5.07, SD = 0.76). Moreover, an interaction between Emotion and Group 
Membership was also observed, F(1, 31) = 6.06, p = .02, η2 = .16. In-group happiness 
sentences (M = 5.88, SD = 0.58) were rated as marginally more intense than out-group 
happiness sentences (M = 5.58, SD = 0.81; p = .07), with no differences between groups 
registered for anger sentences (M = 5.09, SD = 0.80 vs. M = 5.06, SD = 0.80; p = .78). None 
of the other main effects or interactions were significant (all Fs < 1.98, all ps > .16). None of 
the planned t-tests were significant (all ps = ns.). 
Probability. The analysis revealed an Emotion main effect F(1, 31) = 31.74, p < .001, 
η
2
 = .51, with sentences describing happiness situations being rated as more likely to occur 
(M = 5.27, SD = 0.86) than sentences describing anger situations (M = 4.25, SD = 1.14). This 
effect was qualified by an interaction between Emotion and Group Membership F(1, 31) = 
7.99, p = .008, η2 = .20. As expected, happiness situations were rated as more likely to 
happen to the in-group (M = 5.46, SD = 0.97) than to the out-group (M = 5.09, SD = 1.00; p = 
.04), and anger situations were rated as more likely to happen to the out-group (M = 4.37, SD 
= 1.14) than to the in-group (M = 4.14, SD = 1.20; p = .02). The remaining main and 
interaction effects were non-significant (all Fs < 1.94, all ps > .17). Planned t-tests revealed 
that happiness situations were judged as more likely to happen to the in-group (M = 5.48, SD 
125 
 
= 0.99) than to the out-group (M = 5.02, SD = 0.96) only in L1, (t(31) = 2.96, p = .006) and 
anger situations were judged as more likely to happen to the out-group (M = 4.36, SD = 1.05) 
than to the in-group (M = 4.17, SD = 1.10) targets only in L2, (t(31) = -2.52, p = .02). None 
of the remaining planned t-tests was significant (all ps = ns.). 
Table 5. Means (and Standard Deviations) for Intensity, Probability and Valence Ratings as 
a Function of Group Membership and Language. 
 L1   L2  
 In-group  Out-group  t  In-group  Out-group  t 
Intensity         
Happiness 5.83 (0.63) 5.60 (0.73) 1.62  5.92 (0.59) 5.55 (1.03) 1.85 
Anger 5.11 (0.84) 5.03 (0.92) 0.67  5.06 (0.85) 5.09 (0.80) -0.34 
Probability         
Happiness 5.48 (0.99) 5.02 (0.96) 2.96**  5.44 (0.98) 5.16 (1.15) 1.34 
Anger 4.11 (1.36) 4.38 (1.34) -1.88  4.17 (1.10) 4.36 (1.05) -2.52* 
Valence         
Happiness 6.20 (0.50) 5.85 (0.75) 2.54*  6.16 (0.53) 5.98 (0.70) 1.38 
Anger 2.30 (0.74) 2.33 (0.64) -0.19  2.37 (0.57) 2.40 (0.62) -0.38 
Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
Valence. The analysis yielded an Emotion main effect, F(1, 31) = 673.95, p < .001, η2 
= .96, with happiness sentences (M = 6.05, SD = 0.44) being evaluated as more positive than 
anger sentences (M = 2.35, SD = 0.54). Furthermore, a Group membership marginal main 
effect was also observed F(1, 31) = 3.71, p = .06, η2 = .11, with in-group sentences (M = 
4.26, SD = 0.32) being evaluated more positively (less negatively) than out-group sentences 
(M = 4.14, SD = 0.34). Planned t-tests revealed that happiness sentences were considered 
more positive for in-group (M = 6.20, SD = 0.50) than out-group (M = 5.85, SD = 0.75) but 
only in L1, t(31) = 2.54, p = .02. 
Facial EMG 
Zygomatic. An Emotion main affect was observed, revealing that happiness sentences 
evoked overall larger zygomatic activity (M = 0.27, SD = 0.54) than anger sentences did (M = 
0.02, SD = 0.18), F(1, 31) = 7.92, p = .008, η2 = .20. None of the other main effects or 
interactions reached significance (all Fs < 2.18, all ps > .15). None of the planned t-tests was 
significant (all ps > .16). 
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Corrugator. Results indicated an Emotion main effect F(1, 31) = 8.48, p = .007, η2 = 
.21, with anger sentences evoking overall larger corrugator activity (M = .08, SD = .34) than 
happiness sentences (M = -0.14, SD = 0.26). Moreover, a Language main effect was observed 
F(1, 31) = 6.80, p = .01, η2 = .18, with L1 sentences resulting in larger corrugator activity (M 
= 0.02, SD = 0.22) than L2 sentences (M = -0.08, SD = 0.25). These effects were qualified by 
an interaction between Emotion and Language F(1, 31) = 4.30, p < .05, η2 = .12. As expected, 
anger sentences lead to larger corrugator activity in L1 (M = 0.18, SD = 0.38) than in L2 (M = 
- 0.01, SD = 0.37; p = .001). No differences were observed in the simulation of happiness 
sentences in L1 (M = - 0.14, SD = 0.34) and L2 (M = - 0.14, SD = 0.28; p > .90). 
Interestingly, in L1 the corrugator activity was responsive to the sentences’ affective content, 
as expressed in a larger activation of the muscle for anger than happiness sentences (p = 
.004), while in the L2 condition no differences in activation were registered for anger and 
happiness sentences (p > .05). 
Moreover, an interaction between Emotion and Group Membership was also observed 
F(1, 31) = 9.67, p = .004, η2 = .24. As predicted, in-group anger sentences elicited larger 
corrugator activity (M = 0.14, SD = 0.40) than out-group anger sentences (M = 0.02, SD = 
0.35; p < .04). A consistent pattern of results was found for happiness sentences, with in-
group happiness sentences evoking a marginally (p = .056) larger corrugator relaxation (M = 
-0.18, SD = 0.30), than out-group happiness sentences (M = -0.10, SD = 0.25. Notably, while 
in-group anger sentences evoked larger corrugator activation than in-group happiness 
sentences (p = .001), no differences in activation were found for out-group anger and out-
group happiness sentences (p > .10). The higher order three-way interaction did not reach 
statistical significance F(1, 31) = 1.19, p = .28, η2 = .04. 
Furthermore, we tested our specific hypotheses about group membership and 
language effects (see Figure 7). No differences were observed in corrugator activity between 
in-group anger sentences (M = 0.20, SD = 0.47) and out-group anger sentences (M = 0.15, SD 
= 0.45), when sentences were presented in L1, t(31) = 0.59, p = .56. Surprisingly, when 
sentences were presented in L2, in-group anger sentences (M = 0.08, SD = 0.51) elicited 
larger corrugator activity than out-group anger sentences (M = -0.10, SD = 0.37), t(31) = 
2.17, p = .038. None of the planned t-tests was significant for happiness sentences (all ps > 
.16). 
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Figure 7. Change scored corrugator activity (z-transformed) and standard errors for anger 
sentences as a function of group membership and language. 
Based on the obtained results we explored a posteriori the differences in sentence 
simulation between the out-group anger sentences presented in L2 (the condition with smaller 
activation) and the other two remaining conditions. Namely, out-group anger sentences 
presented in L2 (M = -0.10, SD = 0.37) elicited lower corrugator activity than out-group 
anger sentences (M = 0.15, SD = 0.45); p = .003) and in-group anger sentences (M = 0.20, SD 
= 0.47; p = .001) presented in L1. Moreover, we explored the final remaining comparison. 
Namely, although in-group anger sentences evoked larger corrugator activation when 
presented in L1 than when presented in L2, this difference did not reach significance (p > 
.55).  
Thus, out-group anger sentences presented in L2 were the ones evoking the smallest 
corrugator activity. Particularly, contrary to the other three conditions, out-group anger 
sentences presented in L2 evoked a relaxation of the corrugator muscle, a pattern that is 
consistent with smiling. 
5.5. General Discussion 
The present research was designed to investigate differences in affective experience 
and judgments of emotional sentences depending on the targets’ group membership and the 
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language in use. Despite the relevance of contextual cues for the understanding of socio-
cognitive and affective processes, the impact of group membership and language on sentence 
simulation is still under-investigated. Moreover, emotional mimicry studies typically present 
photos or videos of emotional facial expressions, even though linguistic representations of 
emotions (i.e., words, sentences) activate the same somatic patterns of facial activation in the 
reader. Finally, to the best of our knowledge, only one study (Foroni, 2015) has compared the 
simulation of affective content (measured with EMG) in L1 and L2 (see Foroni & Semin, 
2013).  
In our pilot study we observed that Gypsies were the social group perceived as more 
socially distant, less similar, rated with the least degree of identification and belonging and 
target of the most negative explicit attitudes by our Portuguese sample. Hence we have 
chosen the Portuguese Caucasians to represent the in-group and the Portuguese Gypsies to 
represent the out-group in our two experiments.  
Overall, in Experiments 1 and 2 we have confirmed our predictions about the role of 
group membership on judgments and affective simulation of emotional sentences. Namely, in 
both experiments, happiness-related situations were considered to be more likely to occur to 
the in-group targets, while anger-related situations were considered more likely to occur to 
the out-group targets. These findings are consistent with evidence presented in the intergroup 
relations literature showing that in-group members are generally associated with more 
positive, and out-group members with more negative emotional facial expressions (e.g., 
Beaupré & Hess, 2003; Hutchings & Haddock, 2008). Our data on valence self-reports, 
usually absent in previous studies, shows a general higher positivity associated to the in-
group, and a general higher negativity associated to the out-group, which is consistent with 
previous findings using different measures (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1993; Likowski et al., 2008; 
Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Rustemli et al., 2000). 
Extending the findings of emotional mimicry literature to the use of linguistic stimuli, 
we found, as expected, that anger and happiness sentences evoked more affective simulation 
when referring to in-group rather than to out-group members. Interestingly, while in-group 
sentences elicited simulation of affective meaning, as shown by differences in corrugator 
activity evoked by anger and happiness sentences, for out-group sentences this pattern was 
not observed. 
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However, our prediction concerning the impact of language and the joint impact of 
language and group membership on affective simulation and judgments were only partially 
confirmed. Regarding the self-report measures, we were faced with the same pattern of 
inconsistent results previously reported in the literature (e.g., Caldwell-Harris & Ayçiçeği-
Dinn, 2009), suggesting that these measures are probably not the most adequate to explore 
differences in the affective experience triggered by L1 and L2.  
As shown in Experiment 2, EMG seems to be a more accurate and direct measure to 
assess these effects. As predicted, language impacted affective simulation, namely anger 
sentences evoked larger corrugator activation when presented in L1 than in L2. Interestingly, 
while in the L1 condition the affective meaning of sentences was simulated, as shown by 
differences in corrugator activity evoked by anger and happiness sentences, in L2 affective 
meaning did not seem to be simulated, at least to the same extent. Surprisingly, differences in 
the simulation of in-group and out-group sentences seemed to be accentuated when the 
language in use was L2, and not when it was L1. Namely, participants simulated the affective 
content of in-group anger sentences to a greater extent than out-group anger sentences when 
these were presented in L2, and not in L1.  
Specifically, when participants were presented with out-group anger sentences in L2, 
a relaxation of the corrugator muscle was observed. Corrugator relaxation is a pattern 
consistent with smiling, and thus when it is observed as a response to anger-related stimulus 
could be interpreted as a pattern of counter-mimicry. Counter-mimicry has been found 
mainly in studies presenting emotional facial displays but it is still under-explored in studies 
using emotional sentences. Moreover, this specific pattern of counter-mimicry (i.e., smiling 
when reading about an out-group target that is angry or frowning) is not commonly described 
in previous studies. 
Usually, facing a member of an out-group that is angry elicits fear in the perceiver 
(e.g., Van der Schalk et al., 2011). We suggest that our pattern of results may be explained by 
the distance imposed by the written language, by L2, and by out-group members. To know 
that an out-group target is angry but not seeing it might have different effects. Specifically, 
not seeing the target’s face imposes distance from the situation, and the anger expression 
might be interpreted as non-threatening for the self and even elicit positive affect (e.g., 
“He/she is angry but he/she cannot harm me”), similarly to Schadenfreude. This may happen 
particularly in L2 because it is a language that has already been identified as fostering social 
distance (see Azevedo et al., 2016b), and for out-group targets that were also perceived as 
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more socially distant than in-group targets. Thus, the corrugator relaxation evoked by out-
group anger sentences presented in L2, may be explained by the fact that counter-mimicry is 
usually elicited by social targets perceived as socially distant (i.e., out-group members), and 
that this perceived social distance might be accentuated in the written L2.  
Importantly, previous evidence has revealed that L2 simulation is not impaired in all 
situations and for all types of information. For example, simulation in L2 seems to be 
particularly impaired for more abstract types of information (e.g., affect - Li et al., 2015; 
negation - Foroni, 2015). An alternative explanation to the social distance argument is that 
out-group members are represented and described more abstractly (see Liberman, Trope & 
Stephan, 2007) and L2 is also processed at a more abstract level (Azevedo et al., 2016b). 
Thus, maybe simulation was inhibited when out-group anger sentences were presented in L2, 
because both out-groups and L2 are represented more abstractly, and affective simulation in 
L2 seems to be impaired for more abstract information.  
In future studies these alternative explanations should be explored by measuring the 
impact of language and group membership on both perceived social distance and the level at 
which information is represented (i.e., construal-level). Furthermore, we suggest that the 
activity of other facial muscles could be measured. Zygomatic and corrugator muscles’ 
activity constitutes an index of positive versus negative mood (Larsen, Norris, & Cacioppo, 
2003) and not necessarily of discrete emotions. Corrugator activity might signal anger but 
also fear, and thus the measurement of the frontalis muscle would be recommended to better 
differentiate these two emotions (see Hess & Fischer, 2013). Moreover, we believe that 
increasing the sample size would increase the power of our studies, and would also allow 
exploring possible effects of linguistic variables (e.g., age of L2 acquisition) on affective 
simulation.  
Overall, our findings are potentially relevant for several research domains. First, they 
are relevant for research with bilinguals, since studies using psychophysiological indicators 
(particularly EMG) to access emotional experience in L1 and L2 are still scarce. Second, our 
findings may be relevant for embodiment research since they replicate results showing that 
language comprehension entails emotion simulation (Foroni & Semin, 2009), and extend 
these results to the study of L2 and bilingual populations. Third, our results are also 
informative for the in-group favoritism domain, showing another expression of in-group 
preference, namely through the use of intensity, probability and valence self-reports 
concerning positive and negative emotional expressions of in-group and out-group members.  
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Finally, our findings might have some societal impact. The “Refugees crisis”, 
“Brexit”, and the ascension of right-wing conservative views often enter our daily lives 
through the written word, and sometimes in a language that we have learned later in life. 
Thus, exploring the effects of group membership and language on people’s emotional 
experiences, empathy, cognitions and behaviors is of preponderant relevance, since it may 
impact important social and political decisions. 
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In this last chapter we review our main questions, as well as our specific goals and 
hypotheses. Then we discuss the significance of the empirical findings in addressing those 
questions, as well as their theoretical and applied contributions. Finally we identify some of 
the limitations of our research and advance some possible experimental ways to overcome 
them.  
6.1.  Summary and theoretical contributions 
The main goal of the present research program was to experimentally examine the 
grounding of a first-native (L1) and a second-learned language (L2), and how these different 
languages would impact intra-individual, inter-individual and inter-group processes. Framing 
our work within a Socially Situated Cognition approach and integrating evidence from 
embodied cognition and bilingualism fields, in three sets of experiments we investigated 
whether L1 and L2 are grounded in the same way and the consequences that different 
groundings might have.  
In Chapter 1 we reviewed two major approaches on language and cognition. First, we 
briefly described how language and cognition have been framed in the traditional socio-
cognitive perspective largely characterized by amodal, symbolic and decontextualized 
processes (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975; Newell & Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1984). Second, 
we described a more recent perspective, the Socially Situated Cognition approach (SSC; see 
Garrido, Azevedo, & Palma, 2011; Semin & Garrido, 2015; Semin, Garrido, & Palma, 2012, 
2013; Semin & Smith, 2002; Smith & Semin, 2004) which argues for a macro level of 
analysis of the socio-cognitive processes, which considers the joint impact of body, mind, 
physical and social context on cognition (e.g., Barsalou, et al., 2003; Niedenthal, et al., 2005; 
Smith & Semin, 2004).  
We also discussed the applications of these assumptions to the study of linguistic 
communication. Specifically, we have argued that a full understanding of the linguistic 
communication processes would only be possible if one considers that 1) linguistic 
communication is an emergent phenomenon; 2) language is a tool for adaptive action; 3) 
language is a tool to distribute and extend cognition, allowing for the offloading of cognition 
into the environment, individuals and groups; 4) language is a tool for social coupling, and 
communication is biologically grounded; and 5) language comprehension is embodied, being 
grounded on sensorimotor experiences. We explored in greater detail the last assumption, 
reviewing embodiment theoretical accounts of language (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a; 2008), 
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showing that language processing and comprehension entails at least a partial simulation of 
perception (e.g., Zwaan & Yaxley, 2003), action (e.g., Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002) and 
affective states (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009). 
Most of the ideas presented in Chapter 1 are not new and can be found in the SSC and 
embodiment of language literatures. However, this chapter constitutes an integrative 
theoretical effort to apply SSC assumptions to linguistic communication. Our main goal was 
to have a theoretical framework to guide our own studies but that could also constitute a 
useful framework for scholars working on SSC, embodiment, language and bilingualism, 
among others fields. 
In Chapter 2 we examined whether different languages, namely first-native (L1) and 
second-learned (L2), are grounded in the same way. This chapter had two main goals. First, 
to reviewed the available literature showing the differences in processing and comprehending 
L1 and L2, and how these differences may impact cognition, emotion and behavior. Second, 
considering the inconsistencies that characterize the main findings reported in studies 
examining the grounding of L1 and L2 with bilingual populations, we tried to present a 
critical analysis of these findings, to advance some suggestions for methodological 
improvement, and to indicate some future research directions in this field. 
In the first section we described the Linguistic Relativism perspective, which argues 
that the language available to think and describe one’s experiences influences the experiences 
itself (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto, 2010; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003). More 
specifically, the revised studies demonstrated that one’s native language have an important 
role on structuring both low-level (e.g., Drivonikou et al., 2007; Spaepen, Coppola, Spelke, 
Carey, & Goldin-Meadow, 2011) and high-level thought (e.g., Boroditsky, 2001; Casasanto 
et al., 2004).  
Second, we briefly described some important concepts and notions applied in 
bilingualism studies, namely the key variables identified as modulators of the bilinguals’ 
experience with different languages. Variables such as order of acquisition, language 
dominance, level of proficiency, frequency of use, age (AoA) and context (CoA) of 
acquisition have been acknowledged as important factors shaping the emotional experience 
triggered by different languages. Namely, while L1 is usually learned and used in more 
emotional settings and its comprehension entails the integration of information received from 
all sensory modalities (Pavlenko, 2008), L2 is frequently acquired and used in more neutral 
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formal settings, without a significant involvement of the majority of sensory modalities 
(Perani & Abutalebi, 2005). In the end of this section we concluded that since L1 and L2 
have different linguistic, affective, and socialization histories, associated with different 
sensorimotor experiences, it makes sense to argue that sensorimotor and affective grounding 
may be different between these two languages. 
Our argument was further developed by reviewing studies conducted with bilingual 
populations showing that processing and comprehending information in L2: may serve a 
distancing function (e.g., Movahedi, 1996; Santiago-Rivera, Altarriba, Poll, Gonzalez-Miller, 
& Cragun, 2009); is usually associated with reduced self-reported emotional intensity (e.g., 
Dewaele, 2004, 2008); induces lower skin conductance responses (SCRs; Harris, 2004; 
Harris, et al., 2003) at least for taboo words and childhood reprimands; is associated with an 
impairment in recall (e.g., Anooshian & Hertel, 1994); triggers less automatic processing of 
affective content (e.g., Degner, Doycheva, & Wentura, 2012; Segalowitz, Trofimovich, 
Gatbonton, & Sokolovskaya, 2008); and leads to less biases in decision-making and to more 
rational choices (e.g., Costa, Foucart, Hayakawa, et al., 2014; Keysar, Hayakawa, & An, 
2012).  
We then presented evidence from recent studies suggesting that the affective 
grounding of L1 and L2 may be different, since affective simulation does not occur to the 
same extent in both languages (e.g., Foroni, 2015; Li, Liu, & Ma, 2015). In the end of this 
chapter we revisited the previous studies and suggested a few methodological refinements as 
well as some directions regarding future studies. 
The review presented in Chapter 2 constitutes, in our view, an important theoretical 
contribution. Indeed, and despite the great surge of interest in studying linguistic 
communication, research has been focused on the processing, comprehension and affective 
experience of first-native language by monolingual populations in fields such cognitive 
linguistics (e.g., Kövecses, 2000; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), linguistic anthropology (e.g., 
Kulick & Schieffelin, 2004), pragmatics (e.g., Gilbert, 2001; Zhang & Patel, 2006), 
communication sciences (e.g., Krauss & Fussell, 1996), social-cognition (e.g., H. Clark, 
1996; Lindblom & Ziemke, 2007; Ricoeur, 1955), and SSC (e.g., Semin & Garrido, 2015; 
Semin, Garrido, & Palma, 2012, 2013). Most importantly, the association of each language 
(L1 and L2) to different sensorimotor and affective experiences, and its impact on perception, 
action and emotion simulation, has been relatively left aside, even within the embodiment 
framework (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a, 2008; Foroni & Semin, 2009; Glenberg, 1997; Glenberg & 
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Robertson, 2000; see for exceptions Foroni, 2015; Li et al., 2015). Thus, this chapter may 
provide and interesting input for a better theoretical understanding of the socio-cognitive and 
affective impact of linguistic communication, when this communication involves a language 
other than one’s native. 
Moreover, even though some reviews on emotional experience and bilingualism are 
available (e.g., Pavlenko, 2012), they are mainly focused on affective experiences, and are 
extremely vague in advancing with a theoretical proposal regarding the mechanism that may 
explain the differences found between L1 and L2. In Chapter 2 we have emphasized the role 
of embodied simulation as the mechanism responsible for the (different) grounding of L1 and 
L2. Finally, our critical review and analysis of the literature can improve research practices, 
inform theoretical accounts and contribute with new perspectives to inform future research. 
Based on the theoretical accounts and the empirical evidence reported in the first two 
chapters we argued that L1 and L2 are not likely to be grounded in the same way. Thus, in 
the empirical chapters we examined this assumption suggesting that, if that is the case, intra-
individual (i.e., how one processes affective information), inter-individual (i.e., how one 
perceives and evaluates others in terms of social distance), and intergroup (i.e., how 
emotional information about social groups is evaluated and simulated) processes should 
reflect the different groundings of L1-L2.  
In Chapter 3, we hypothesized that processing affective information would be 
facilitated and more automatic in L1 than in L2. In two experiments, we have used the 
affective priming paradigm to investigate prime/target congruency effects in L1 and L2. In 
Experiment 1, valenced words were used as primes and targets and the pairs were presented 
both in L1 and in L2. The typical congruency effect was found, that is, participants responded 
faster when the prime-target pairs had a congruent valence (i.e., positive-positive or negative-
negative). Notably, as predicted, the congruency effect was found only when the pairs were 
presented in L1 but not when the pairs were presented in L2. In Experiment 2, participants 
evaluated both words-photos (facial expressions) and photos-words pairs and the words were 
presented in both L1 and L2. This time, congruency effects were observed in both L1 and L2, 
in both types of task (i.e., evaluating word-photos and photo-words pairs). Other relevant 
outputs also emerged from the analyses. In both experiments the hit rates were very high and 
independent of language, and overall response times were faster in L1. 
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These results lend additional support to previous findings showing that affective 
priming effects are observed in L1 but not in L2 (e.g., Degner et al., 2012) and constitute 
strong support for our claim that L2 is not affectively grounded to the same extent as L1. 
Since affective priming effects rest on the affective grounding of language (e.g., Foroni & 
Semin, 2012), and these effects are absent in L2, these findings support the idea that due to 
different affective groundings, affective processing is facilitated in L1 relative to L2. 
Importantly, the equal hit rates observed in both languages suggest that it is highly 
unlikely that our results are due to lack of comprehension in L2. Moreover, the fact that 
participants were slower to evaluate stimuli in L2 suggests that simulation is more difficult in 
this language (see Foroni, 2015; Foroni & Semin, 2012). 
Our studies extend previous findings by introducing word-photo and photo-word 
pairs. When photos were part of the prime/target pairs language did no longer moderate the 
congruency effects suggesting that the simulation of facial expressions permit to overcome 
the slowdown produced by L2 words. Hence, one might argue that the affective constraints 
imposed by a second language are reduced by the simulation of valenced facial expressions. 
This is consistent with the idea that photos of facial expressions constitute strong affective 
cues that are processed very fast (De Houwer & Hermans, 1994), and that they recruit 
somatic activity, thus producing the same emotional expression in the perceiver (e.g., 
Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000).  
In Chapter 4 we examined the impact of language on inter-individual processes, 
namely on judgments of perceived social distance. In this chapter we experimentally tested 
whether an L2 linguistic context leads to judgments of higher social distance from social 
targets, as compared to an L1 linguistic context. We further proposed that construal-level 
should be the mechanism explaining the relation between linguistic context and perceived 
social distance. This proposal was advanced based on two main arguments. First, in L2 (vs. 
L1) the simulation of previous sensorimotor experiences during language comprehension is 
impaired (e.g., Foroni, 2015), and sensorimotor information constitutes a low-level 
characteristic of a situation (Maglio & Trope, 2012). Thus, we reasoned that L2 should 
activate a higher level mindset than L1. Second, higher (vs. lower) level construals induce 
higher perceived social distance between the self and a target (e.g., Stephan, Liberman, & 
Trope, 2011). Hence, we have hypothesized that language should impact judgments of social 
distance through construal-level. 
140 
 
We have tested these assumptions in three experiments. Linguistic context was 
manipulated between-subjects by asking participants to write a short neutral story either in L1 
or L2. In Experiment 1, social distance was measured both as familiarity and similarity to the 
self, while in Experiment 3 it was measured as resources allocation. Construal-level was 
measured both as conceptual level of processing using the Behavior Identification Form (BIF; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) in Experiment 2, and as perceptual level of processing with the 
Shape Task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) in Experiment 3. In the analysis we have also taken 
into account the role of L2 age of acquisition as an important modulator of language effects. 
In Experiment 1, participants read about fictitious and real (i.e., the experimenter) 
social targets’ actions and were asked to write small narratives about their behaviors in L1 or 
L2. After writing the small narrative, they were asked to evaluate the social target for 
familiarity and similarity to the self. Results have shown that linguistic context did not affect 
evaluations of fictitious social targets but did affect evaluations made about the experimenter. 
Namely, in the L1 condition participants considered the experimenter to be more familiar and 
similar to the self than in the L2 condition. In Experiment 2, we have explored the impact of 
linguistic context on conceptual construal-level. Results showed that L2 leads to a higher 
level conceptual construal than L1. Notably, as predicted, this difference was only found for 
Late Bilinguals (LBs), and not for Early Bilinguals (EBs). In Experiment 3, we tested our full 
model. We found for LBs a negative conditional indirect effect of the linguistic context on 
social distance from the experimenter through level of perceptual construal. More 
specifically, for LBs (and not for EBs), L2 induced higher level perceptual construal than L1, 
which led to lower resources allocation (higher social distance) to the experimenter. 
Importantly, overall, neither linguistic context, nor construal-level affected the resources 
allocated to fictitious social targets.  
Suggestions that L2 has a distancing function have already been presented in clinical 
settings (e.g., Movahedi, 1996; Santiago-Rivera et al., 2009). However, the assumption that 
L2 leads to higher psychological distance than L1 was never, to the best of our knowledge, 
experimentally tested. This assumption relied essentially on a few case studies, on therapists’ 
perceptions rather than on speakers’ perceptions, or on qualitative data. Notably, it was also 
unclear what type of psychological distance were these reports referring to (i.e., temporal, 
spatial, social, or hypotheticality; e.g., Bar-Anan, Liberman, Trope, & Algom, 2007; Trope & 
Liberman, 2003), and what are the psychological mechanisms explaining the relationship 
between language and psychological distance. Additionally, our results contribute to the 
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construal-level literature, by proposing a new possible manipulation to induce different 
construal-level mindsets, namely the use of different languages.  
Importantly, these results add meaningful inputs to the embodiment literature. Our 
findings suggest that the relation between embodiment and construal-level is bidirectional. 
Maglio and Trope (2012) have shown that under a high-level mindset embodiment effects are 
reduced. Our results suggest that conditions in which embodiment effects are minimized (i.e., 
L2) trigger a higher-level mindset. Moreover, linguistic context did not only affect the level 
of conceptual construal but also the level at which perceptual information is processed. These 
findings are in line with embodied approaches to cognition, suggesting that cognition derives 
from and is connected to perception, and that conceptual and perceptual systems are both re-
enacted during language comprehension (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a, 2008; Borghi, Glenberg, & 
Kaschak, 2004). Finally, these findings extend the embodied cognition literature typically 
focused on the grounding of L1, by showing that the extent to which simulation processes 
occur can be moderated by the language (L1-L2) one is using. 
In our final empirical chapter (Chapter 5) we had three main goals. First, to replicate 
findings showing that language comprehension requires at least partial simulation of affective 
states, which impacts judgments (e.g., Foroni & Semin, 2009). Second, to investigate whether 
sentences’ affective simulation is affected by the group membership (i.e., in-group; out-
group) of the described targets, similarly to the way facial mimicry is affected by the group 
membership of the targets’ facial displays (e.g., Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Finally, to explore 
whether the simulation and judgments of affective sentences describing targets with different 
group memberships are modulated by the language one is using.  
In Experiments 1 and 2, we asked bilinguals to make judgments of intensity, 
probability and valence of sentences describing social targets (i.e., in-group or out-group) in 
emotional situations (i.e., anger or happiness). The sentences were presented to participants 
both in L1 and L2. In Experiment 2 the activity of the corrugator supercilii (i.e., associated 
with frown) and of the zygomatic major (i.e., associated with smile) muscles was also 
recorded through the use of facial electromyography (EMG). 
Overall, in Experiments 1 and 2 we confirmed our predictions about the impact of 
group membership on judgments. Namely, in both experiments happiness-related situations 
were considered to be more likely to occur to in-group targets while anger-related situations 
were considered to be more likely to occur to out-group targets. Consistently, valence 
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judgments were more positive (and less negative) for sentences describing the in-group than 
for those describing the out-group. However, language manipulation had no significant 
influence in these self-reports. In Experiment 2 we have confirmed that affective simulation 
occurs during language comprehension, by showing that anger and happiness-related 
sentences consistently activated the muscles of interest (i.e., corrugator and zygomatic, 
respectively). Importantly, as predicted, the affective simulation of anger sentences was 
stronger in L1 than in L2, and anger and happiness sentences have elicited stronger affective 
simulation when referring to in-group rather than to out-group members.  
Surprisingly, differences in affective simulation of sentences describing in-group and 
out-group targets have been enhanced in L2 and not in L1. Particularly, out-group anger 
sentences presented in L2 have elicited less corrugator activation than all the other 
conditions. Contrary to all the other conditions, out-group anger sentences presented in L2 
have evoked a corrugator relaxation, a pattern consistent with smiling and thus with counter-
mimicry. We have speculated that since counter-mimicry occurs more often in response to 
socially distant groups (i.e., out-groups) and L2 also fosters social distance (see Chapter 4), it 
was in this condition that counter-mimicry patterns were observed. 
The findings reported in Chapter 5 have implication for several different fields. First, 
they are relevant for the bilingualism research, because studies using psychophysiological 
measures, particularly EMG, to access emotional experience in L1 and L2 are still scarce. 
Second, our findings are also informative for the in-group favoritism domain (Tajfel, 1982), 
by showing another expression of in-group preference, namely that probability and valence 
judgments of sentences with positive and negative emotional content are influenced by group 
membership.  
Importantly, our results may be relevant for the embodiment research for several 
reasons. First, we have replicated findings showing that not only emotional facial displays 
(i.e., photos or videos) do evoke affective simulation, but that language comprehension also 
entails the simulation of affective experience (Foroni & Semin, 2009). Furthermore, our 
results are in line with previous findings showing that affective simulation is stronger in L1 
than in L2, at least for some categories of stimuli (e.g., Foroni, 2015). Additionally, we have 
also replicated findings showing that group membership shapes affective simulation (e.g., 
Bourgeois & Hess, 2008). Finally, we extended the findings presented in the embodiment 
literature by showing that the impact of group membership on sentences’ simulation depends 
on the language one is using.  
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Overall, our work has a multidisciplinary flavor and integrates approaches from 
different study domains, namely SSC, embodied cognition, bilingualism, construal-level 
theory and intergroup relations. The results from the three sets of experimental studies have 
shown that L1 and L2 are unlikely to be embodied in the same way, a finding that is expected 
to have consequences for intra-individual, inter-individual and inter-group processes. In 
addition to the theoretical contributions that this work may have, we have also identified 
some implications that it may bring to more applied fields, as described in the next section. 
6.2.  Applied Implications 
The proposed research elucidates the factors and conditions that contribute to 
predictable positive and detrimental consequences of using L2 in everyday life. Particularly, 
we have found that L2’s affective content is processed less automatically, that this language 
induces more abstract higher level thought, that it promotes social distance and that it 
strengthens the differences in the simulation of in-group and out-group members’ emotions. 
These findings might have several consequences in terms of decision-making, social policies 
and educational programs. Although our suggestions may be somehow speculative, we think 
they deserve careful consideration and above all further experimental examination. 
In our work we have found that L2’s affective content is processed less automatically, 
which allows to reduce congruency effects (see Chapter 3). This is expressed in faster 
responses in decision-making, since the affective connotation implied by the decision is 
ignored (or at least it is processed more slowly). This might have practical positive 
implications when one uses L2. For instance, when the “best possible decision” should be 
made in a short time, implies reduced emotionality or a focus on utilitarism, using L2 instead 
of L1 to communicate seems to promote performance efficiency. This should be expected 
particularly when communication does not imply face-to-face contact, which could constrain 
the rationality implied by L2. Hence, we would advise the use of L2 to communicate in 
environments in which performance depends on fast and rational decisions, which is the case 
of multinational companies. However, when the emotional content needs to be considered in 
decision-making (e.g., cutting salaries, collective dismissals, or others’ well-being) the use of 
L1 or face-to-face communication would be recommended.  
In Chapter 4 we have shown that L2 is associated with more abstract high-level 
thought and L1 with more concrete low-level thought. This means that using L2 to 
communicate should make more available “how” an action is being performed, while using 
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L1 directs one’s attention on “why” that action is being performed. In other words, it is 
expected that someone using L2 would focus “on the forest” while someone using L1 would 
focus “on the threes”. Thus, the use of L1 or L2 might improve performance and motivation 
depending on the task at hand. For instance, sometimes one has to deal with an excessive 
amount of work, or to perform tasks characterized by high levels of complexity. Using L2 in 
communication could be a good way to improve employees’ motivation because they would 
focus on the “why” they are doing their jobs (e.g., a good salary, to help someone at risk) 
putting aside what they have to do to achieve their goals. Performance might also come out 
benefited as having a more global picture can often help in complex situations. However, in 
many contexts this could have detrimental consequences. For instance, let’s consider a war 
context in which the action to be implemented is “bombing Syria”. In this context, to focus 
on “why” some measures are being implemented (e.g., “Make America great again”) 
ignoring the “how” they are being implemented (e.g., killing civilians) might promote 
speeches and acts conveying that “the ends justify the means”.  
Taken together the findings of Chapter 3 and 4 one can assume that L1 is 
characterized by higher emotionality and induces higher familiarity than L2. It is well-known 
that people like what is familiar and buy what they like. If that is the case, advertisements 
should appear in the target population’s native language to increase sales. Additionally, one 
can speculate that language of communication can also affect vote intentions. Politics could 
use sentences in the native language of the population they want to reach out (e.g., using 
sentences in Spanish if they want more Latinos’ votes) to increase votes. 
Besides revealing that L2 (vs. L1) induces higher perceived social distance (Chapter 
4), and contrary to our prediction, our findings also seem to suggest that L2 strengthens the 
in-group favoritism bias (Chapter 5). Particularly, in L2 people seem to have more difficulty 
in simulating out-group members’ emotions, and thus to feel (and maybe to fully understand) 
what others are feeling. Hence, when establishing social policies or making international 
decisions concerning other people’ welfare, it would be important to have communication 
conveyed and transmitted in people’s native language. Namely, in agencies responsible for 
important international decisions (e.g., EU, ONU, NATO) we would advise to transmit 
information in each person native language, and during decision-making to ask people to 
communicate in their L1. This could emphasize the emotional content of the decision, to 
decrease the perceived social distance between the decision maker and the targets of the 
decision, to promote empathy, and to minimize the differences between “us” and “them”. 
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Finally, our findings may also impact the way schools integrate the learning of L2 in 
their programs. Since learning L2 in early stages in life promotes not only semantic 
acquisition but also the integration and simulation of affective meaning, it would be 
recommended that the acquisition of this language would occur already during early 
childhood. Moreover, it would be important to promote a learning environment that do not 
only stimulates semantic acquisition, but that also integrates sensorimotor and affective 
experiences in the learning process. This seems to be the best way to ensure that L2 becomes 
a truly common language. 
6.3.  Limitations, remaining questions, and ideas for future studies 
The findings presented in this work have shed some light to some of our (many) initial 
questions. However, many others remained to be answered and new questions have arisen.  
The results from affective priming tasks presented in Chapter 3 suggest that 
processing affective content in L2 is less automatic than processing the same content in L1, a 
constraint that is overcome by the use of emotional facial expressions. We suggest that in 
future studies affective priming tasks could be used to replicate our findings and that the 
affective experience of L1 and L2 could be further explored by introducing other types of 
stimulus materials.  
Non-verbal communication (e.g., bodily postures, facial expressions) is essential in 
the expression and understanding of emotions, intentions and desires. However, one’s 
perceptions and emotional experience are highly impacted by verbal communication, namely 
by what one hears. For instance, Harris, Ayçiçeği and Gleason (2003) have shown that L1 
words presented in the auditory modality elicited stronger SCRs than the ones presented in 
the visual modality, with no differences registered between modalities in L2. These effects 
might reflect the outcome of distinct learning environments: the acquisition of language early 
in life (L1) occurs essentially via the auditory modality and thus richer affective and 
sensorimotor experiences might be associated with this modality. In contrast, L2 stimuli 
presented in the auditory and visual modalities might be more similar because a greater 
amount of experiences may have taken place with print, due to the learning context (e.g., 
school, work). The further examination of processing and comprehending L1’s and L2’s 
affective content in distinct modalities could be particularly relevant since the use of the 
auditory modality in L1 and L2 may express different emotional experiences associated with 
different contexts (e.g., strong emotional experiences with caregivers at home; neutral 
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emotional experiences during class at school, respectively), whereas the use of the visual 
modality in L1 and L2 could be associated with experiences in similar contexts (i.e., neutral 
emotional experiences during class at school), although in different moments in life (i.e., 
early childhood vs. late childhood or adolescence). Hence, the use of auditory stimuli might 
enhance the expression of the different affective groundings of L1 and L2.  
Moreover, faces of in-group and out-group members could be used in further affective 
priming paradigms designed to extend our findings. If facial expressions are automatically 
simulated overcoming L2’s constraints, maybe the use of faces of out-group members would 
not produce the same effect since they induce lower or absent facial mimicry (see Bourgeois 
& Hess, 2008; Van der Schalk et al., 2011). Additionally, further studies should address the 
question of why is L2 processing slower than L1 processing. Namely, is simulation more 
difficult in this language or can these results be explained by differences in proficiency, 
frequency of use or age of acquisition of L1 and L2?  
The findings reported in Chapter 4 seem to suggest a bidirectional relation between 
construal-level and embodiment. While previous studies have shown that in a high-level 
mindset embodiment effects are reduced (Maglio & Trope, 2012), our own findings suggest 
that using a disembodied language (i.e., L2) can also trigger a higher level mindset. Thus, in 
future studies this possible bidirectional relation should be explored, as well as the extent to 
which varying the linguistic context (L1, L2) could be used as a manipulation to explore 
embodiment effects.  
Our findings also indicate that for LBs the language used in communication (L1, L2) 
affects directly familiarity and similarity ratings (Experiment 1), but affects only indirectly 
resources allocation through level of perceptual construal (Experiment 3). One possible 
explanation for these results is that familiarity and similarity ratings, and resources allocation 
tasks, although often used interchangeably, measure different constructs or at least different 
features of social distance. First, resources allocation requires an action that is expected to 
have direct consequences, while rating someone is a more passive task with no direct 
consequences, neither for the self nor for the targets. Second, whereas giving more to 
someone while remaining with less constitutes a cost to the self, passively evaluating 
someone’s familiarity and similarity does not constitute a loss. It is possible that, to be 
willing to incur in costs to the self implies a higher social proximity towards a target, whereas 
evaluating someone’s familiarity or similarity does not require feeling that close to someone. 
Thus, we believe it would be important to replicate our findings and to investigate whether 
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these measures differ in such a way. We also suggest that more direct measures of social 
distance, such as the Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale (IOS; Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992) 
should be used in future studies.  
In the experiments reported in Chapter 4 we addressed the question of whether L2 
induces psychological distance to a greater extent than L1. Our findings suggest that this is 
the case but we only tested one dimension of this construct – social distance. Since nowadays 
the use of a second language is a common phenomenon and that important decisions are 
made when using this language, we suggest that the effects of linguistic context on social 
distance should be replicated and extended to the other three dimensions– temporal, spatial, 
and hypotheticality – since the four dimensions of psychological distance are interrelated 
(e.g., Bar-Anan et al., 2007). 
Additionally it would be relevant to explore the consequences of these findings for 
cognition and behavior. For instance, using L2 in communication might have possible 
consequences for creativity due to its relation with psychological distance and abstract 
thought (both conceptual and perceptual; see Chapter 4). Extensive evidence was provided 
showing that psychological distance, as opposed to psychological proximity, promotes 
creative responses and better performance on problem solving tasks that require creative 
insight (e.g., Förster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Jia, Hirt, & Karpen, 2009). Notably, 
distant perspectives, as opposed to proximal perspectives, undermine analytical problem 
solving (e.g., Förster et al., 2004). Hence, future studies could explore whether using L2 in 
communication could be used as a mean to promote creativity, while using L1 to 
communicate could be more recommended when decisions require analytical thought. 
Importantly, these studies should take into consideration that L2 could only be used as a tool 
to promote creative thinking when using this language does not elicit fear or anxiety (i.e., like 
in the case of speakers with low proficiency and frequency of use in this language), since 
these feelings are associated with lower creativity (see for meta-analysis, Baas, De Dreu, & 
Nijstad, 2008). 
Moreover, further studies could explore whether using different languages – that seem 
to trigger different types of thought - could impact social judgments and attributions. Namely, 
actions performed by socially distant people are more likely to be represented in terms of 
abstract and superordinate characteristics, such as traits, whereas the same actions performed 
by close ones are more likely to be represented in terms of more concrete and subordinate 
features, such as contextualized behaviors (e.g., Idson & Mischel, 2001). Thus, since L1 and 
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L2 induce social distance and abstract thought to a different extent, it would be interesting to 
explore in further studies whether the use of these different languages would impact the 
causal explanations of other people’s behavior. 
It would also be important to replicate and extend the findings reported in Chapter 5, 
namely on the impact of language on judgments and simulation of affective content referring 
to targets with different group membership. Specifically, it would be interesting to explore in 
further studies whether using different languages (L1 and L2) would affect attitudes towards 
different social groups (in-group, out-group). Since L2 seemed to enhance differences 
between in-group and out-group members, at least when these were not measured explicitly, 
studies could be designed to implicitly assess (e.g., using IAT) whether attitudes toward out-
group (in-group) members would be more negative (positive) when using L2 (vs. L1).  
Moreover, it would be important to further examine whether our unexpected EMG 
findings (i.e., higher differences in simulating in-group and out-group sentences in L2; 
corrugator relaxation evoked by L2 out-group sentences) might be explained by a higher 
social distance or higher level construal induced by L2 and by out-group members, as 
suggested in the end of the chapter. Overall, it would be important to replicate our findings 
using a larger sample size to increase the power of the studies. Furthermore, with a larger 
sample, it would be possible to explore the impact of linguistic variables (e.g., age of 
acquisition, proficiency, and frequency of use) on the emotional experience of sentences 
describing in-group and out-group targets in L1 and L2. Finally, these studies should be 
accompanied by a direct measure of affective simulation (e.g., EMG) to ascertain that the 
findings can be explained by embodied mechanisms. 
The important role of communication in our social lives is undeniable. We live in a 
multicultural technological world where the use of a second language to communicate is an 
increasingly common phenomenon. Using a second language can shorten distances across 
people, space and time, unify nations, countries, groups and individuals. However, it can also 
enhance differences, promote distance and foster emotional desensitization. In either way, 
approaching us or tearing us apart, using a common language has, like no other mean, 
allowed human beings to navigate the world in ways that we thought would never be 
possible.  
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APPENDIX A (CHAPTER 3 – Experiments 1 and 2) 
 
Experiment 1: Word-Word Pairs 
 
Experiment1: Word Primes  
English Version  Portuguese Version 
negative neutral positive  negative:  neutral positive 
to enrage to hammer to kiss  enfurecer martelar beijar 
to cry to seat to smile  chorar sentar sorrir 
to hate to answer to entertain  odiar responder divertir 
to despise to hide to laugh  desprezar esconder rir 
to annoy to cook to love  aborrecer cozinhar amar 
to terrify to swim to enjoy  aterrorizar nadar apreciar 
Adapted from the Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW, Bradley & Lang, 1999) adaptation for European 
Portuguese (Soares, Comesaña, Pinheiro, Simões, & Frade, 2012). The norms include the original English word 
and the Portuguese translation, so L1 and L2 words sets were alike. 
 
Experiment1: Word Targets 
English Version  Portuguese Version 
negative  positive  negative  positive 
upset  beautiful  chateado  belo 
sad  kind  triste  amável 
selfish  joyful  egoísta  alegre 
sick  friendly  doente  amigável 
lonely  nice   solitário  simpático 
unhappy  happy  infeliz  feliz 
Selected from the same normative set (Soares et al., 2012).  
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Experiment 2: Word-Photo & Photo-Word Pairs 
 
Word Primes / Photo Targets 
 
Experiment 2: Word Primes 
English Version  Portuguese Version 
negative neutral positive  negative  neutral positive 
upset shy beautiful  chateado tímido belo 
sad odd kind  triste invulgar amável 
selfish moody joyful  egoísta temperamental alegre 
sick smooth friendly  doente suave amigável 
lonely quick nice   solitário rápido simpático 
unhappy astonished happy  infeliz espantado feliz 
 
Experiment 2: Photo Targets  
Female Targets  Male Targets 
negative positive  negative positive 
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Experiment 2: Word-Photo & Photo-Word Pairs 
 
Photo Primes / Word Targets 
 
Experiment 2: Photo Primes 
Female Targets  Male Targets 
negative neutral positive  negative neutral positive 
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Experiment 2: Word Targets 
English Version  Portuguese Version 
negative  positive  negative  positive 
upset  beautiful  chateado  belo 
sad  kind  triste  amável 
selfish  joyful  egoísta  alegre 
sick  friendly  doente  amigável 
lonely  nice   solitário  simpático 
unhappy  happy  infeliz  feliz 
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APPENDIX B (CHAPTER 4 – Experiments 1, 2 and 3) 
 
 Experiment 1: Presented Sentences 
 
Portuguese Version 
A Alice está a dar de comer a um gato vadio.  
O Daniel está a convidar pessoas para uma festa.  
A Diana está a fumar no parque.  
O David está a ler um livro sobre o Tibete.  
A Laura está a falar alto ao telemóvel.  
O Samuel está a explicar um trabalho a um colega de turma. 
A Catarina está a recolher dados no laboratório (sentence regarding the experimenter) 
 
 
English Version 
Alice is feeding a stray cat.  
Daniel is inviting guests to a party.  
Diana is smoking in the park.  
David is reading a book about Tibet.  
Laura is speaking loudly on the cell phone.  
Samuel is explaining an assignment to a classmate.  
Catarina is collecting data in the laboratory (sentence regarding the experimenter) 
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Experiment 2: Behavioural Identification Form (BIF) 
 
Portuguese Version 
 
Vamos de seguida apresentar-lhe uma nova tarefa. Por favor leia atentamente as instruções 
que se seguem. 
Todos os comportamentos podem ser descritos de várias formas. Por exemplo, uma pessoa 
poderá descrever um comportamento como “escrever um artigo”, enquanto que outra pessoa 
poderá descrever o mesmo comportamento enquanto “pressionar teclas no teclado”. Ainda, 
outra pessoa poderá descrevê-lo como “expressar pensamentos”. Este questionário foca-se 
nas suas preferências pessoais relativas a como um comportamento deve ser descrito. 
Seguidamente irá encontrar vários comportamentos listados. Depois de cada comportamento 
estarão duas formas através das quais o comportamento poderá ser identificado. Por exemplo:  
 
Ir à aula (o comportamento) 
a. sentar numa cadeira  
b. olhar para o professor 
 
A sua tarefa é escolher a opção, a ou b, que a seu ver melhor descreve o comportamento. 
Escolha simplesmente a opção que prefere (a ou b). Confirme que respondeu a todos os itens. 
Escolha apenas uma alternativa para cada par. Lembre-se, escolha a descrição que 
pessoalmente acredita ser a mais apropriada para cada par. 
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1. Fazer uma lista 
a. Ficar organizado  
b. Apontar coisas 
13. Votar 
a. Influenciar a eleição 
b. Preencher o boletim de voto  
 
2. Ler 
a. Percorrer linhas impressas  
b. Adquirir conhecimento 
 
14. Trepar a uma árvore 
a. Conseguir uma boa vista 
b. Agarrar-se a ramos  
 
3. Juntar-se ao exército 
a. Ajudar na defesa da Nação  
b. Alistar-se 
 
15. Preencher um teste de personalidade 
a. Responder a questões 
b. Revelar como és 
4. Lavar a roupa 
a. Remover odores da roupa  
b. Pôr a roupa na máquina  
 
16. Escovar os dentes 
a. Prevenir cáries dentárias 
b. Mover uma escova às voltas dentro da 
boca 
5. Apanhar uma maçã  
a. Arranjar algo para comer  
b. Colher uma maçã de um galho  
 
17. Fazer um teste  
a. Responder a questões 
b. Mostrar conhecimento 
6. Derrubar uma árvore 
a. Empunhar um machado 
b. Arranjar lenha 
18. Cumprimentar alguém 
a. Dizer olá  
b. Mostrar simpatia 
 
7. Medir um quarto para alcatifar 
a. Preparar-se para remodelar 
b. Usar uma fita métrica  
 
19. Resistir à tentação 
a. Dizer “não” 
b. Mostrar coragem moral 
 
8. Limpar a casa 
a. Mostrar asseio 
b. Aspirar o chão 
20. Comer 
a. Obter nutrientes  
b. Mastigar e engolir 
9. Pintar um quarto 
a. Dar pinceladas  
b. Fazer o quarto parecer novo  
 
21. Plantar um jardim  
a. Plantar sementes  
b. Obter vegetais frescos  
 
10. Pagar a renda 
a. Manter um sítio para viver  
b. Passar um cheque 
22. Viajar de carro  
a. Seguir um mapa  
b. Ver a paisagem  
 
11. Cuidar das plantas de casa 
a. Regar as plantas 
b. Tornar a divisão mais bonita 
23. Arranjar um buraco num dente 
a. Proteger os seus dentes 
b. Ir ao dentist 
 
12. Trancar a porta 
a. Pôr uma chave na fechadura  
b. Proteger a casa 
24. Falar com uma criança 
a. Ensinar algo a uma criança  
b. Usar palavras simples 
 
25. Tocar à campainha 
a. Mexer um dedo 
b. Ver se alguém está em casa 
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English Version 
 
Now we will present you a new task. Please read carefully the following instructions. 
Any behavior can be described in many ways. For example, one person might describe a 
behavior as "writing a paper," while another person might describe the same behavior as 
"pushing keys on the keyboard." Yet another person might describe it as "expressing 
thoughts." This questionnaire focuses on your personal preferences for how a number of 
different behaviors should be described. 
Below you will find several behaviors listed. After each behavior will be two different ways 
in which the behavior might be identified. For example: 
 
Attending a class (the behavior) 
a. sitting in a chair 
b. looking at a teacher 
I do not understand the meaning of some of these behaviors 
 
Your task is to choose the identification, a or b, that best describes the behavior for you. 
Simply chose the option you prefer (a or b). Be sure to respond to every item. Please mark 
only one alternative for each pair. Remember, choose the description that you personally 
believe is more appropriate for each pair.  
Note: If you do not understand the meaning of some of the behaviors (of the target behavior, 
of the behavior A or B, please choose “I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors.” 
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1. Making a list 
a. Getting organized  
b. Writing things down 
I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
10. Paying the rent 
a. Maintaining a place to live 
b. Writing a check 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
2. Reading 
a. Following lines of print  
b. Gaining knowledge 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
11. Caring for houseplants 
a. Watering plants  
b. Making the room look nice 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
3. Joining the Army 
a. Helping the Nation's defense 
b. Signing up 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
12. Locking a door 
a. Putting a key in the lock  
b. Securing the house 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
4. Washing clothes 
a. Removing odors from clothes 
b. Putting clothes into the machine 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
13. Voting 
a. Influencing the election 
b. Marking a ballot 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
5. Picking an apple 
a. Getting something to eat 
b. Pulling an apple off a branch 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
14. Climbing a tree 
a. Getting a good view 
b. Holding on to branches 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
6. Chopping down a tree 
a. Wielding an axe  
b. Getting firewood 
I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
15. Filling out a personality test 
a. Answering questions  
b. Revealing what you're like 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
7. Measuring a room for carpeting 
a. Getting ready to remodel 
b. Using a tape measure 
I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
16. Tooth brushing 
a. Preventing tooth decay 
b. Moving a brush around in one's mouth 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
8. Cleaning the house 
a. Showing one's cleanliness 
b. Vacuuming the floor 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
17. Taking a test 
a. Answering questions  
b. Showing one's knowledge 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
9. Painting a room 
a. Applying brush strokes  
b. Making the room look fresh 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
18. Greeting someone 
a. Saying hello  
b. Showing friendliness 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
19. Resisting temptation 
a. Saying "no"  
b. Showing moral courage 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
22. Traveling by car 
a. Following a map  
b. Seeing countryside 
I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
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20. Eating 
a. Getting nutrition 
b. Chewing and swallowing 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
23. Having a dental cavity filled 
a. Protecting your teeth 
b. Going to the dentist 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
21. Growing a garden 
a. Planting seeds  
b. Getting fresh vegetables 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of these 
behaviors 
24. Talking to a child 
a. Teaching a child something 
b. Using simple words 
 I do not understand the meaning of some of 
these behaviors 
25. Pushing a doorbell 
a. Moving a finger 
b. Seeing if someone's home 
I do not understand the meaning of some of these behaviors 
  
203 
 
Experiment 3: Shape Task 
Example of figures presented in the Shape Task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982) 
 
Which of the Figures (A or B) is more similar to the Target Figure? 
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Experiment 3: Dictator Game 
 
Portuguese Version 
 
Cenário 1 
Imagine-se na biblioteca. A única pessoa que lá está, o João, está a ler um livro. 
Agora imagine que você foi premiado com 10 livros novos. Você pode ficar com os livros 
para si ou pode dar alguns ao João.  
Por favor indique o número de livros que estaria disposto(a) a dar ao João.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Cenário 2 
Imagine-se à espera na fila para comprar café na cafetaria. O Pedro é a única pessoa na fila 
atrás de si para comprar café. 
Agora imagine que no momento que está prestes a comprar o café, o café acaba-se. O dono 
da cafetaria compensa-o (mas não ao Pedro) dando-lhe 20 senhas de café grátis. Você pode 
ficar com as senhas para si ou pode dar algumas ao Pedro.  
Por favor indique o número de senhas que estaria disposto(a) a dar ao Pedro. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
Cenário 3 
Imagine-se a fazer cópias de alguns artigos. O André, a única pessoa que lá está, acabou de 
chegar para tirar algumas cópias.  
Agora imagine que encontra 5 cartões de cópias para a fotocopiadora no chão. Você pode 
ficar com os cartões para si ou pode dar algumas ao André.  
Por favor indique o número de cartões que estaria disposto(a) a dar ao André. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
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Cenário 4 
Imagine que chegou ao teatro mas a peça foi cancelada. Outra pessoa que veio ver a mesma 
peça, a Matilde, está à procura de informação a esse respeito.  
Agora imagine que depois de se queixar aos directores, estes lhe oferecem (mas não à 
Matilde) 8 bilhetes para outras peças. Você pode ficar com todos os bilhetes para si ou 
pode dar alguns à Matilde.  
Por favor indique o número de bilhetes que estaria disposto(a) a dar à Matilde. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Cenário 5 
Imagine que está numa loja de música num momento de saldos. Imagine a Inês a entrar na 
loja.  
Agora imagine que o dono da loja lhe ofereceu 15 CD’s gratuitamente. A Inês chega logo a 
seguir mas já não sobravam nenhuns para dar. Você pode ficar com todos os CD’s para si ou 
pode dar alguns à Inês.  
Por favor indique o número de CD’s que estaria disposto(a) a dar à Inês. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
Cenário 6 
Imagine que chegou a uma padaria mas o empregado estava prestes a fechar a loja duas horas 
mais cedo devido a algum motivo. Outra pessoa, a Cláudia, está a aproximar-se da padaria.  
Agora imagine que o empregado da padaria lhe oferece 7 pães porque estava com pressa para 
fechar a loja. A Cláudia também queria comprar pão mas quando chega o empregado já tinha 
fechado a padaria. Você pode ficar com todos os pães para si ou pode dar alguns à Cláudia.  
Por favor indique o número de pães que estaria disposto(a) a dar à Cláudia. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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Cenário 7 
Agora vai ser-lhe apresentado outra situação. Por favor note que a outra pessoa nesta situação 
é a Catarina, a experimentadora deste estudo.  
Por favor tente imaginar a seguinte situação: 
 
Imagine que passa por uma campanha de telemóveis no Campus Universitário. A única 
pessoa que se está a aproximar do stand é a Catarina. 
Agora imagine que os patrocinadores lhe deram o último conjunto de 9 cartões para 
telemóvel, e que não havia mais para a Catarina. 
Você pode ficar com todos os cartões para si ou pode dar alguns à Catarina.  
Por favor indique o número de cartões que estaria disposto(a) a dar à Catarina. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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English Version 
 
Scenario 1 
Imagine yourself in the library. The only other person there, João, is reading a book. 
Now, imagine that you were awarded with 10 new books by the library. You can either keep 
the books to yourself or give some to João.  
Please indicate the number of books you would be willing to give to João.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Scenario 2 
Imagine yourself waiting in line to buy coffee in the cafeteria. The only other person, Pedro, 
is next in line after you to get coffee.  
Now imagine that in the moment you are about to get your coffee, the coffee runs out. The 
owner of the cafeteria compensates you (but not Pedro) with 20 free-coffee coupons. You 
can either keep the coupons to yourself or give some to Pedro.  
Please indicate the number of free-coffee coupons you would be willing to give to Pedro.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
 
Scenario 3 
Imagine yourself making copies of some articles. The only other person there, André, just 
arrived to make some copies.  
Now imagine that you find 5 copy cards for the copy machine on the floor. You can either 
keep the cards to yourself or give some to André. 
Please indicate the number of cards you would be willing to give to André.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
208 
 
Scenario 4 
Imagine that you arrive to a theatre, but the performance was cancelled. Another person who 
arrived to see the same play, Matilde, is looking for the information about it.  
Now imagine that after complaining to the directors, you (but not Matilde) were offered 8 
tickets to other performances. You can either keep all the tickets to yourself or give some 
to Matilde.  
Please indicate the number of tickets you would be willing to give to Matilde.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Scenario 5 
Imagine that you are at a music shop in a moment of sales. Imagine Inês who is entering the 
shop. 
Now imagine that the shop owned granted you with 15 CDs for free. In a minute Inês arrives 
but there were no free CDs left. You can either keep all the awarded CD’s to yourself or give 
some to Inês.  
Please indicate the number of CD’s you would be willing to give to Inês. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
 
Scenario 6 
Imagine that you arrived to a bakery but the employee was about to close two hours earlier 
due to some necessity. Another person, Cláudia, is approaching the bakery.  
Now imagine that the bakery employee offered you 7 breads because he was in a hurry to 
close the shop. Cláudia also wanted to buy some bread but when she arrived the employee 
had just closed the bakery. You can keep all the breads to yourself or give some to Cláudia.  
Please indicate the number of breads you would be willing to give to Cláudia. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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Scenario 7 
Now, you will be presented with another situation. Please note that the other person in this 
situation is Catarina, the experimenter of this study. Please try to imagine the following 
situation: 
 
Imagine that you came across a cell phone campaign by the University Campus. The only 
other person approaching the campaign stand is Catarina. 
Now, imagine that you received the last set of 9 cards for cell phone from the advertisers, 
and there weren't any cards left to Catarina. You can either keep all the cards to yourself or 
give some to Catarina.  
Please indicate the number of cards you would be willing to give to Catarina. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Appendix C (CHAPTER 5 - Pilot Study, Experiment 1 and 2) 
 
Pilot Study 
 
Nacionalidade: _______________________; Etnia: _______________________________ 
Idade: ______; Sexo: F         M     
 
A nossa vida social implica que todos pertençamos a um ou mais grupos. De entre estes 
vários grupos destacam-se os baseados na nacionalidade (e.g., portugueses, espanhóis, 
alemães, chineses, etc.), na sua etnia (e.g., caucasianos, africanos, asiáticos, ciganos), na sua 
raça (e.g., branco, negro, mestiço, etc.), sua religião (e.g., católicos, judeus, muçulmanos, 
hindus, etc.) entre outros.  
Muitas vezes com base em pistas simples, conseguimos categorizar os outros num 
determinado grupo, e isso constitui um importante mecanismo de poupança de recursos 
cognitivos quando formamos impressões, permitindo antecipar alguns dos seus 
comportamentos e facilitando a nossa interacção social. Em Psicologia Social é comum 
referir as pessoas que fazem parte do nosso grupo como sendo do nosso In-group. As 
pessoas que fazem parte de outro grupo que não o nosso pertencem a um Out-group. 
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
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1. Assinale com uma X no   da figura que melhor descreve a sua percepção de 
PROXIMIDADE com os seguintes grupos. Escolha uma ÚNICA opção (das 7 existentes) 
por cada grupo. 
 
Portugueses 
 
 
 
Caucasianos 
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Africanos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Asiáticos 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chineses 
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Indianos 
 
Ciganos 
 
Alemães 
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Brasileiros 
 
Europa do Leste 
 
Árabes 
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Espanhóis 
 
 
 
 
2. Escolha o número da escala (fazendo um círculo à sua volta) que melhor represente a 
sua opinião. Qual o seu grau de IDENTIFICAÇÂO em relação aos seguintes grupos? 
Outgroups Identificação em relação ao Out-group 
Portugueses Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Caucasianos Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Africanos Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Asiáticos Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Chineses Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Indianos Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Ciganos Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Alemães Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Brasileiros Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Europa do Leste Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Árabes Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
Espanhóis Pouca Identificação   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muita Identificação 
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3. Escolha o número da escala (fazendo um círculo à sua volta) que melhor represente a 
sua opinião. Qual a sua percepção de SEMELHANÇA em relação aos seguintes 
grupos? 
Outgroups Percepção de Semelhança em relação ao Out-group  
Portugueses Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Caucasianos Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Africanos Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Asiáticos Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Chineses Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Indianos Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Ciganos Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Alemães Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Brasileiros Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Europa do Leste Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Árabes Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
Espanhóis Muito Diferente   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Semelhante 
 
4. Escolha o número da escala (fazendo um círculo à sua volta) que melhor represente a 
sua opinião. Qual a sua percepção de PERTENÇA em relação aos seguintes grupos 
Outgroups Percepção de Pertença em relação ao Out-group 
Portugueses Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Caucasianos Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Africanos Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Asiáticos Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Chineses Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Indianos Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Ciganos Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Alemães Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Brasileiros Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Europa do Leste Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Árabes Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
Espanhóis Nenhuma Pertença   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Completa  Pertença 
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5. Escolha o número da escala (fazendo um círculo à sua volta) que melhor represente a 
sua opinião. Qual a sua ATITUDE em relação aos seguintes grupos? 
Outgroups Atitude em relação ao Out-group 
Portugueses Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Caucasianos Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Africanos Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Asiáticos Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Chineses Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Indianos Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Ciganos Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Alemães Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Brasileiros Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Europa do Leste Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Árabes Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
Espanhóis Muito Negativa   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Muito Positiva 
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Experiments 1 and 2: Presented Sentences 
 
Portuguese Stimuli  English Stimuli 
O João está a Sorrir  João is Smiling 
O João está Carrancudo  João is Frowning 
O João está a Chorar   João is Crying 
O Sandro está a Sorrir   Sandro is Smiling 
O Sandro está Carrancudo  Sandro is Frowning 
O Sandro está a Chorar  Sandro is Crying 
A Ana está a Sorrir   Ana is Smiling 
A Ana está Carrancuda   Ana is Frowning 
A Ana está a Chorar   Ana is Crying 
A Salomé está a Sorrir   Salomé is Smiling 
A Salomé está Carrancuda   Salomé is Frowning 
A Salomé está a Chorar  Salomé is Crying 
O João está Feliz   João is Happy 
O João está Zangado    João is Angry 
O João está Triste   João is Sad 
O Sandro está Feliz   Sandro is Happy 
O Sandro está Zangado   Sandro is Angry 
O Sandro está Triste   Sandro is Sad 
A Ana está Feliz   Ana is Happy 
A Ana está Zangada   Ana is Angry 
A Ana está Triste   Ana is Sad 
A Salomé está Feliz   Salomé is Happy 
A Salomé está Zangada   Salomé is Angry 
A Salomé está Triste  Salomé is Sad 
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